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Abstract 
Traditionally (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 1995, Levinson 2000, Jackendoff 2002, Chomsky 
2005a), linguistic expressions have meaning in virtue of having linguistic semantic 
properties. It is often claimed that linguistic semantics is functionally distinct from but 
related to the semantics of thought. In particular, linguistic semantics is assumed to be 
deterministically (necessarily and always) decoded in utterance interpretation and fed, 
as a basic premise, to pragmatic processing. Linguistic semantics is supposed to aid (i.e. 
constrain) utterance interpretation insofar as it is at least ‘widely’ shared among speech 
community members (Carston 2002). However, it has been suggested that linguistic 
semantics is problematic (e.g. Burton-Roberts 2005, Gibbs 2002, Recanati 2005).     
 This thesis argues that the notion of linguistic semantics, as well as the process 
of deterministic decoding of such content, is implausible and explores the consequences 
of this claim for a theory of meaning and utterance interpretation.  
In the first part, I raise questions about the nature of semantics (externalism or 
internalism) as well as its structure (atomism, molecularism or holism). In line with the 
Representational Hypothesis (e.g. Burton-Roberts 2012), I maintain that thought is the 
only locus of semantics and that meaning is not a property of linguistic expressions, but 
a cognitive relation between an uttered word and semantics (of thought). I argue that 
whereas semantic content is holistic, meaning (in the sense of Burton-Roberts) is locally 
– i.e. contextually – constrained to a degree which, all things being equal, allows for 
successful communication. I argue that utterance interpretation is a wholly pragmatic 
inferential process, immediately constrained by a personal (i.e. holistic) inference about 
the communicative intention of a particular speaker in a particular conversational 
context. I claim that such a process of utterance interpretation can be implemented in 
terms of Hintzman’s (1986) multiple-trace theory of memory.  
 In the second part, I illustrate my argument by an analysis of the relation 
between the word if and Material Implication (MI). I show that the claim (e.g. Grice 
1989, Noh 2000) that if semantically encodes MI cannot be maintained. I argue that the 
application of MI has to be pragmatically determined and, therefore, when MI applies, it 
does so at the level of (holistic) thought – not at the (anyway problematic) linguistic 
semantic level. I explain the interpretation of conditionals in terms of Horton & Gerrig’s 
(2005) extension of a multiple-trace theory of memory into the study of common 
ground. I also discuss the implications of a wholly pragmatic account of utterance 
interpretation for the distinction between explicit and implicit communication.  
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Introduction 
 
Twenty men crossing a bridge, 
Into a village, 
Are twenty men crossing twenty bridges, 
Into twenty villages, 
Or one man 
Crossing a single bridge into a village. 
 
This is old song 
That will not declare itself . . . 
 
Twenty men crossing a bridge, 
Into a village, 
Are 
Twenty men crossing a bridge 
Into a village. 
 
That will not declare itself 
Yet is certain as meaning . . . 
 
The boots of the men clump 
On the boards of the bridge. 
The first white wall of the village 
Rises through fruit-trees. 
Of what was it I was thinking? 
So the meaning escapes. 
 
The first white wall of the village... 
The fruit-trees... 
 
(Wallace Stevens ‘Metaphors of a Magnifico’) 
 
 
Traditionally (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 1995, Levinson 2000, Jackendoff 2002, Chomsky 
2005a), linguistic expressions have meaning in virtue of having specifically linguistic 
semantic properties. It is often claimed that linguistic semantics is functionally distinct 
from but related to the semantics of thought. In particular, linguistic semantics is 
assumed to be deterministically (necessarily and always) decoded/accessed in utterance 
interpretation and fed, as a basic premise, to pragmatic processing. Linguistic semantics 
is supposed to aid (i.e. constrain) utterance interpretation insofar as it is at least ‘widely’ 
shared among speech community members (Carston 2002).  
 In this thesis, I argue that the notion of linguistic semantics, as well as the 
process of deterministic decoding of such content, is implausible and explore the 
consequences of this claim for a theory of meaning and utterance interpretation. The 
arguments put forward in this thesis apply to any theory of meaning which assumes 
some notion of linguistic semantics – in principle, any theory which places itself within 
the Saussurean tradition. However, I will focus my attention on Chomsky’s theory and 
its extension (as argued by in Sperber & Wilson 1995, Carston 2002) in Relevance 
Theory. This is because the theoretical tension I am interested in – i.e. the tension 
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between the assumption that there is linguistic semantics, on the one hand, and 
individualism about mental content, on the other – is clearly discernible in both 
Chomsky (e.g. 2000a) and Relevance Theory (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 1995, Carston 
2002).  
As for individualism, Chomsky (2000a: 37) argues that there is nothing in the 
mind-external world such that it could correspond to ‘the properties of the intricate 
modes of reference that a […] name encapsulates’. What we ever talk about is the world 
as seen through internalist and individualistic perspectives made available by our minds. 
Indeed, Chomsky (e.g. 2000a: 137) argues that the study of natural language 
meaning/semantics should be tantamount to the study of (individualistic) beliefs 
mediating between cognisers and things in the world. In other words, for Chomsky, 
natural language meaning/semantics is radically individualistic.   
However, Chomsky’s radical individualism is in tension with his double-
interface view of language, itself a legacy of Saussure’s notion of the linguistic sign. 
For Saussure and for Chomsky, the linguistic sign is partly constituted by what it is a 
sign of – i.e. a signifier, a concept (Burton-Roberts & Poole 2006b). In this tradition, 
which I refer to as the Saussurean-Chomskyan tradition (after Burton-Roberts 2007), 
linguistic expressions are double-interface objects which have sound properties and 
meaning properties as their constitutive parts. In Chomsky’s tradition in particular, 
linguistic expressions are <PHON, SEM> pairs, i.e. double-interface syntactic objects 
constituted by phonological and semantic properties (Burton-Roberts 2011). Following 
from this double-interface idea is the view that words, and linguistic expressions in 
general, have meaning in virtue of constitutively encoding specifically linguistic, 
context-invariant and stable semantic properties (i.e. linguistic semantics). Whereas 
Chomsky’s radical individualism about natural language meaning/semantics suggests 
that there is no linguistic semantics, it is precisely his double-interface (<PHON, SEM>) 
view of linguistic expressions which invokes this notion.   
It is usually claimed that linguistic semantics is distinct from but ‘related’ to the 
semantics of thought (e.g. Chomsky 2005a, Carston 2002). Linguistic semantics is 
assumed to be deterministically decoded by the language module and fed, as a basic 
premise, to pragmatic processes of utterance interpretation. Linguistic semantics is 
supposed to aid (i.e. constrain) utterance interpretation insofar as it is at least ‘widely’ 
shared among members of a given speech community (Carston 2002). However, it has 
been suggested that linguistic semantics is a problematic notion (e.g. Burton-Roberts 
2005, Gibbs 2002, Recanati 2005).      
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 The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I presents theoretical arguments against 
the notion of linguistic semantics and for a radically pragmatic (holistic) model of 
utterance interpretation. It consists of three chapters: chapter 1 (‘The externalist-
internalist debate’), chapter 2 (‘The locus of semantics and the decoding-inferring 
distinction’) and chapter 3 (‘Unleashing holism’). Part II looks at whether the arguments 
made in Part I can and should be applied to linguistic analysis – in particular, to the 
analysis of the meaning of the word if. Part II consists of two chapters: chapter 4 (‘Does 
if encode Material Implication?’) and chapter 5 (‘Holistic and individualistic conditions 
on interpretation’).  
In chapter 1, I critically engage with Fodor’s (e.g. 2008) externalist position on 
the nature of semantics and seek to justify the adoption of internalism (e.g. Chomsky 
2000a). I argue that Fodor’s externalism about semantic content is untenable as it 
presupposes internalist content in the guise of mind-dependence thesis. Relatedly, I 
argue that Fodor’s lexical-conceptual isomorphism, which is the assumption that 
‘atomic’ concepts equal word meanings, is problematic in the light of cross-linguistic 
evidence. I then identify four aspects of Chomsky’s internalism that I endorse: (a) 
innateness of concepts, (b) internal compositionality of a word’s semantics, (c) its 
context-variability and (d) its radically individualistic nature. However, I argue that the 
tension between the consequences of Chomsky’s internalist-individualistic assumptions 
(from which it follows that there is no linguistic semantics) and his double-interface 
view of language (from which it follows that there is linguistic semantics) needs to be 
resolved.  
Chapter 2 argues for the resolution of the tension between internalism 
individualism, on the one hand, and the assumption that linguistic semantics is 
necessary to account for meaning in language, on the other, in favour of internalism-
individualism. I seek to show that linguistic semantics is an implausible and 
unnecessary notion. In particular, I examine the notion of linguistic semantics (and 
lexical concept) in Relevance Theory, a theory argued to be an extension of Chomsky’s 
paradigm (Sperber & Wilson 1995, Carston 2002). After discussing some problems 
with the nature and acquisition of linguistic semantics, I argue that the posited process 
of deterministic decoding of such content is redundant in cases of loose use, cases of so-
called concept narrowing and where the communicated concept is the same as the 
assumed lexical concept. I argue that there is no linguistic semantics and that utterance 
interpretation is a wholly pragmatic inferential process, immediately constrained by a 
personal (i.e. holistic) inference about the communicative intention of the speaker in a 
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given conversational context. I defend my view by dismissing two potential criticisms: 
(a) If words do not have meaning in virtue of encoding linguistic semantics, how do 
they mean?; (b) If there is no linguistic semantics constraining word use, how do we 
ever communicate successfully? I argue that the Representational Hypothesis’ (e.g. 
Burton-Roberts 2012) definition of meaning-as-relation invalidates criticism (a) and 
that Hintzman’s (1986) multiple-trace theory of memory and information retrieval 
invalidates (b).   
Chapter 3 looks at the philosophical legacy in thinking about linguistic 
semantics (in particular, in Relevance Theory’s notion of linguistic semantics). I argue 
that all philosophical notions of shared content which have been posited as linguistic 
semantics (i.e. causal-externalist wide content, social-externalist wide content and non-
truth-theoretic narrow content) are problematic and that holism is the only plausible 
thesis about mental content. I defend holism against three criticisms made by its 
opponents (e.g. Fodor & Lepore 1992) – that holism does not allow for mental 
generalisations (and thus for a theory of the human mind), that holism does not offer an 
accurate account of compositionality, and that it gives rise to the sense-reference 
problem. I endorse Bilgrami’s (1992) holistic thesis about the unity and locality of 
content and discuss how, in the light of Bilgrami’s thesis and the Representational 
Hypothesis (e.g. Burton-Roberts 2012), we can and should distinguish between a 
domain of concepts and a domain of associations between semiotic labels and concepts. 
Finally, I argue that whereas semantic content is holistic, meaning (in the sense of 
Burton-Roberts) is locally – i.e. contextually – constrained to a degree which, all things 
being equal, allows for successful communication. 
In part II, I illustrate my argument by an analysis of the relation between the 
word if and the logical functor of material implication (MI). The reason for looking at 
this particular word is its significance to the distinction between deterministically 
decoded linguistic semantics and pragmatically inferred semantics of thought. While the 
claim that if semantically encodes MI has been controversial in philosophy, pragmatic 
explanations of the deviations in the interpretation of conditionals from the supposedly 
encoded MI (e.g. Grice 1989) may be thought of as one of the most successful 
achievements of pragmatic theory.   
 However, in chapter 4, I argue that the claim (e.g. Grice 1989, Noh 2000) that if 
semantically encodes MI cannot be maintained even when supported by pragmatic 
explanation. I show that the problem of pragmatic intrusion into encoded semantics 
arises for Relevance Theory (Carston 2002, Noh 2000), as it did for Grice (1989). I 
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argue that the application of MI has to be pragmatically determined and, therefore, 
when MI applies, it does so at the level of (holistic) thought – not at the (anyway 
problematic) linguistic semantic level.  
 In chapter 5, I show how the interpretation of conditionals can be explained in 
terms of a wholly pragmatic inferential process. This interpretational process is cashed 
out in terms of Horton & Gerrig’s (2005) extension of a multiple-trace theory of 
memory (e.g. Hintzman 1986) into the study of conversational common ground. I argue 
that once Horton & Gerrig’s argument – that interlocutor-specific information places 
immediate constraints on utterance interpretation – is acknowledged, it is possible to 
explain the distinction between the weak (i.e. modelled by MI) and the strong (i.e. 
modelled by equivalence) interpretations of conditionals. I distinguish between basic 
uses of conditionals (where if signals a relation between two propositional objects p and 
q) and extended uses of conditionals (where if signals a relation between a proposition 
and an utterance (or speech act)). I explain why the wholly pragmatic (holistic) analysis 
I propose is more adequate to handle variation found in the interpretation of basic and 
extended uses than previous approaches (e.g. Noh (2000), Sweetser (1990), Smith & 
Smith (1988)). Finally, I discuss the implications of a wholly pragmatic approach to 
utterance interpretation for the distinction between explicit and implicit communication.  
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Chapter 1. The externalist-internalist debate 
 
1.0 Introduction 
One of the fundamental questions of semantic theory is how meaning in language 
arises. Crucial to this question is the distinction between externalism and internalism 
about mental/semantic content: for internalists (e.g. Chomsky 2000a, 2003), semantic 
content is to be defined in terms of purely mind-internal states and relations, whereas 
for externalists (e.g. Fodor 1998, 2008), semantic content is to be defined in terms of the 
relation between the mind and the mind-external reality. Differences aside, a general 
assumption shared by both externalist and internalist accounts of semantic content is 
that meaning in language arises in virtue of (i) the semantics of thought, and (ii) some 
relation between words and concepts, i.e. constituents of thought. Regarding (i), this 
chapter critically engages with Fodor’s (e.g. 2008) externalist position on the nature of 
semantics and, in doing so, seeks to justify internalism (e.g. Chomsky 2000a). As for 
(ii), the chapter provides arguments against Fodor’s (ibid.) lexical-conceptual  
isomorphism (i.e. conceptual atomism) and in favour of a compositional account of 
conceptual correlates of words (i.e. concepts which correspond to words in a language).    
In the first section, I look at Fodor’s (1998, 2008) notion of semantic content. I 
argue that Fodor’s referentialism about semantic content is untenable for two reasons. 
First, it presupposes internalist content in the guise of mind-dependent properties that 
our minds attribute to mind-external entities. Furthermore, it is these properties that 
compose and not, as Fodor argues, reference. Relatedly, Fodor’s ‘lexical-conceptual 
isomorphism’ (i.e. the assumption that ‘atomic’ concepts just are word meanings) raises 
problems. First, it incorrectly predicts one-to-one mapping between words and concepts. 
Second, referential equivalents like English shallow and French peu profond indicate 
that at least some ‘atomic’ concepts have compositional content. The isomorphism is 
also incompatible with Fodor’s view that thought is not necessarily language-dependent. 
In the context of the externalist-internalist debate about the nature of semantic content, 
the problems with Fodor’s referentialism strongly tip the balance in favour of 
internalism – the subject of section 1.2.  
In the second section, I provide an overview of Chomsky’s internalism. This 
includes a brief introduction to the architecture of Chomsky’s Faculty of Language and, 
following from that, his views on the nature of semantic content. Here I begin to 
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identify some tensions in Chomsky’s thinking; whereas for Chomsky concepts are 
innate and invariant across the species, natural language (e.g. English, Polish, Swahili) 
semantics, which is ‘related to’ or perhaps ‘identical with’ innate conceptual resources, 
is variable across contexts and individuals and hence not subject to Chomsky’s 
principled inquiry into language. Finally, I discuss a tension between Chomsky’s views 
on natural language semantics and a view of natural language semantics which follows 
from his double-interface legacy. This is followed by a conclusion.   
1.1 Fodor’s externalism and the Language of Thought hypothesis   
On the Language of Thought (LOT) hypothesis, thinking is computation, i.e. it is a 
causal chain of operations on mental symbols or concepts. Fodor’s LOT hypothesis 
specifically is a version of a Representational Theory of Mind, a theory that aims to 
explain how minds represent things. The Representational Theory of Mind, in other 
words, is a theory concerned with how it is possible that we think about what we think 
about – that is, often things in the mind-external world.    
Before I discuss Fodor’s account, let me briefly point out that there are several 
important assumptions underlying his referentialism. The first of these is that 
conceptual correlates of words are atomic; that is, they are not compositionally 
constituted.
1
 Fodor’s atomicity follows straightforwardly from his rejection of the 
analytic-synthetic distinction (Fodor 1998: 70-72, 2007: 3). But consider (1) and (2) 
below (from Rey 2010). 
(1) People who run move their bodies. 
(2) People who run damage their bodies. 
By definition, analytic sentences are those whose truth value is known solely in virtue 
of knowing the meaning/semantics of the expressions they are composed by. For 
example, because the verb run is definable in terms of the verb move (i.e. run entails 
move)
2
, (1) is known to be true by anyone who knows the meaning/semantics of the 
expression run. In contrast, the truth value of a synthetic sentence is not known simply 
by knowing the meaning/semantics of expressions it is composed by, but requires 
reference to the mind-external world; in order to know the truth value of a synthetic 
                                                          
1
 For Fodor, an atomic concept is just any concept that corresponds to some word, even if it might 
intuitively seem that the meaning of the relevant word is compositional. 
2
 Later in this chapter, I argue that entailment does not actually hold between words but between 
concepts.  
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sentence, we need to go beyond logic and consult our so-called encyclopaedic 
knowledge (we need to know what the world is like). For example, the truth value of (2) 
cannot be determined by looking at the meanings/semantics of run and damage because 
there is no relation of entailment between these two expressions. Put differently, 
running is not definable in terms of damaging – running may but does not have to 
damage one’s body. The idea behind the analytic-synthetic distinction is that the 
meanings/semantics of expressions can be defined compositionally in terms of the 
expression’s logical, but not synthetic, relations with other expressions. Such an 
approach to meaning/semantics has been termed MEANING MOLECULARISM (e.g. Lepore 
1999, Pagin 2006). 
An example often rehearsed in the context of molecularist approaches to word 
meaning/semantics is the word bachelor. The molecularist assumption is that the word 
bachelor can be defined in terms of adult, male, single and human. This is to say that 
the meaning/semantics of the word bachelor is defined in terms of (i.e. is 
compositionally constituted by/contains) the concepts ADULT, MALE, SINGLE and 
HUMAN or that the word bachelor semantically licences inferences to these concepts 
and no others.
3
 
Despite being quite intuitive, the analytic-synthetic distinction has come under 
severe criticism. For example, Fodor (1998: 107) concedes that analytic relations, if 
there were any, could in principle provide a satisfactory account of word 
meaning/conceptual content. He argues, however, that no version of molecularism can 
be right. Fodor agrees with Quine (1951) that since no one has been able to draw a 
serious distinction between conceptual connections that are analytic (i.e. those which 
enter into content-constitutive relation with a concept) and those that are not, there is no 
such distinction.
4
 In definitional terms, this means that word meanings/semantics cannot 
be construed as definitions which we all share; in inferential terms, this means that there 
are no inferences which a word necessarily and sufficiently gives rise to. Furthermore, 
Fodor’s rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction means that any compositional 
account of the semantics of conceptual correlates of words will inevitably be holistic, 
i.e. psychological and individualistic. This would be in conflict with Fodor’s second 
assumption.    
                                                          
3
 Laurence & Margolis (1999) make a distinction
 
between containment and inferential molecular 
accounts.
 
I assume that the fact that a word licences particular inferences arises because it is used to 
represent particular conceptual structures, i.e. compositionally complex concepts. Inferential relations and 
conceptual containment are thus two sides of the same coin. 
 
4
 Lahav (1989) provides arguments against molecularism by discussing adjective-noun expressions.  
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The second assumption is actually a constraint that Fodor sets for his theory. 
That is, Fodor holds that a theory of concepts should be able to account for content 
identity amongst the species. In Fodor’s (e.g. 1998: 28, 34) terms, his theory should 
meet the publicity constraint on concepts, i.e. a constraint by which a theory of concepts 
should predict that we all share types of the same primitive concepts. This is necessary 
because, for Fodor, only content identity can account for intentional generalisations 
across individuals and across slices of time in the same individual. Such intentional 
generalisations are, in turn, assumed to be necessary to explain rational behaviour.
5
  
The third of Fodor’s assumptions is that we need referential semantics to 
account for the fact that we often think and therefore talk about the mind-external 
world: ‘What minds do is think about things’ (Fodor 2008: 8, italics original). This 
assumption is grounded in Fodor’s (Fodor 2008: 16 fn 29) rejection of solipsism6. 
Solipsism is wrong, Fodor argues, because (among other things) it seems to deny that at 
least some of the time we do think about the world (e.g. 2007: 7). Fodor’s referential 
semantics, which is a theory of co-variances between symbols in the mind and things in 
the world, is supposed to connect concepts and thus words directly to the world. It will 
shortly become clear that whereas I share with Fodor the intuition that very often we 
think and talk about the mind-external word, I do not agree that this intuition can be 
explained in terms of referential semantics. 
As mentioned, Fodor is concerned with the question of how it is possible to 
think about the mind-external world. The two big questions that Fodor (1998, 2008) 
expects his theory to answer are: (a) in what sense do concepts hook up/refer to things 
out there in the world?, and (b) in virtue of what do atomic concepts compose to form 
complex concepts? In simple terms, Fodor asks what it is about the content of a concept 
like CAT that it hooks up to cats in the mind-external world, and what it is about the 
concept CAT that it can combine with another atomic concept like BLACK to form the 
complex concept BLACK CAT.  
Before I engage with Fodor’s recent answers to these questions, let me briefly 
consider one issue surrounding the development of Fodorian thinking on the ontology 
of concepts.  
                                                          
5
 I return to this point in chapter 3. 
6
 There are two kinds of solipsism: methodological and ontological. Methodological solipsism holds that 
mental states and processes are insensitive to the mind-external environment and thus to properties such 
as truth and reference (e.g. Fodor 1980). Thus, for a methodological solipsist it does not matter whether 
there exists anything in the mind-external world. Ontological solipsism is a much stronger thesis which 
holds that nothing exists except one’s own mind. Fodor (2008) rejects both kinds of solipsism.   
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Quote 1: […] it used to seem to me that atomism about concepts means that 
DOORKNOB is innate. But now I think that you can trade a certain amount of 
innateness for a certain amount of mind-dependence. Being a doorknob is just: 
striking our kinds of minds the way that doorknobs do. So, what you need to 
acquire the concept DOORKNOB “from experience” is just: the kind of mind 
that experience causes to be struck that way by doorknobs. The price of making 
this trade of innateness for mind-dependence is, however, a touch of Wotan's 
problem. It turns out that much of what we find in the world is indeed “only 
ourselves”. It turns out, in lots of cases, that we make things be of a kind by 
being disposed to take them to be of a kind. (Fodor 1998: 162, my emphasis in 
bold) 
 
One interesting thing about this quote is the evident importance for Fodor of conceptual 
atomism and, relatedly, of lexical-conceptual isomorphism, which is the claim that 
atomic concepts are correlates of words. Fodor’s atomicity claim, which, as mentioned, 
follows from his rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, has withstood Fodor’s 
radical transition from concept innateness to concept acquisition. It is important now to 
look more closely at what possibly motivated Fodor’s transition to concept acquisition 
and whether this move was advantageous and genuine. I turn to these questions now. 
We have seen that it is Fodor’s rejection of compositional semantics for 
conceptual correlates of words that leads him to atomism. For Fodor (2008: 66-67), 
primitive concepts are, roughly, correlates of words: hence concepts like CAT, BLACK, 
DOORKNOB or CARBURETTOR are not decomposable, he argues. 
Now, there are two ways in which one may, in principle, develop the atomicity 
story. It may be claimed that atomicity is tantamount to innateness, i.e. that all atomic 
concepts, including CARBURETTOR and BUREAUCRAT, are innate. In fact, as 
Quote 1 above shows, Fodor used to be committed to such a view. But this way of 
thinking is highly controversial. CARBURETTOR and BUREAUCRAT are not even 
natural kind concepts – it is difficult to think that one could have an atomic concept 
CARBURETTOR prior to some experience with carburettors.  
Note that whereas it is controversial to hold that atomic concepts like 
CARBURETTOR are innate, it seems plausible to assume that concepts like 
CARBURETTOR are innate as long as they are compositionally constituted. In other 
words, there is no problem with BUREAUCRAT and CARBURETTOR being innate in 
virtue of being composed by innately specified primitive content. But, as we have seen, 
Fodor rejects compositional content for conceptual correlates of words. 
More recently, however, Fodor (2008) has claimed that atomic concepts, which 
he takes to correlate with words, are not innate, but acquired in experience. More 
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specifically, concepts get their ‘content’ referentially, by locking onto properties which 
things in the mind-external world possess.  
1.1.1 Referential content and Fodor’s mind-dependence thesis  
For Fodor (1998, 2008), mental states are representational because they carry 
information about things in the world. This representational relation is established via 
referential semantics; semantic ‘content’ of the so-called atomic concepts is actually 
constituted by the relation concepts have to what they refer to (‘lock to’) in the mind-
external world. For example, the concept CAT (and the word cat) gets its semantic 
‘content’ from its relation to cats in the mind-external world. More specifically, 
semantic ‘content’ is ‘individuated’ via the relation a concept has to the properties 
things in the world possess. It is in this sense that Fodor can be said to espouse an 
externalist semantics.  
It is important to emphasise, then, that for Fodor semantic ‘content’ is not an 
internal property of concepts. It is a relation. The ‘content’ is constituted by (i.e. is) the 
relation between the concept and what it applies to in the mind-external world – 
semantic ‘content’ such construed consists in the referential relation. In that sense (i.e. 
as a relation between a concept and something other than a concept) ‘content’ is actually 
external to the concept. This gives rise to the question of whether there is anything in 
Fodor’s theory that constrains the ‘content’-constitutive relation in a way which makes 
a concept like CAT get its ‘content’ from a relation to cats and not any other external 
objects.  
Indeed, as observed by Burton-Roberts (ms), if a structured concept like 
BLACK CAT refers to black cats it does so non-arbitrarily. I assume (with Burton-
Roberts) that Fodor would agree that the relation is non-arbitrary because of the 
semantic content of BLACK CAT. This semantic content is compositional, i.e. 
compositionally derived from its constituent concepts (and thus internally). In respect of 
this example, it seems reasonable to say that the referential value of the concept 
(assuming concepts have referential value) is determined by its internal compositional 
content. This implies a distinction between conceptual content and reference.  
If concepts do actually lock onto things in the world, we want to say that they do 
so non-arbitrarily – in other words, that there is something about the concept itself 
(some property of the concept, which I am calling its internal content) that determines 
that it locks onto the things it does lock onto and not anything else. The question is then: 
should we align ‘semantics’ with (internal) content or with (external) reference? Having 
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so distinguished between content and reference, it seems reasonable to say that content 
is metaphysically prior to and a precondition for reference. Insofar as ‘semantics’ is 
referential at all, such semanticity derives from, is parasitic on, internal conceptual 
content. It is arguable, then, that it is internal content that is fundamentally ‘semantic’.   
Fodor’s treatment of structured concepts is an argument for such non-referential 
semantics – it is the internal compositional content of BLACK CAT that determines its 
referent. And if that is true for phrases (‘phrasal concepts’), the same should obtain for 
words (atomic concepts). Yet, for Fodor, when it comes to primitive concepts such as 
BLACK and CAT themselves, ‘content’ is determined – indeed consists in – the 
external relation of a concept to a referent. For Fodor, the ‘content’ of CAT or BLACK 
resides in a relation to mind-external things/properties – their semantics is referential 
and non-compositional. Hence, Fodor has no means of saying how, for example, 
BLACK non-arbitrarily locks onto black things. Why shouldn’t the concepts RED, 
ROUND or LATE lock onto black things? The question is: what is it about any 
particular concept in and of itself that makes it lock onto the things it does lock onto and 
not other things? The problem is that if primitive concepts are to be in a non-arbitrary 
relation to what they ‘lock to’, then they must have logically prior internal content 
independent of, but determinative of, the ‘locking’ relation just like complex concepts.   
However, an objection to that line of reasoning might go as follows. Fodor does 
not hold that BLACK CAT refers to black cats in virtue of some property internal to it. 
If reference composes, as it does for Fodor (2007: 18), then it is not any internal 
property of a concept that composes. Semantic ‘content’ for Fodor is, we remember, not 
a property of concepts but a relation to what the concept locks to. For Fodor, BLACK 
CAT refers to black cats in virtue of the referential content of its constituent concepts. 
In other words, BLACK CAT refers to black cats because BLACK refers to black 
things and CAT refers to cats. But notice that even if such an account of 
compositionality can be taken to explain why complex concepts refer to what they do, it 
cannot explain why atomic concepts refer to what they refer to. Figure 1.1 illustrates 
this point. 
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Figure 1.1: Fodor’s circularity problem 
 
For Fodor, the referential ‘content’ of CAT cannot determine its reference (the bottom 
arrow) because it is the referential relation that determines – in fact, is – the ‘content’ 
(the top arrow); it is in virtue of the referential relation that a concept gets the content 
that it does. Thus, to say that CAT refers to cats in virtue of its referential content would 
simply be circular. Unless there is something which is internal to atomic concepts and 
which determines the referential relation, the referential relation just is arbitrary and not 
explained.   
Clearly, Fodor would not welcome this conclusion, even though it would seem 
to follow from a referential account of conceptual content. This is because of the 
previously mentioned requirement that Fodor sets for his theory – the constraint that a 
theory of concepts should be able to explain content identity amongst the species (1998: 
30-34). Yet, if content is acquired in experience, then its identity cannot be guaranteed. 
Concept acquisition can proceed along different experiential paths for different 
individuals, unless there is some internal constraint on the content-constitutive locking 
relation. So how does Fodor resolve this problem? 
According to Fodor, we acquire concepts like CAT and DOORKNOB from 
experiences with typical cats and doorknobs, not anything else; clearly then, for Fodor, 
the relation between concepts and referents is non-arbitrary. So what other than internal 
compositional content can determine the locking relation? Consider Quote 1 again, 
repeated here for convenience. 
Quote 1: […] it used to seem to me that atomism about concepts means that 
DOORKNOB is innate. But now I think that you can trade a certain amount 
of innateness for a certain amount of mind-dependence. Being a doorknob is 
just: striking our kinds of minds the way that doorknobs do. So, what you need 
to acquire the concept DOORKNOB “from experience” is just: the kind of mind 
that experience causes to be struck that way by doorknobs. The price of making 
this trade of innateness for mind-dependence is, however, a touch of Wotan's 
problem. It turns out that much of what we find in the world is indeed “only 
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ourselves”. It turns out, in lots of cases, that we make things be of a kind by 
being disposed to take them to be of a kind. (Fodor 1998: 162, my emphasis in 
bold) 
 
For Fodor (see also 1998: 148-150), the concept DOORKNOB is not innate, just mind-
dependent – it is possible to acquire it because the properties we ascribe to doorknobs 
are in the mind prior to concept acquisition. Fodor posits such mind-dependent 
properties in order to ‘naturalise’ reference; if the property of being a doorknob is mind-
dependent, then, Fodor (1998: 147) argues, laws about doorknobs are really laws about 
our kinds of mind. These mind-dependent properties are what constrains concept 
acquisition and what makes the concept-referent relation non-arbitrary.
7
 I will refer to 
this as Fodor’s ‘mind-dependence thesis’.  
There are two related issues here. First, the mind-dependence thesis allows that 
the external relation of a concept to a thing is internally determined – as in the account 
of structured concepts like BLACK CAT discussed above. In the light of Fodor’s 
purported externalism about conceptual content, his mind-dependence thesis is at least 
surprising. I maintain that by exchanging innateness for mind-dependence Fodor is just 
reinstating in other words what he claims to reject – namely, that internal content 
determines the referential relation. In short, Fodor’s mind-dependence thesis arguably 
amounts to the innateness of internal (i.e. non-relational/non-referential) conceptual 
content.  
Furthermore, notice that the notion of reference that Fodor develops is not 
reference as traditionally understood. Canonically, for reference to occur there needs to 
be something to refer to. For Fodor, however, the properties that concepts refer (or lock) 
                                                          
7 Fodor (2007: 142) agrees with Margolis that beliefs etc. may mediate the content constitutive locking 
relation.  
Margolis notes (rightly, I think) that the thesis that concept possession is atomistic does not preclude 
the possibility that beliefs, hypotheses, theories, and the like may mediate the causal/nomic relation 
between a mental representation and the property it’s locked to. The stress here, however, is on the 
contrast between mediation and constitution. It may be that tokenings of beliefs about dogs are 
(sometimes? always?) links in the reference-making causal chain that connects token dogs to DOG 
tokens. (Hears bark; thinks: Where there’s a bark, there’s a dog; therefore, there’s a dog.) It 
wouldn’t follow that having that belief is constitutive of having that concept.  
 
This is highly problematic in the light of Fodor’s (e.g. 1998: 124, 2003: 3) claim that one cannot think 
about something unless one has a concept for it. In order to have a thought ‘Where there’s a bark, there’s 
a dog; therefore, there’s a dog’ one needs to have the DOG concept. This means that, on the pain of 
circularity, a thought about dogs cannot, even non-constitutively, mediate the acquisition of the content of 
the concept DOG. One can imagine the following objection to what I’m saying here. Of course, you 
cannot think about dogs unless you have the DOG concept. What Fodor means is that the causal/nomic 
relation between the concept DOG and the property of being a dog is about getting the content of the 
concept. Well, even if it were so, Fodor would still have to face the question of what it is that makes such 
a content-less concept lock onto dogs and not anything else.  
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to are not possessed by things out there in the world independently of our minds. The 
property of doorknobhood that we ascribe to doorknobs is not a fact about doorknobs, 
but a fact about our minds. This means that there are no doorknobs such as to refer to in 
any sense that supports externalism. In fact, when Fodor writes that ‘much of what we 
find in the world is indeed “only ourselves”’ (Quote 1), the following question arises: 
can one get more internalist than that? 
Fodor’s mind-dependence thesis has serious implications for his account of 
compositionality. Fodor (2007: 18) argues that the only semantic property that 
composes is reference. However, if I am right in arguing that Fodor’s notion of 
reference is circular without presupposing the mind-dependent properties, it is not 
reference that composes (or if it does, it does so derivatively). For one thing, there is 
nothing out there in the mind-external world that a concept can refer to because things 
out there in the world do not possess, independently of our minds, the properties our 
minds ascribe to them. Secondly, what seems to compose are precisely such mind-
dependent properties, which, I have argued, constitute the internal compositional 
content of a concept.  
In summary, not only does Fodor need internalist semantics in order to get 
content identity, but he re-introduces it through the back door in the guise of mind-
dependent properties. Fodor’s referential content is circular without internalist content, 
and once internalist content is re-introduced, it is not in fact reference itself that 
composes.  
My rejection of Fodor’s referentialism and, relatedly, his atomicity claim, is also 
my rejection of lexical-conceptual isomorphism as explanatory of the word-concept 
relation. Fodor’s mind-dependence thesis, I have argued, allows for internalist, 
compositional content of conceptual correlates of words. Further problems come to light 
when the isomorphism is considered in a cross-linguistic context. The next section 
addresses this. 
1.1.2 Fodor’s lexical-conceptual isomorphism 
Fodor’s lexical-conceptual isomorphism can be interpreted in two ways. On the first 
interpretation, atomic concepts are different for speakers of different languages. On the 
second interpretation, an atomic concept is such that there exists a word for it in some 
language. On both these interpretations, word-concept isomorphism is problematic.  
The first interpretation is problematic for the assumption that we all share the 
same conceptual primitives, i.e. Fodor’s atoms. In other words, it does not satisfy 
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Fodor’s publicity constraint on concepts (1998: 28, 34) in cross-linguistic terms. 
Generally speaking, the isomorphism on the first interpretation is inconsistent with 
Fodor’s view of LOT as invariant across the species.  
Furthermore, the very existence of referential equivalents like English shallow 
and French peu profond (literal translation: little deep) is a problem for a referential 
account. Presumably, the concepts SHALLOW and PEU PROFOND have the same 
referential content – they apply to the same things in the world. But if the referential 
content of PEU PROFOND is the sum of the referential contents of its constituent parts 
and yet the referential content of PEU PROFOND is the same as the referential content 
of SHALLOW, then there is no reason why SHALLOW should not, in principle, have a 
compositional content – the content expressed by the French with the phrase peu 
profond. This undermines non-compositionality of conceptual correlates of words.  
If isomorphism is a claim that atomic concepts are such that there exists a word 
for it in some language, then, in the shallow/peu profond example, both the English and 
the French have an atomic concept that for some reason is differently ‘expressed’ in the 
two languages. But now, having assumed lexical-conceptual isomorphism, one cannot 
explain why the French do not have a word to ‘express’ this atomic concept. More 
generally, one cannot explain why there is no one-to-one match between words and 
concepts cross-linguistically. But when taken to its logical conclusion, isn’t that what 
lexical-conceptual isomorphism should predict? To put it bluntly, the problem is that 
lexical-conceptual isomorphism, when treated seriously, raises the question of why 
different languages have different vocabularies.  
But this is not the end of the problems for the second interpretation. Take the 
English expression a person who asks too many questions ‘why’. I take it that Fodor 
would agree that this expression corresponds, to use a vague term, to a complex concept 
in LOT. There seems to be nothing particularly controversial about this assumption, and 
there seems to be nothing particularly problematic for Fodor about it. Until we learn that 
Russians actually have a word for it – почемучка8 (pochemuchka). Now, if one is a 
Fodorian theorist and one were prepared to agree that the English translation 
corresponds to a complex concept, then one has a problem with the Russian data. There 
is nothing that prevents the complex concept corresponding to the English expression 
from constituting the compositional content of the concept corresponding to the Russian 
                                                          
8
 The word is not monomorphemic, but neither is doorknob, which Fodor takes to correspond to an 
atomic concept.  
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word. This means that, at least methodologically, the isomorphism has to face the 
shallow/peu profond problem even on the second interpretation.  
There are, obviously, many examples like that. The English word doorknob 
translates into Turkish as kapı tokmağı. The English expression the day after tomorrow 
translates into Polish as pojutrze and into Italian as dopodomani. The noun palomino 
translates into Romanian as cal de culoare aurie. Now, if a Fodorian analyst were a 
Romanian, especially one that is not interested in or does not care about horses, they 
would presumably argue that the Romanian expression corresponds to a complex 
concept in LOT. It would seem inconceivable to such an analyst (as a speaker of 
Romanian) to think that there should be a word for it. This does not mean that such an 
analyst would never construct a word for palomino or borrow it from another language. 
Consider now Fodor‘s claim that the concept BLACK CAT is complex. What if 
some language developed a word for it – blat, for example? (Note that the word blat 
seems as implausible for us as palomino does for at least some speakers of Romanian.) 
If blat translates as black cat, we have to assume that the expressions blat and black cat 
‘express’ concepts with the same referential content. This brings us again to the 
shallow/peu profond problem, this time with the conclusion that if Fodor is serious 
about his lexical-conceptual isomorphism, he has to face what is for him the problem of 
the creativity and productivity of language users.
9
  
One final issue pertaining to lexical-conceptual isomorphism is that it is 
incompatible with Fodor’s belief that thinking without language is possible and that 
there is no reason to suppose that thinking is language-dependent (2008: 218, 220). In 
this respect Fodor seems to be sympathetic to Chomsky’s views. Consider the following 
quote from Chomsky (2000b: 76). 
Quote 2: Now what seems to me obvious by introspection is that I can think 
without language. In fact, very often, I seem to be thinking and finding it hard to 
articulate what I am thinking. It is a very common experience at least for me and 
I suppose for everybody to try to express something, to say it and to realise that 
is not what I meant and then to try to say it some other way and maybe come 
closer to what you meant; then somebody helps you out and you say it in yet 
another way. That is a fairly common experience and it is pretty hard to make 
sense of that experience without assuming that you think without language. You 
think and then you try to find a way to articulate what you think and sometimes 
you can’t do it at all; you just can’t explain to somebody what you think. 
Sometimes you make judgements about things very fast, unconsciously. If 
somebody asks you how you made the judgement, it is often extremely hard to 
                                                          
9
 More generally, Fodor’s theory needs to face the ‘problem’ of accidental and socio-cultural factors 
involved in the development of language-particular vocabularies.  
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explain. Experiences like that seem to indicate that we can and do think without 
language and, if you are thinking, then presumably there’s some kind of 
conceptual structure there. The question of how this is related to language is just 
another research topic which, at this point, can barely be touched; but it is 
potentially important and interesting. 
 
My own experience (and I believe others’) chimes with what Chomsky reports here. 
Quote 2 suggests that thinking (at least one kind of it) and language are not one and the 
same phenomenon; thinking can and does take place without language. This in itself 
suggests that the relation between words and concepts is more complex than what 
isomorphism – and thus atomism – commits one to.  
As mentioned, Fodor’s rejection of compositional content for conceptual 
correlates of words follows from his rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction on the 
grounds that it may be difficult, even impossible, to specify what such compositional 
content could be. But notice that it is impossible to specify such content by using words. 
The problem is the following. If at least one kind of thought – the kind that Chomsky 
reports on – is ontologically language-independent and pre-linguistic in the sense that, 
as Chomsky (2000a: 61) puts it, in language acquisition children ‘label’ pre-existing 
concepts, then the fact that speakers cannot ‘articulate’ compositional content in a 
particular language does not preclude the existence of such content. Given (a) Fodor’s 
mind-dependence thesis, and therefore his internalism, and (b) Fodor’s view that 
thinking is not necessarily language-dependent, Fodor seems closer to internalism than 
he overtly admits.  
In the next section, I discuss Chomsky’s internalist approach to semantics and 
reference.
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1.2 Chomsky’s internalism  
Chomsky’s internalist pursuits have their basis in questions about the nature of the 
Faculty of Language. Therefore, before discussing Chomsky’s internalist semantics 
specifically, I will provide a brief overview of his view of the architecture of the Faculty 
of Language. I will then discuss Chomsky’s views on conceptual content and its relation 
                                                          
10
 As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the aim of providing a critical overview of Fodor’s theory 
was to justify my adoption of internalism. But Fodor’s externalism is just one type of externalism (i.e. 
causal externalism). Another type is social externalism (e.g. Burge 1979, Putnam 1975), whose 
proponents also place themselves in opposition to internalism, and whose arguments Chomsky (2000a) 
rejects. I do not discuss social externalism in this chapter but return to it in some detail in chapter 3, 
where I look at the relation between philosophical accounts of mental content and the notion of linguistic 
semantics.  
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to natural language semantics. Here I will also identify a significant tension in 
Chomsky’s thinking – the tension between Chomsky’s view of linguistic expressions as 
objects doubly grounded in phonological and semantic properties (the double-interface 
view) and his individualistic approach to semantics. I will then discuss how Chomsky’s 
double-interface view, but not his individualistic view of natural language semantics, 
has influenced Relevance Theory (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 1995, Carston 2002).   
1.2.1 Chomsky’s Faculty of Language 
On Chomsky’s theory (e.g. 2000a: 27, 117-118), the Faculty of Language (henceforth 
FL) has two components: a cognitive system that stores information and performance 
systems (articulatory-perceptual and conceptual-intentional) that make use of this 
information for articulation, interpretation, expression of beliefs and desires, talking 
about the world, etc. The cognitive system of FL is accessed by the performance 
systems, but is distinct from them. The cognitive system of FL is modified in response 
to linguistic experience; it changes states, from ‘initial’, which is innate and universal to 
human species, to ‘I-language’, which is internal (but not innate) and individual.  
The initial state of FL includes general phonological and semantic principles, 
and the mature state (i.e. I-language) is a generative procedure that ‘assigns structural 
descriptions to expressions and interacts with the motor and perceptual system and other 
cognitive systems of the mind/brain to yield semantic and phonetic interpretations of 
utterances’ (Chomsky 2000a: 60).  
I-language generates linguistic expressions (or structural descriptions, Chomsky 
2000a: 26), which include instructions that performance systems access and use for 
interpreting thoughts on the meaning side and expressing thoughts on the sound side 
(Chomsky 2000a: 27-29). More specifically, I-language consists of a computational 
procedure (which is invariant) and a lexicon (where language variation lies). The 
lexicon is a set of lexical items – complexes of semantic and phonological properties 
(Chomsky 2000a: 175). The computational procedure selects items from the lexicon and 
maps them (i.e. forms an expression, a more complex array of such features) into 
phonetic form (PF) and logical form (LF) – i.e. it maps them to <PHON, SEM> pairs. All 
of this, for Chomsky, is pure syntax (Chomsky 2000a: 120, 125).    
More recently, Chomsky (e.g. 2004, 2005a) has elucidated the relation between 
the cognitive system of FL and the performance systems in terms of the Strong 
Minimalist Thesis. The Strong Minimalist Thesis states that Universal Grammar – i.e. 
the innate and invariant part of FL – is perfectly designed to satisfy the interface 
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conditions, which are conditions imposed by the conceptual-intentional (C-I) and 
articulatory-perceptual (A-P) interfaces. Interface conditions must be satisfied ‘[i]f 
language is to be usable at all’ (Chomsky 2004: 106).   
This Minimalist Faculty of Language consists of NARROW SYNTAX, a 
computational procedure which maps a lexical array to a derivation; the PHONOLOGICAL 
COMPONENT, which maps a derivation to PHON; and the SEMANTIC COMPONENT, which 
maps a derivation to SEM. The computation maps a lexical array to a <PHON, SEM> 
syntactic object piece by piece, cyclically. That is, syntactic objects are constructed by 
narrow syntax in stages (or in ‘phases’). The phonological component and the semantic 
component apply to units constructed by narrow syntax; the operation TRANSFER 
transfers a derivation to the phonological and semantic components, where they are 
converted into PHON and SEM, respectively (Chomsky 2004: 107-110). 
In line with the Strong Minimalist Thesis, the A-P interface places a condition 
on narrow syntax that PHON indicates temporal order. An interface condition placed on 
narrow syntax by the C-I interface is that SEM anticipates a duality of semantic 
interpretation at C-I. One kind of such properties has to do with argument structure 
(theta-theoretic properties). The other kind involves everything else, namely scopal and 
discourse-related properties (Chomsky 2004: 110).  
Chomsky (e.g. 2004, 2005a, 2005b) argues that there are three factors involved 
in the determination of I-languages: 1) genetic endowment, 2) experience and 3) 
principles that are language- or even organism-independent. Investigating the third 
factor allows a principled explanation of the properties of language – explanation in 
terms that reach beyond the linguistic. Chomsky’s quest for principled explanation of 
FL in terms of its interaction with the interfacing systems has given rise to the view of 
FL as a non-autonomous module of the mind.  
What is of particular interest to me now is the extent to which the semantic 
component of FL is determined by the conceptual-intentional system and the way it 
interacts with it. This brings us to the next sub-section, where I consider Chomsky’s 
views on concepts (i.e. elements of the conceptual-intentional system) as well as the 
relation and interaction between them and the SEM element of the Chomskyan <PHON, 
SEM> object.  
1.2.2 Two kinds of semantic content? 
When discussing Chomsky’s stance on semantics, it is important to note his (2007: 14) 
asymmetry assumption, which is the view that language is primarily optimised to the 
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conceptual-intentional interface. Mapping to the sensory-motor (i.e. articulatory-
perceptual) interface is merely an ‘ancillary procedure’; it is used only for 
externalisation and involves morpho-phonology
11, which is there to satisfy the ‘linking 
condition’. The linking condition, which can be traced back to Aristotle, states that 
language links sound and meaning (Chomsky 2005a: 10) and has given rise to 
Chomsky’s view of linguistic expressions as syntactic objects constituted by both 
semantic and phonological properties (i.e. double-interface objects). The double-
interface idea will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2. Now I will concentrate on 
the interaction of semantic properties of Chomsky’s linguistic expressions and their 
relation to the conceptual-intentional system. Consider quote 3 below. 
Quote 3: Generation of expressions to satisfy the semantic interface yields a 
"language of thought." If the assumption of asymmetry is correct, then the 
earliest stage of language would have been just that: a language of thought, used 
internally. It has been argued that an independent language of thought must be 
postulated. I think there are reasons for skepticism, but that would take us too far 
afield. (2007: 14, my emphasis) 
 
This quote is revealing in several ways. If language is primarily optimised to the 
conceptual-intentional performance system (and since mapping to PHON is a ‘secondary 
process’, 2005a: 4), then, for Chomsky, language is primarily (in evolutionary, but also 
in functional terms) employed for thinking. We can see then why Chomsky is so 
concerned with the nature of concepts, i.e. constituents of thought. However, the view 
of language as primarily used for thinking gives rise to the following question: given 
that Chomsky distinguishes at least two kinds of thinking, namely language-
independent thinking and thinking which involves language, how are the two types of 
thinking different (in the sense of Quote 2)? In other words, how does natural language 
semantics differ from the semantics of LOT? Answering this question becomes difficult 
in the light of the following quote: 
Quote 4: […] the core theory of language—Universal Grammar (UG)—must 
provide, first, a structured inventory of possible lexical items that are related to 
or perhaps identical with the concepts that are the elements of the 
‘‘cognoscitive powers,’’ sometimes now regarded as a ‘‘language of thought’’ 
along lines developed by Jerry Fodor (1975)
12
; and second, means to construct 
from these lexical items the infinite variety of internal structures that enter into 
thought, interpretation, planning, and other human mental acts, and that are 
                                                          
11
 For Chomsky (e.g. 2007: 8) phonology includes morphology.  
12
 Prior to his externalist commitments in Fodor (1998) and (2008), Fodor argued that conceptual 
correlates of words were innate.  
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sometimes put to use in action, including the externalization that is a secondary 
process if the speculations just reviewed turn out to be correct. (2005a: 4, my 
emphasis) 
 
It is clear from Quote 4 that the primitive elements of natural language semantics are 
strongly associated with the semantics of thought: they are ‘related to’ or perhaps even 
‘identical with’ them. But if we are to make any sense of that, we need to know how the 
two kinds of semantics – that in LOT and that in UG – are different if they are merely 
related or, if they are identical, whether it is conceptually necessary to duplicate them, 
i.e. to posit two loci of the same semantic elements.
13
  
If natural language semantics and the semantics of thought are ‘related’, then 
presumably they are grounded in the same conceptual-intentional modality (i.e. they 
both deal with concepts), but are structurally distinct.  
Relevant here is the analytic-synthetic distinction. Fodor, as we have seen in 
1.1.1, rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction and is therefore committed to atomic (i.e. 
non-structured) and therefore purely referential content. Chomsky, however, endorses 
the analytic-synthetic distinction and hence possibly also the notion of molecular 
semantic content for conceptual correlates of words. I used the word ‘possibly’ for two 
reasons; the first is that the existence and endorsement of the analytic-synthetic 
distinction does not necessarily amount to the existence and endorsement of molecular 
linguistic semantics and the second is that Chomsky is actually not unsympathetic to 
meaning holism. I explore the first of these points in the remainder of this section, and 
the second one in 1.2.3.  
Chomsky (e.g. 2000a: 61-67) argues that there is enough linguistic evidence to 
support the analytic-synthetic distinction. Consider words like chase or persuade, 
which, as Chomsky observes, involve reference to human intention: 
Quote 5: To chase Jones is not only to follow him, but to follow him with the 
intent of staying on his path, perhaps to catch him. To persuade Smith to do 
something is to cause him to decide or intend to do it; if he never decides or 
                                                          
13
 Following from this last comment is the question about the rationale for positing the C-I interface at all. 
If the semantic elements of UG are ‘identical to’ the semantic elements of LOT, then, arguably, the 
semantic component of UG just is the language of thought. The following quotes from Chomsky are 
relevant here: 
The simplest thesis is that an expression E has no existence apart from its properties at the interface 
levels, PHON(E) and SEM(E) (if these exist). (2000a: 175, my emphasis) 
On very weak assumptions about efficient computation, there should be no linguistic levels beyond 
those that are imposed by interface conditions: that is, the interface levels themselves. In fact, it is 
not even obvious that these exist. (2005a: 16, my emphasis) 
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intends to do it, we have not succeeded in persuading him. Furthermore, he must 
decide or intend by his own volition, not under duress […] (Chomsky 2000a: 62) 
 
What follows from this observation is the distinction between ‘truths of meaning’ (i.e. 
analytic truths) and ‘truths of fact’ (i.e. synthetic truths). If Tom chased Jones, then he 
necessarily followed him intending (at least) to stay on his path. If Mark persuaded 
Smith to join the Chester-le-Street amateur rowing club, then at some point in time 
Smith decided or intended to join the Chester-le-Street amateur rowing club. In a 
similar vein, if John killed Bill, then Bill is dead. These are all ‘truths of meaning’ – we 
arrive at them just by virtue of knowing language, i.e. without having to consider or 
know what the world is like. This, for Chomsky, is a good indication that ‘there are 
necessary connections among concepts, reflected in connections of meaning among 
words’ (2000a: 63, my emphasis). The word ‘reflected’ here is crucial because it clearly 
indicates that when Chomsky says that there is no reason why semantic connections 
should not be ‘completely fixed and stable as a matter of biological endowment’, he is 
talking about connections among concepts, and not linguistic expressions. The latter 
merely ‘reflect’ such connections.  
This distinction comes out even more clearly when Chomsky (2000a: 66) writes 
that in language acquisition the child’s task is to ‘discover labels’ for the innate stock of 
concepts. The figures below will help me illustrate this point.  
             Figure 1.2: blimpft                               Figure 1.3: molont 
 
Figure 1.2 and figure 1.3 share the same configuration of three blocks. We can even say 
that the configuration of blocks in figure 1.2 is contained in the configuration presented 
in figure 1.3. Now, if we assume for the sake of this illustration, that the individual 
blocks represent primitive concepts and that the patterns formed out of them represent 
structured concepts, we can say that the structured concept in figure 1.2 is entailed by 
the structured concept in figure 1.3 because it is contained within it. In other words, 
there is an analytic relation between the configurations/structured concepts in the two 
figures. Let me now label the structure in figure 1.2 as blimpft and the one in figure 1.3 
as molont. This allows us to say – by proxy – that the word blimpft is contained within 
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the word molont, that the word molont entails the word blimpft, and that there is an 
analytic relation between them. But notice the importance of ‘by proxy’ here; we know 
that it is not the word blimpft that is contained in the word molont, rather it is the 
structure which I have labelled blimpft that is contained within the structure that I have 
called molont.    
It seems to me that when Chomsky talks about analytic relations he makes a 
similar distinction – the analytic relations concern concepts (i.e. SEM) and not their 
morpho-phonological labels (i.e. PHON) or linguistic expressions/words (i.e. <SEM, 
PHON>) as such. Let me explain this.     
There are two aspects of Chomsky’s linguistics that are relevant here. The first is 
his view of linguistic expressions as double-interface objects constituted by morpho- 
phonological and semantic properties. The second is the notion of I-language, with the 
emphasis on the individualistic nature of it. The first point to observe is that even 
though, for Chomsky, morpho-phonological and semantic properties together constitute 
a syntactic object, the fact remains that the relation between them is arbitrary, i.e. non-
natural (it is the locus of Saussurean arbitrariness). The implications are the following. 
In my blocks scenario (figure 1.2 and figure 1.3), I have argued that the analytic relation 
does not hold between blimpft and molont but between the structures that these nonce 
words merely label. This argument can be further extended to say that the analytic 
relation does not hold between (i) the object constituted by the structure that the label 
blimpft labels and the label itself on the one hand, and (ii) another object constituted by 
the structure that the label molont labels and the label itself, on the other. The analytic 
relation does not hold between such doubly constituted objects because the relation 
between the structure and the label is arbitrary.  
To explain this, let us imagine that I was wrong in calling those structures 
blimpft and molont respectively – I confused them with some other labels. The 
structures presented in figure 1.2 and figure 1.3 should actually be called plumtug and 
gufhan. The fact that the labels can change, while leaving the relation between the 
conceptual structures intact, clearly shows that the analytic relation holds between the 
conceptual structures only, rather than between labels or objects constituted by 
structures and labels. In other words, logical relations do not care about labels. This 
argument is necessarily extendable to natural languages because the relation between 
morpho-phonological and semantic properties is arbitrary, i.e. non-natural. Evidence for 
this comes from cross-linguistic, cross-dialectal and diachronic considerations: the same 
structure is labelled chase in English, gonić in Polish and inseguire in Italian; the same 
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thing is called plimsoll or gym shoe or sandshoe in English; no-one uses the Middle 
English label þou anymore. Analytic relations thus clearly do not hold between labels or 
linguistic expressions (i.e. double-interface objects). Chomsky seems to mean precisely 
that when he writes that it is ‘the a priori framework of human thought, within which 
language is acquired, [that] provides necessary connections between concepts’ (2000a: 
62-63).     
I also mentioned that the view of analyticity as pertaining solely to concepts 
follows from Chomsky’s insistence on the individualistic nature of I-language. It is well 
known that the word disinterested is synonymous with impartial for many, but not all, 
speakers of English. It follows then that many, but not all, speakers of English will use 
the two words interchangeably. They will do so because in their minds the semantic 
structures labelled by the two words are similar, if not identical. That the analytic 
relation exists only between the semantic structures labelled is clear from the empirical 
fact that other speakers do not use the two words interchangeably. For those that do not, 
there is no analytic relation between the semantic structure labelled disinterested and the 
semantic structure labelled impartial (but there is such relation for them between the 
structure labelled disinterested and the structure labelled uninterested). This, and other 
more idiosyncratic uses like that of pineapple instead of pinnacle (Burton-Roberts 
2012), demonstrates that there is a decisively individualistic element implicated in 
assigning and using labels. It also demonstrates that analyticity judgments are an 
individualistic matter.   
These individualistic insights into analyticity judgements highlight a problem in 
Fodor’s approach. Fodor’s rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction follows from 
his identification of concepts with word meanings/semantics (lexical-conceptual 
isomorphism). If concepts are to be shared amongst the human species but are also 
taken to equal word meanings/semantics, then such concepts cannot be internally 
compositional and shared precisely because internal compositionality of a concept 
which corresponds to a word is an individualistic matter. For Fodor, atomism follows. 
However, I have argued that Fodor’s identification of concepts with word 
meanings/semantics is misguided. Once a distinction is made between concepts as such 
and the way a concept functions as a word’s semantics, it is not necessary to posit the 
anyway problematic atomism to maintain the nativist claims about concepts.
14
 
                                                          
14
 I shortly return to the question of whether such an unambiguous distinction is actually made by 
Chomsky himself.  
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Now, if Chomsky is right in his I-assumptions – i.e. internalist and 
individualistic assumptions – about word meaning/semantics, then there is no 
interesting (i.e. cross-speaker and/or cross-context stable) notion of linguistic semantics. 
But before I discuss this point in more detail, let me investigate another reason behind 
Chomsky’s I-assumptions, i.e. his observations about reference.   
1.2.3 Chomsky on reference 
What clearly distinguishes Chomsky from Fodor are their different notions of content. 
Fodor, as mentioned, endorses a notion of a concept’s ‘content’ that is constituted by a 
relation to something external to the concept. Such ‘content’ is not a property of a 
concept; it is a relation. Fodorian ‘content’ is experientially acquired. Chomsky, by 
contrast, endorses a notion of content as a property of a concept. Chomsky has an 
innate, internalist, compositional notion of content. In principle, this contrast between 
Fodor and Chomsky is very clear, even though Fodor’s mind-dependence thesis 
undermines his externalism. As argued in section 1.1, externalism about conceptual 
content is problematic if only because it is circular and not explained without 
presupposing internalist content.   
Fodor (e.g. 2008: 16) argues that internalism is problematic because it leads to 
solipsism. Solipsism, in turn, is wrong because, to use Fodor’s (2008: 53, fn 4) words, 
‘we use ‘tables’ and ‘chairs’ to talk about tables and chairs (respectively)’. I am re-
iterating these issues here because internalism is not an uncontroversial position and is 
explicitly an undesirable one for referentialists. Fodor writes: 
Quote 6: Patently, the referentialist view that semantics is about a relation of 
reference that holds between symbols and the world is incompatible both with 
‘ontological’ solipsism (the view that there isn’t anything in the world) and 
‘methodological’ solipsism (the view that it doesn’t matter to semantics whether 
there is anything in the world). (Fodor 2008: 16 fn 29) 
 
I maintain that even though the purpose of Fodor’s referentialist enterprise was to come 
up with a non-solipsist account, he has failed to provide it. And even though he argues 
that no idealism follows from his theory because ‘doorknobs are real but mind-
dependent’ (Fodor 1998: 150), I hope to have successfully shown in section 1.1 that, 
despite his proclaimed externalism, Fodor himself is a methodological solipsist 
precisely by virtue of his mind-dependence thesis. This suggests that there is no escape 
from methodological solipsism, which, at the end of the day, is the claim that there are 
mind-external entities, but that we can only experience them through the ‘perspectives’ 
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or ‘lenses’, to use Chomsky’s (e.g. 2000a: 36, 42) terms, allowed by our minds. In other 
words, we cannot experience the world (e.g. doorknobs) independently of our minds. 
This seems even pre-theoretically uncontroversial, and theoretically, I have argued, it is 
the only place to start from.  
Indeed, Chomsky (e.g. 2000a: 127-129) argues that reference is much more fine-
grained than object reference allows for. The example that he famously discusses in this 
context is that of the name London. Chomsky (2000a: 37) observes that we can think 
and talk about London in terms of ‘a location or area, people who sometimes live there, 
the air above it (but not too high), buildings, institutions, etc., in various combinations’. 
Moreover, he notes that ‘under some circumstances, it [London] could be completely 
destroyed and rebuilt somewhere else, years or even millennia later, still being London, 
that same city.’ For Chomsky then, ‘there neither are nor are believed to be things-in-
the-world with the properties of the intricate modes of reference that a […] name 
encapsulates’ (2000a: 37). Hence, what we ever refer to is the world as seen through 
‘the perspectives made available by the resources of the mind’ (Chomsky 2000a: 16).  
Ludlow (2003) remarks that Chomsky’s concerns about referential semantics 
are, at their root, concerns about what he calls ‘the language/world isomorphism’. This 
isomorphism is a correlation between something in the world (an object, an event) and 
its mental representation. What Chomsky’s London example shows is that there is no 
isomorphism between an entity in the world and the linguistic expression London that 
we use when we talk about London. More precisely, there is nothing in the mind-
external world such that it corresponds to the semantic properties ‘encapsulated’ by the 
term London.    
Chomsky’s arguments against the language-world isomorphism can be grouped 
into three inter-related categories. Ludlow (2003) calls them the Implausible 
Commitments Argument, the “Type Mismatch” Argument and the Misbehaving Object 
Argument. I will discuss them now and then, in the following sub-section, I will try to 
identify some insights that these arguments offer on Chomsky’s views on the relation 
between natural language semantics and the semantics of the C-I system.  
The Implausible Commitments Argument concerns reference to fictional entities 
such as unicorns or Santa Claus, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, it is related 
to Chomsky’s discussion of terms like London, i.e. terms which prima facie could be 
granted an external referent. The argument emphasises the fine-grained nature of 
reference and, following from this, the implausibility of there being in the mind-external 
world any entities that correspond to what we are talking about when using language. 
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Other expressions that Chomsky famously discusses in this context are the flaw in the 
argument and the average man. Chomsky observes: 
Quote 7: If I say “the flaw in the argument is obvious, but it escaped John’s 
attention,” I am not committed to the absurd view that among things in the world 
are flaws, one of them in the argument in question. Nevertheless, the NP the 
flaw in the argument behaves in all relevant respects in the manner of the truly 
referential expression the coat in the closet – for example, it can be the 
antecedent of it and serves as an argument, taking a θ-role. (Chomsky 1981: 
324) 
 
Just as there are no things in the mind-external world such that correspond to terms like 
London and the flaw in the argument, neither are there entities corresponding to 
expressions like the average man (consider ‘The average man has 2.3 children’). For 
Chomsky neither the world nor the cogniser’s mental model is constituted by entities 
that speakers describe as things that concern them (e.g. Chomsky 2000a: 135-136).  
The “Type Mismatch” Argument concerns a disparity between the type of 
individuation that objects and substances intuitively have and the type of individuation 
that a referential semantics provides. For explanatory purposes, Ludlow (2003: 149) 
makes a distinction between a P-substance and an I-substance. In the context of the 
expression water, the P-substance would be H2O, i.e. that sort of matter that would play 
part in a physical theory, whereas the I-substance would be that which we intuitively 
talk about when we are using language. The problem, Ludlow (2003) argues, is that, in 
terms of referential semantics, water would be assigned the P-substance (H2O) as its 
semantic value, but the I-substance we are talking about when we use the term water is 
often something else. For example, what we find in rivers is often called water, but it 
would rarely be considered H2O. Furthermore, it appears that there are things that have 
chemical composition closer than river water has to H2O, but that we do not call water. 
Tea is one such example. The general argument then is that P-substances and I-
substances do not match up.  
The third argument against referential semantics, the Misbehaving Object 
Argument, is closely related to the first two. The “Type Mismatch” Argument was 
illustrated by the usage of the term water, but what the case of water also illustrates is 
that the I-substance talked about when using this word is, as Ludlow (2003: 15) puts it, 
‘a most ill-behaved sort of substance’. Chomsky imagines the following scenario: 
Quote 8: Suppose cup1 is filled from the tap. It is a cup of water, but if a tea bag 
is dipped into it, that is no longer the case. It is now a cup of tea, something 
different. Suppose cup2 is filled from a tap connected to a reservoir in which tea 
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has been dumped (say, as a new kind of purifier). What is in cup2 is water, not 
tea, even if a chemist could not distinguish it from the present contents of cup1. 
The cups contain the same thing from one point of view, different things from 
another; but in either case cup2 contains only water and cup1 only tea. (Chomsky 
2000a: 128) 
 
The point that Chomsky is making here is that whether we regard something as water or 
not depends on the intricate interaction of human interests, concerns, beliefs and 
intentions. The fact that I-substances, or what we may call I-meanings, are so ‘unruly’ 
follows naturally from the assumption that meaning/semantics of linguistic expressions 
is determined by internalist-individualistic psychology. Chomsky (e.g. 1975, 2002) 
argues that even apparently simple concepts like that of object do not correspond to 
what we may describe as P-substances in any interesting way. He observes that 
spatiotemporal contiguity, a prima facie good candidate for identifying P-substances, is 
not sufficient; a wing of an aeroplane is an object, but its left half (though equally 
continuous) is not, a herd of cattle is not an object, but a picket fence with breaks is 
(though equally discontinuous). Whether something is called an object or not, Chomsky 
(1975: 203) concludes, is crucially determined by beliefs about human will and 
intention.  
Even the simplest of words integrate information about such properties as 
material constitution, design, intended use, origin, causal properties, etc. (e.g. Chomsky 
2002: 87). More interestingly, lexical items often provide conflicting perspectives on 
how to view the world. Books, for example, can be both abstract and concrete; if two 
copies of the same book are taken out from the library by two people, then in the 
abstract sense they have taken out the same book, but in the concrete sense a different 
one. Chomsky writes: 
Quote 9: […] the internal conditions on meaning are rich, complex, and 
unsuspected; in fact, barely known. The most elaborate dictionaries do not 
dream of such subtleties; they provide no more than hints that enable the 
intended concept to be identified by those who already have it (at least, in 
essential respects). (Chomsky 2000a: 36) 
 
There are two points to be made about quote 9. On the one hand, the semantics, or the 
perspectives for viewing the world that lexical items afford, are genetically given. 
Chomsky claims that a child would not be able to understand the richness and 
complexity of meaning if it were not – in some ‘essential respects’ – innately pre-
determined (see also 2000a: 61). It seems then that such innate semantics should, in 
principle, be subject to a naturalistic inquiry, like that of Chomsky’s. But it is not; the 
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question about the meaning/semantics of linguistic expressions falls outside Chomsky’s 
naturalistic enquiry into the nature of FL (e.g. Chomsky 2000a: 20, 36). The reason for 
this is that, even though perspectives – or let us call them conceptual primitives – are 
innate and hence species-invariant, the associations between morpho-phonological 
labels and conceptual structures are dependent on context and individualistic 
psychology. If we combine the innateness thesis with the individualistic nature of 
language, Chomsky’s point seems to be that even though semantic content (i.e. 
conceptual content) is innate, the role it plays in language use – or the way it is involved 
in meaning/semantics of linguistic expressions – is context-variable and speaker-
variable.  
Another thorny issue that Chomsky hints at in discussing natural language 
semantics concerns the intricacy and often paradoxicality of the perspectives that a 
linguistic expression can provide; the abstract and concrete aspects of a book discussed 
above are a case in point. But let us take a closer look at a word like cow. If we wanted 
to argue that natural language semantics was subject to a naturalistic inquiry, we would 
have to find a level of semantic representation that corresponds to the word cow and that 
is species-invariant. Presumably, such semantic representation would have to be 
abstract enough as to underdetermine all uses of the word cow. The intuitive, pre-
theoretical problem is that a word cow can provide such conflicting perspectives as 
[animate] as well as [inanimate] (‘Would you like a cow or a dog?’, asked by a mother 
to a child at a toy shop), [human] (‘She’s a cow’, spoken derogatorily of a woman) 
alongside [non-human], [male], [female], [white], [brown], [purple], [dotty], [dead], 
[alive], [fleshy], [fluffy], [made of clay] among millions of other possible perspectives. 
It is not surprising then that Chomsky (2000a: 132) regards a naturalistic inquiry into 
natural language semantics as ill-fated.  
The consequences are profound: from Chomsky’s internalism-individualism it 
follows that the meaning/semantics of linguistic expressions is neither stable nor shared 
in any interesting way, i.e. it is not shared in a way that supports naturalistic (or social 
externalist) accounts of linguistic semantics. This is the essence of I-language. 
Fundamentally, Chomsky (e.g. 2000a: 137) argues that a radically individualistic 
approach to the study of natural language meaning/semantics – i.e. a holistic approach, 
which involves the study of beliefs mediating between us and things in the world – 
seems to be a ‘fruitful’ direction to pursue.15   
                                                          
15
 In this context, Chomsky (2000a: 137) makes reference to Bilgrami’s (1992) radically contextualist 
thesis about unity and locality of semantic content. Bilgrami’s approach is discussed in chapter 3.  
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However, this sympathy of Chomsky’s for holism and individualism is in 
tension with his view of language, and thus of linguistic expressions, as doubly 
constituted by phonological and semantic properties. The next section is concerned with 
this tension. 
1.2.4 Chomsky’s legacy in research into semantics and pragmatics 
As discussed earlier, Chomsky (e.g. 2005a: 10) reconstructs Aristotle’s idea – that 
language links sound and meaning – by attributing both phonology and semantics to 
linguistic expressions. On this view, linguistic expressions are taken to be double-
interface syntactic objects constituted by phonological and semantic properties (<PHON, 
SEM>). The following figure illustrates this. 
Figure 1.4: The double-interface object 
 
Following from this double-interface assumption is the view that (i) words, and 
linguistic expressions generally, have meaning in virtue of encoding linguistic 
semantics as their constitutive property and that (ii) it is in virtue of having meaning as 
their constitutive property that words guide interpretation to specific regions of the 
conceptual space. For example, in Relevance Theory (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 1995, 
Carston 2002), which considers itself an adjunct to (/an extension of) Chomskyan 
tradition (Wedgewood 2007: 679), the encoded linguistic semantics is necessarily and 
always decoded by the language module and delivered as logical form to the pragmatic 
processor.  
The point that I am making here is this. The view that there exists a specifically 
linguistic, i.e. non-pragmatic, semantic level follows from the view that linguistic 
expressions are double-interface objects. Indeed, in the light of the double-interface 
view of language, Chomsky’s (2005a: 4) claim that natural language semantics may be 
‘related’ to the semantics of thought and Chomsky’s (e.g. 2000a: 62) endorsement of 
the analytic-synthetic distinction may be interpreted in favour of some notion of 
linguistic semantics. On the other hand, Chomsky’s (2005a: 4) claim that natural 
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language semantics may be ‘identical’ with – i.e. the same as – the semantics of 
thought, and Chomsky’s (e.g. 2000a: 137) endorsement of holism and individualism (as 
well as a careful reading of Chomsky’s writings on the analytic-synthetic distinction) 
are incompatible with the notion of linguistic semantics. Indeed, Chomsky concedes:  
Quote 10: […] that any such thing as I-meaning (“semantic representation,” 
“narrow content”) even exists is now commonly denied. Comparable questions 
about I-sound have rarely been raised. The empirical disciplines seem to me to 
study them in much the same way: in particular, to assume that both involve 
invariant universal features of which LIs [linguistic expressions] are constituted 
(and hence are not radically holistic). I will tentatively assume that postulation 
of I-sound and I-meaning is legitimate, returning to reasons for denying it. 
(Chomsky 2000a: 170, my emphasis) 
 
The problem, for Chomsky, is that if there is no interesting (i.e. cross-speaker and/or 
cross-context shared) notion of linguistic semantics (i.e. no interesting notion of SEM) – 
as implied by his I-assumptions – it is not clear in what sense a linguistic expression can 
be a double-interface <PHON, SEM> object. This tension in Chomsky’s thinking – that 
there is SEM because language deals with double-interface objects and that there cannot 
be SEM because of the I-nature of words’ meanings/semantics – is the leitmotif of this 
thesis.  
1.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has engaged with two related questions: about the nature of semantics and 
about the relation between words and concepts. As for the first question, I argued that 
Fodor’s notion of referential semantics does not offer a plausible answer to the question 
of how we think about the mind-external world as it presupposes innate, non-referential, 
compositional content in the guise of mind-dependent properties (e.g. Fodor 1998: 141, 
162). I showed that the account of referential semantics is circular unless it presupposes 
such innate non-referential content. Fodor’s mind-dependence thesis, I concluded, is 
actually a re-introduction of the Chomskyan notion of conceptual content, i.e. content 
which is an innate, constitutive, compositional property of concepts.  
What motivates Fodor’s account of referential semantics, I suggested, is his 
lexical-conceptual isomorphism, i.e. a view that primitive concepts correspond to word 
meanings/semantics. I have argued that this isomorphism yields an inappropriate 
account of the word-concept relation as it is incompatible with cross-linguistic evidence 
and with Fodor’s own view that thought is language-independent.  
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The problems with Fodor’s theory provide ample justification for the adoption 
of Chomsky’s internalist account of conceptual content, which was introduced in the 
second part of the chapter. The aspects of Chomsky’s theory that I endorse are the 
following: 
a) Innateness: conceptual primitives, and structures defined over them, are innate 
and hence species-invariant 
b) Compositionality: conceptual correlates of words are structured, i.e. 
compositionally constituted by conceptual primitives 
c) Context-variability: words often ‘encapsulate’ conflicting perspectives, i.e. 
their meaning/semantics is highly context-variable 
d) Individualism: the meaning/semantics of words is individualistic, i.e. the 
conceptual structures ‘encapsulated’ by words vary from person to person  
In the light of the problems with Fodor’s account, assumptions (a) and (b) are rather 
uncontroversial: from (a) and (b) it follows that a conceptual structure associated with a 
word like carburettor is innate in the sense that the conceptual primitives by which it is 
compositionally constituted are innate, as is the generative computation that allows for 
such composition. Problems start when we consider assumptions (c) and (d) in detail. 
As mentioned, Chomsky’s I-assumptions, if correct, have serious implications not only 
for theories postulating the existence of some form of linguistic semantics, but also for 
the double-interface view of language as such.  
 In the next chapter, I criticise Relevance Theory’s notion of linguistic semantics 
and argue that such content is implausible and redundant in accounting for meaning in 
language. I introduce the Representational Hypothesis (e.g. Burton-Roberts 2012), a 
conceptual programme which rejects the double-interface view of language and, along 
with it, the assumption that words have meaning as a constitutive property. In line with 
the Representational Hypothesis, I argue for a semiotic, wholly inferential, account of 
utterance interpretation, and explain the mechanics of such an account in terms of 
Hintzman’s (e.g. 1986) multiple-trace theory of memory.  
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Chapter 2. The locus of semantics and the decoding-inferring 
distinction 
 
2.0 Introduction 
The aim of chapter 1 was to show that Fodor’s referential notion of semantic content 
does not offer a plausible answer to the question of how we think and talk about the 
mind-external world. One reason is that it presupposes (and is circular without 
presupposing) internalist, compositional content and the other is that it is based on a 
methodologically unsound assumption of lexical-conceptual isomorphism. The 
conclusions were that the nativist epistemology is necessary in explaining human 
cognition and that the relation between words and concepts is more complex than 
Fodor’s lexical-conceptual isomorphism predicts. 
The discussion of problems with Fodor’s account brought me to Chomsky’s 
internalism about conceptual/semantic content. I identified four aspects of Chomsky’s 
thinking that I endorse: (a) innateness of conceptual primitives (and structures defined 
over them), (b) internal compositionality of a word’s semantics, (c) its context-
variability and (d) its individualistic nature. However, I argued that there is a tension in 
Chomsky’s account between his internalist-individualistic assumptions and the double-
interface view of language and linguistic expressions.  
As discussed in 1.2.1, for Chomsky (e.g. 1995) Language (i.e. FL) is subject to a 
realist/naturalistic enquiry in terms of necessary principles – it is ‘a real object of the 
natural world’. By hypothesis, Language is ‘perfect’, which means that it is free of any 
form of variation – there is nothing in it that is not conceptually necessary. Crucially, 
for Chomsky (e.g. 2007), the two systems that Language interfaces with, C-I and A-P – 
and hence SEM and PHON components of Language – are indeed conceptually necessary. 
Given Chomsky’s realist/naturalistic concerns, it should follow that since SEM is a 
necessary component of Language, which is natural, SEM too should be subject to a 
formal explanation in terms of necessary principles. Thus, positing SEM, i.e. some 
notion of linguistic/lexical semantics which is cross-speaker and cross-context shared 
follows from Chomsky’s realist/naturalistic inquiry into Language as the double-
interface system.  
However, as mentioned in chapter 1, Chomsky’s I-assumptions are incompatible 
with positing some such form of SEM. Indeed, Chomsky (2000a: 170) concedes that he 
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only ‘tentatively’ assumes that it exists.1 The problem is that Chomsky’s 
acknowledgement of the variability (individualistic and contextual) in the association 
between a word form and semantic properties suggests that, for him, word ‘meanings’ 
cannot be shared in any interesting sense, and yet the double-interface idea depends on 
the existence of SEM (and PHON). This gives rise to the question of whether or not it is 
possible and necessary to posit SEM.    
In this chapter, I address (i) the question of whether the notion of shared 
semantic content is theoretically sound, and if not (ii) whether it is possible to account 
for mutual understanding between interlocutors in communication without positing the 
level of shared semantic content.  
As mentioned in 1.2.4, Relevance Theory (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 1995, Carston 
2002) places itself within the Chomskyan tradition. For this reason, I answer the first 
question (i) by looking at Relevance Theory’s (e.g. Carston 2002, 2010) notion of 
linguistic semantics. In 2.1, I argue that Relevance Theory does not actually offer an 
account of linguistic semantics which is shared among the members of the same speech 
community or across contexts. The appeal to linguistic semantics is thus not doing the 
work it was devised to do in the first place. The second problem is that, even in 
Relevance Theory’s terms, the process of deterministic decoding of linguistic semantics 
is redundant; depending on the interpretation of Relevance Theory, linguistic content of 
a word is either decoded only to be ‘dropped and replaced’ or it is anyway 
pragmatically inferable. Therefore, I argue that the notion of specifically linguistic 
semantics should be rejected.    
In 2.2, I discuss Burton-Roberts’ (e.g. 2009) criticism of the double-interface 
tradition. I then introduce the Representational Hypothesis (e.g. Burton-Roberts 2000, 
2012; Burton-Roberts & Poole 2006a; Chng 1999), a conceptual programme which 
rejects the double-interface view of linguistic expressions (<PHON, SEM>) as 
problematic and anyway unnecessary to account for linguistic ‘sound with a meaning’. 
In rejecting the double-interface tradition, the Representational Hypothesis rejects the 
notion of linguistic semantics (i.e. it attributes no semantic properties to linguistic 
expressions) and offers a semiotic, wholly inferential, account of meaning in language.  
Finally, in 2.2.3, I argue that the mechanics of the representational account can 
be implemented in terms of Hintzman’s (e.g. 1986) multiple-trace theory of memory. 
Like the Representational Hypothesis, Hintzman’s model predicts that the 
                                                          
1
 Similar claims follow, and similar problems arise, on the PHON side of the double-interface object (see 
e.g. Carr 2000). This issue, however, goes beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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understanding of speaker-intended meaning is not mediated by the cognitive process of 
deterministic decoding of specifically linguistic concepts. Rather, it is a wholly 
pragmatic, inferential process. I then discuss some advantages of a wholly inferential 
model over Relevance Theory’s two-step (i.e. ‘decode and infer’) model.  
2.1 Linguistic semantics in Relevance Theory 
In the double-interface tradition, linguistic signs have meaning in virtue of encoding 
linguistic semantic properties: the word cat is meaningful because it constitutively 
encodes (i.e. has as its property) the concept CAT. This effectively equates having 
meaning with having semantic properties.  
A consequence of this assumption is that to account for meaning in language we 
need to posit two kinds of semantics – that of words and, on the assumption that 
thoughts too have semantics, that of thoughts. In Relevance Theory (e.g. Carston 2002), 
this idea is developed in terms of the distinction between linguistic semantics and real 
semantics, respectively. I explain this distinction below. 
For Relevance Theory (e.g. Carston 2002, henceforth RT), the linguistic system 
‘maps’ a phonetic representation into a semantic representation, which is ‘a structured 
(presumably conceptual) mental representation’ (Carston 2002: 9). This semantic 
representation, or ‘encoded linguistic meaning’, is to be understood in terms of ‘some 
appropriate notion of logical form, computed by linguistic decoding system’ (ibid.).  
One of Carston’s (2002) aims is to work out the details of the relation between 
the assumed linguistic meaning decoded by the language faculty and occasion-specific 
interpretations of utterances (i.e. propositions, or thoughts, communicated by 
utterances). This concern of Carston’s reflects RT’s distinction between linguistic 
meaning and speaker meaning. LINGUISTIC MEANING is context-independent and refers 
to ‘relatively stable meanings in a linguistic system, meanings which are widely shared 
across a community of users of the system’ (Carston 2002: 19-20). In contrast, SPEAKER 
MEANING refers to a thought communicated by a particular speaker on a particular 
occasion. Hence, speaker meaning is to a large extent individualistic and context-
dependent. The semantic content of the logical form en/decoded by the language faculty 
is referred to as LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS, whereas the semantic content of the 
thought/proposition communicated by the speaker is referred to as REAL SEMANTICS.  
Whereas linguistic semantics, in virtue of being context-independent, does not 
have truth-theoretic properties (i.e. it is not true of false with respect to any state of 
affairs in the world), real semantics has truth-theoretic properties (i.e. it is true or false 
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with respect to some state of affairs in the world). Fundamentally, thus, the distinction 
between real and linguistic semantics is made in terms of truth-theoretic properties or 
lack of them, respectively. Importantly, Carston (2002: 11) also explains the linguistic-
real distinction in terms of two types of cognitive processes: DECODING and INFERRING. 
It is linguistic meaning that is decoded and it is speaker meaning that is inferred.  
Related to the claim about the non-truth-theoretic nature of linguistic semantics 
is RT’s claim that linguistic meaning UNDERDETERMINES utterance meaning, i.e. it 
underdetermines the thought/proposition communicated by a speaker. It is because 
linguistic meaning is non-truth-theoretic that speaker meaning cannot be determined by 
linguistic decoding alone but has to be derived by pragmatic inference (from context). 
RT’s linguistic UNDERDETERMINACY THESIS pertains to all levels: ‘While sentences 
encode thought/proposition templates, words encode concept templates; it’s linguistic 
underdeterminacy all the way down’ (Carston 2002: 360).  
One of the key insights of Relevance Theory (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 1987, 
Wilson & Sperber 2004) is that the inferring of speaker meaning is guided by the 
pragmatic principle of RELEVANCE. A stimulus (e.g. an utterance) is taken to be relevant 
if it yields a POSITIVE COGNITIVE EFFECT. In other words, a stimulus is relevant if it 
makes a difference to an individual’s representation of the world by improving the 
individual’s knowledge, confirming a suspicion, settling a doubt, etc. The central type 
of positive cognitive effect caused by the processing of an utterance is a CONTEXTUAL 
IMPLICATION. This is a conclusion deducible from the conjunction of the linguistic input 
and the context. In general terms, the greater the positive cognitive effect is, the greater 
the relevance of the stimulus.  
However, construing relevance just in terms of positive cognitive effects does 
not suffice. In principle, there is no limit as to how many and what sort of contextual 
implications an individual may draw; there is nothing that tells the hearer which of the 
many potentially relevant contextual implications is the most relevant. What 
counterbalances this undesirable result is the importance of PROCESSING EFFORT, which 
is the required use of perception, memory and inference, in establishing the most 
relevant conclusion. Generally, the less the processing effort is, the greater the relevance 
of the stimulus. For Relevance Theory thus relevance is calculated in terms of positive 
cognitive effects and processing effort. Consider the following example, taken from 
Wilson & Sperber (1993). 
(1) Peter took out his key and opened the door. 
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In (1), the fact that the speaker conjoined two pieces of information (that Peter took out 
his key and that he opened the door) suggests that the speaker intends these two pieces 
of information to be processed together (i.e. as relevant to each other). Wilson & 
Sperber (1993) argue that because encyclopaedic knowledge that to open a door one 
normally uses a key is easily accessible, the interpretation that Peter used the key he 
took out (referred to in the first verb phrase) to open the door (referred to in the second 
verb phrase) comes readily to mind. This interpretation yields adequate cognitive effects 
(i.e. it explains why Peter took out his keys or how he opened the door) with the least 
cognitive effort (because the knowledge of how possessing keys is relevant to opening a 
door is easily accessible) and is thus taken by the hearer to be the intended speaker 
meaning. 
 In the next section, I discuss problems in RT’s distinction between linguistic 
and real kinds of semantic content.  
2.1.1 Relevance Theory’s linguistic-real distinction 
Parallel to the distinction between linguistic semantics and real semantics is RT’s 
distinction between LEXICAL and AD HOC
2
 concepts. Lexical concepts are elements of 
the logical form decoded by the language module, whereas ad hoc concepts are 
elements of the pragmatically inferable thought. By definition, the content of lexical 
concepts (just like the content of the logical form which is composed by lexical 
concepts) does not have truth-theoretic properties. In contrast, the content of ad hoc 
concepts (just like the content of the thought/proposition which is composed by ad hoc 
concepts) has truth-theoretic properties. Thus, just as the decoded logical form 
underdetermines the communicated thought/proposition at the sentence level, so the 
decoded lexical concept underdetermines the communicated ad hoc concept at the word 
level. Carston (2010: 250) suggests that the most plausible assumption is that both 
lexical and ad hoc concepts are atomic in the sense of Fodor (1998).
3
 
 In the spirit of RT’s underdeterminacy thesis, Carston (e.g. 1998: 2, 2002: 360) 
entertains the idea that words encode ‘concept schemas’ or ‘pointers’ to a conceptual 
space. As such, they are ‘templates’ for the construction of a fully propositional 
conceptual structure. On this proposal, schematic content of concepts encoded by 
                                                          
2
 The notion of ad hoc memory categories was first proposed by Barsalou (1983), for whom ad hoc 
categories, unlike common categories (like birds, furniture), are not well established in memory.  
3
 I return to this issue in 2.1.3.1.  
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linguistic expressions is juxtaposed with the real (i.e. truth-theoretic) nature of the ad 
hoc concepts and thoughts/propositions they compose.   
 However, this radical understanding of linguistic underdeterminacy – in terms 
of truth-theoretic value or lack of it – has been consistently undermined in RT. Already 
in (2002: 362), Carston allows that at least some lexical concepts – for example, natural 
kind concepts like CAT – are ‘full-fledged’. By this, Carston means that some lexical 
concepts have truth-theoretic properties. This already undermines the distinction 
between two kinds of semantic content.  
 In fact, this problem goes deeper. Burton-Roberts (2005) observes that Carston 
(2002) consistently qualifies her claim that sentences do not encode propositions, i.e. 
truth-theoretic objects, by ‘seldom if ever’ or ‘almost never’. He also notes that Sperber 
& Wilson (1986/95) allow that the decoded logical form enters into logical relations of 
contradiction and therefore implication. Consider example (2) below (discussed in 
Burton-Roberts 2005: 395-396). 
(2) She carried it. 
According to Sperber & Wilson (1986/95), the logical form of sentence (2) (i.e. SOME 
FEMALE ENTITY AT SOME POINT IN THE PAST CARRIED SOMETHING), 
enters into the relation of contradiction with NO ONE EVER CARRIED ANYTHING 
and thus into the relation of implication with SOMEONE AT SOME POINT CARRIED 
SOMETHING. The problem with this, Burton-Roberts (2005) argues, is that only 
propositional, i.e. truth-theoretic, forms can ever enter into logical relations. In other 
words, by allowing that the decoded logical form enters into logical relations of 
entailment and contradiction, Sperber & Wilson must allow that the decoded logical 
form has truth-theoretic properties. This leads Burton-Roberts (ibid.) to argue that RT’s 
concept schemas, which are elements of the logical form, actually are general concepts.  
Burton-Roberts’ argument is further supported by Carston’s (2010: 235) 
observation that a ‘hearer of ‘She’s happy’ who retrieves just the proposition SOME 
FEMALE PERSON IS HAPPY has not fully grasped the proposition expressed’ [my 
emphasis]. What is grasped – i.e. the linguistically encoded, ‘existentially closed’ 
formula – is given the status of a proposition by Carston, contrary to RT’s 
underdeterminacy thesis. 
Burton-Roberts’ point is also strengthened by various claims in Carston (2010), 
in particular by Carston’s (2010: 242) claim that inferred ad hoc concepts ‘may be more 
specific or more general than the encoded concepts’. The problem with it is that if 
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concepts can be compared for specificity, they must have the same kind of semantics. 
Indeed, Carston (2010: 245) makes an unambiguous statement when she writes that 
(full-fledged) lexical concepts are ‘basic element[s] of the language of thought’.  
This shows that RT’s distinction between ad hoc concepts and lexical concepts 
in terms of truth-theoretic value or lack of it has actually collapsed. This leads to several 
problems for RT. The first is that if truth theoretic value or lack of it is no longer 
defining of the linguistic-real distinction, it is not clear how RT still subscribes to the 
linguistic underdeterminacy thesis. The second problem is that if some lexical concepts 
are full-fledged, it is not clear that lexical concepts can actually provide linguistic 
‘evidence’ for the speaker-intended interpretation. I explain this problem in 2.1.2. The 
third problem is that with the truth-theoretic versus non-truth-theoretic distinction 
undermined, there is no longer a principled distinction between RT’s lexical concepts 
and ad hoc concepts. I discuss this problem in 2.1.3. 
2.1.2 The problem of linguistic ‘evidence’ 
As Carston (2002: 365) puts it, encoded linguistic semantics (henceforth ‘encoded 
semantics’ or ‘linguistic semantics’) provides ‘evidence (often rich and detailed 
evidence, but never a complete encoding, never a proof) of the thoughts being 
communicated’. Wedgewood (2007: 666) phrases it in terms of shared content: ‘RT 
notion of encoded meaning […] provides the logically necessary level of some 
infallibly shared content’.    
There are two ways in which linguistic semantics is supposed to be shared in 
RT. The first pertains to context-independence – encoded meaning is shared across 
contexts. I refer to it as cross-context shareability. The second refers to shareability 
among speakers – in RT linguistic meaning is (widely) shared amongst members of the 
same speech community. I refer to it as cross-speaker shareability.  
Cross-context shareability allows that the (shared) encoded content be 
deterministically (i.e. necessarily, always) decoded by the linguistic system. Without the 
assumption of cross-context shareability, positing the process of deterministic decoding 
would be implausible. As for cross-speaker shareability, it is supposed to help explain 
how mutual understanding between interlocutors, against their backgrounds of holistic, 
idiosyncratic beliefs, is possible. Explaining mutual understanding is a huge task and 
encoded semantics is supposed to aid it by providing a (relatively) stable mutual core of 
meaning shared by interlocutors in communication. Thus, the theoretical significance of 
cross-speaker shareability falls on the assumption that it is a reliable – because shared 
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by (almost) all speakers of a given language – constraint on pragmatic search for the 
speaker intended meaning. It is in this sense that encoded semantics functions as the 
linguistic ‘evidence’.  
However, I argue that neither concept schemas nor full-fledged lexical concepts 
can (or are necessary to) provide evidence for intended speaker meaning. 
2.1.2.1 Concept schemas 
Recanati (1998: 630) makes reference to Hintzman’s (1986) multiple-trace theory of 
memory, which predicts that ‘[w]ords, as expression-types, do not have “meanings”, 
over and above the collection of token-experiences they are associated with. The only 
meaning which words have is that which emerges in context’. Carston (2002: 375) also 
makes reference to Hintzman’s radical contextualism, but only to reject it in favour of a 
more ‘conservative’ view ‘on which words do encode something, albeit something very 
schematic, which simply sends the system off to a particular region in long-term 
memory’. The schemas that Carston talks about are, as discussed above, one proposed 
type of encoded semantics. But there are problems. 
Firstly, there are fundamental questions about the cognitive function of 
abstract/schematic lexical concepts and how they are acquired. Cross-context 
shareability demands that encoded semantics is a context-invariant, stable ‘meaning’ of 
a word, which underlies all uses of a particular word. For example, for a word like take, 
encoded semantics has to underlie such uses as take money from someone=remove 
something without permission, take 4 from 15=subtract, take credit cards=accept, take 
the bus=travel somewhere using a particular form of transport, take linguistics at 
university=study, etc.
4
 This brief survey of different uses of the word take shows that 
for encoded semantics to underlie all uses of a given word it has to be very abstract or 
schematic.
5
   
The abstract nature of lexical semantics is actually the first problem that we 
encounter: Carston (2002: 364-365) herself concedes that schemas are so abstract that 
they are (almost) never employed in thinking. She admits that it is quite difficult to see 
how they are ever acquired if they do not play a role in thoughts and how they become 
the meanings of lexical expression types. The first concern reveals an interesting thing: 
                                                          
4
 These uses were taken(!) from Cambridge Dictionaries Online. 
5
 Young (2005) also criticises the notion of a concept schema. Young (2006) illustrates the ‘abstractness’ 
problem in particular with a thorough cross-linguistic comparison of the form-concept relations for the 
English word open. 
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since it is only concepts, not concept ‘templates’, that are entertainable in (i.e. play a 
role in, are elements of) thought, it seems that even for Carston, schemas should 
preferably be general concepts if they are ever to be acquired. Despite these problems, 
Carston assumes the following. 
Quote 1: There must be some process of abstraction, or extraction, from the 
particular concepts associated with the phonological form /open/ to the more 
general ‘meaning’, which then functions as a gateway both to the existing 
concepts of opening and to the materials needed to make new OPEN* concepts 
which may arise in the understanding of subsequent utterances. (Carston 2002: 
364) 
 
However, as noted by Burton-Roberts (2007), there is a problem with the acquisition of 
concept schemas. Linguistic semantics is supposed to be acquired in experience and, in 
Carston’s terms, it provides a ‘gateway’ to the understanding of the meaning of a word 
in context. It guides the hearer to the intended context-dependent meaning of a word. 
However, linguistic semantics is abstracted from, and hence presupposes prior 
understanding of utterances. In other words, the acquisition of linguistic semantics is 
post hoc. But if the acquisition of linguistic semantics is post hoc and presupposes prior 
understanding of utterances, then, in principle, decoding linguistic semantics cannot be 
a necessary step in utterance interpretation.  
In a nutshell, the problem is that positing concept schemas as encoded semantics 
amounts to positing constructs which are either (a) impossible to acquire, since it is 
impossible to employ them in thinking or (b) possible to acquire, but not necessary in 
understanding an utterance. If (a), concept schemas cannot function as cross-context 
shared content. If (b), their post hoc acquisition undermines the condition that they be 
necessarily (i.e. deterministically) accessed. 
I will later argue that concept schemas (by which I mean general concepts) – 
even when they exist – are not linguistically decoded, but pragmatically inferred. In the 
meantime, I look at full-fledged lexical concepts.  
2.1.2.2 Full-fledged lexical concepts 
Carston (2002, 2010) asserts that RT follows Fodor (1998, 2008) in assuming that 
conceptual correlates of words are atomic, i.e. not compositionally constituted. As 
discussed in chapter 1, Fodor’s atomism equals, roughly, the assumption that all 
apparent logical relations and other information which is associated with a given 
concept do not constitute the content of this concept. The content of a concept is 
44 
 
constituted by a causal relation a concept bears to things in the mind-external world. For 
example, the content of an atomic concept like CAT is constituted by its relation to 
properties that cats in the mind-external world possess.
6
   
Likewise, in RT, every word is taken to encode an atomic concept. For example, 
the word cat encodes an atomic concept CAT. By assumption, all the bits of 
information that in a cogniser’s memory may be associated with the word cat – for 
instance, that cats are animals, that they are quadrupled felines, that they meow, have 
whiskers, that my neighbour’s cat is called Smudge, that Smudge scratched my 
neighbour last week, etc. – do not constitute the content of this concept. In other words, 
all associated (logical and encyclopaedic) information is, by assumption, non-
constitutively attached to a given concept.  
That said, Carston (e.g. 2002: 214, fn 31) emphasises the following difference 
between Fodor’s account and RT. Fodor, she argues, endorses a code model of 
communication whereby the concepts communicated are the same as the concepts 
en/decoded. In RT, however, there is only a partial mapping between words and 
concepts since large part of the conceptual repertoire is not lexicalised – i.e. large part 
of the conceptual repertoire is populated by ad hoc concepts.
7
 
Importantly, Carston (2010: 247) argues that ad hoc concepts are contextually 
derived from such a (non-content constitutive) pool of logical and 
individualistic/holistic information. This means that ad hoc concepts are constructed 
through personal inference and shows that Carston’s LOT (unlike Fodor’s LOT) is 
populated by pragmatically (i.e. individualistically/holistically) derived concepts. Thus, 
Carston’s conceptual content (unlike Fodor’s content) is not free from 
individualism/holism. This gives rise to another problem for Carston’s argument that 
lexical concepts provide ‘evidence’ for the speaker intended meaning.  
As mentioned at the outset of this section, full-fledged lexical concepts are ex-ad 
hoc concepts which underwent lexicalisation and became encoded as linguistic meaning 
(Carston 2010: 244). The problem with linguistic ‘evidence’ in the case of full-fledged 
lexical concepts is that if full-fledged lexical concepts are ex-ad hoc concepts, then they 
                                                          
6 Fodor writes:    
[…] concepts have both referents and a congeries of beliefs (etc.) in which they are embedded. 
It’s just that, whereas the former has to do with the content of the concept, the latter has to do 
with its (e.g. inferential) role in mental processes. The distinction between these is independently 
motivated; content is what composes, and inferential roles and the like do not. (Fodor 2008: 87-
88) 
7
 A similar claim is made by Lalumera (2009).  
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have been constructed through personal inference. If that is the case, full-fledged lexical 
concepts cannot, in principle, constitute adequate cross-speaker ‘evidence’. 
It may be argued that the problems I have discussed in this section are not really 
problems for RT. After all, Carston (2002: 365, 19-20) makes it clear that linguistic 
semantics is ‘never a proof’ and that it is only ‘widely’ shared among members of the 
same speech community. However, what I have discussed here does raise the question 
of whether it is true that (A) or (B): 
(A) Hearer H converges (to a sufficient degree) on what speaker S communicates 
because S and H share linguistic semantic content which is encoded and 
therefore deterministically decoded in utterance interpretation and which 
therefore constrains utterance interpretation 
(B) Hearer H converges (to a sufficient degree) on what speaker S communicates 
despite the non-existence of such shared linguistic semantic content  
In this section, I have argued that linguistic semantic content is either impossible to 
acquire or if possible, then either unnecessary in utterance interpretation (because post 
hoc) or not cross-speaker shared (because constructed through personal inference). The 
status quo is this. RT’s distinction between real and linguistic semantics can no longer 
be made in terms of truth-theoretic value or lack of it (as argued in 2.1.1). Neither can it 
be made in terms of the distinction between holistic/individualistic content versus 
shared content, respectively (as argued in this section). However, there is one more way 
of defining the distinction between real and linguistic semantics – namely, in terms of 
the distinction between the cognitive processes of decoding versus inferring (as argued 
by Carston 2002: 11). This distinction, however, relies on RT’s conservative 
assumption that the cognitive process of deterministic decoding of specifically linguistic 
semantics is a necessary step in utterance interpretation. In what follows, I argue that the 
process of decoding is actually redundant. 
2.1.3 Redundancy of decoding 
In this section, I argue that decoding is redundant in cases of loose use, cases of so-
called ‘concept narrowing’8 and where the communicated concept is the same as the 
purportedly encoded concept, i.e. in pretty much all cases. My argument holds 
                                                          
8
 In RT (Carston 1996, 2002), concept narrowing and broadening are both accounted for by the single 
process of concept adjustment/modulation. I use the term “narrowing” for expository purposes.  
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regardless of whether concepts are thought to be atomic á la Fodor (1998, 2008) or 
compositionally constituted. 
2.1.3.1 Atomic content or compositional content? 
As discussed earlier, Carston (2002, 2010) asserts that RT follows Fodor (1998, 2008) 
in assuming that conceptual correlates of words are atomic, i.e. not compositionally 
constituted. In practice, however, conceptual correlates of words are often decomposed 
into analytic properties in RT. Burton-Roberts (2005: 399) observes that Carston (2002) 
sometimes decomposes lexical concepts; for example, RAW is decomposed into NOT + 
COOKED. Relatedly, consider example (3) below (taken from Carston 2002: 27). 
(3) The steak is raw.  
In RT, the interpretation of the utterance of (3) proceeds is two steps. First, the 
linguistic system deterministically decodes the lexical concept RAW
9
, which we can 
understand as not cooked (though, by RT’s assumption, this concept is not 
compositionally constituted). From such linguistically decoded input, the pragmatics 
module derives the ad hoc concept RAW*, which is the concept communicated in this 
particular context. Here we can understand the concept RAW* as ‘cooked but not long 
enough’, but again, by assumption, this concept is atomic.  
The use of the word raw in (3) exemplifies the so-called ‘loose use’ (/’concept 
broadening’), the term which subsumes metaphorical uses, hyperbolic uses or cases in 
between. In such cases, the encoded lexical concept is ‘relaxed’ and a more general ad 
hoc concept is pragmatically derived on its basis. Now, Carston (2002: 28) observes that 
the idea that the ad hoc concept is pragmatically derived from a lexical concept is 
controversial in cases like (3). This is because, the ad hoc concept RAW* is not 
logically related to the lexical concept RAW. Carston’s point is that RAW* cannot be 
derived from RAW because RAW* does not ‘analytically imply [uncookedness]’.  
There are two observations to be made here. First, if RAW* cannot be derived 
from the lexical concept RAW, it follows that the lexical concept is only decoded to be 
‘dropped and replaced’ with a logically unrelated ad hoc concept. This is acknowledged 
by Carston (2002: 28, 341, 358), who herself talks of the ‘drop and replace’ scenario in 
the case of loose use. The problem is that if the lexical concept is only decoded to be 
‘dropped and replaced’, it is needlessly decoded.   
                                                          
9
 By convention, in RT lexical concepts are represented by using capitalised letters, whereas ad hoc 
concepts are accompanied by asterisks (*).  
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The second observation is this. Carston (Carston 2002: 28) argues that the idea 
that ad hoc concepts are pragmatically derived from lexical concepts is controversial in 
the case of loose use like (3) precisely because the communicated concept does not 
‘analytically imply’ the lexical concept. From this we can deduce that there is nothing 
controversial in an ad hoc concept being pragmatically derived from a lexical concept if 
the ad hoc concept ‘analytically implies’ the lexical concept. The problem for Carston is 
that if the ad hoc concept ‘analytically implies’ the lexical concept, then it is, in part, 
compositionally constituted by it. Otherwise, it would not ‘analytically imply’ it.  
This further shows that in RT there is an instability about whether concepts are 
atomic or compositional. A bigger problem for RT, however, is that the cognitive 
process of decoding of lexical concepts is redundant regardless of whether concepts are 
taken to be atomic or compositionally constituted. This is what I turn to now. 
2.1.3.2 The redundancy problem 
In RT (e.g. Carston 2002, 2010), the process involved in the derivation of ad hoc 
concepts is the pragmatic process of concept MODULATION or ADJUSTMENT. For 
example, in the case of loose use the lexical concept is modulated/adjusted so as to 
derive a more general concept. As discussed, it is acknowledged in RT that in cases of 
loose use the idea of pragmatic derivation of an ad hoc concept from a lexical concept is 
controversial.  
Let us now apply RT’s ‘decoding plus inferring’ model to the analysis of (4) and 
(5) below (taken from a random BNC
10
 search). 
(4) When Mr Cerezo, before his election, stood up against successive military 
regimes the rightists tried to kill him. 
(5) […] one of the mechanisms by which phagocytes kill intercellular organisms is 
the production of reactive oxygen intermediates […]. 
On the assumption that RT’s model does apply here, the interpretation of the word kill 
in (4) and (5) proceeds in two steps. First, a lexical concept KILL is deterministically 
decoded (as part of the logical form) in both (4) and (5). The second step involves the 
pragmatic process of modulation/adjustment of the lexical concept to a more specific ad 
hoc concept – KILL* in (4) and KILL** in (5). In cases of concept narrowing, the idea 
                                                          
10
 Data cited herein have been extracted from the British National Corpus Online service, managed by 
Oxford University Computing Services on behalf of the BNC Consortium. All rights in the texts cited are 
reserved. 
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of pragmatic derivation of the ad hoc concept on the basis of the lexical concept does 
not seem controversial because the pragmatically communicated ad hoc concepts do 
entail the encoded lexical concept – i.e. the concept KILL in both examples.  
However, Burton-Roberts (2007) and Groefsema (2007) argue that the very 
notion of concept adjustment or modulation is incompatible with the notion of atomic 
conceptual content; if lexical concepts really are atomic, then they cannot in principle be 
adjusted or modulated. Now, when RT theorists argue that ad hoc concepts are formed 
from lexical concepts, what they mean is that ad hoc concepts are formed from logical 
and encyclopaedic entries attached to lexical concepts (as discussed earlier). Since, by 
definition, lexical concepts are atomic and since logical and encyclopaedic entries are in 
RT non-content-constitutive, i.e. they are not part of the lexical concept, ad hoc concept 
formation cannot amount to the modulation or any other sort of manipulation of the 
lexical concept. It can only amount to the replacement of the posited lexical concept 
with another one.  
The problem for RT is that if concepts are – as Carston argues – atomic, Burton-
Roberts’/Groefsema’s criticism applies to all cases of utterance interpretation. If that is 
the case, lexical concepts are always decoded only to be dropped and replaced with ad 
hoc concepts, i.e. they are needlessly decoded.  
However, given RT’s instability regarding whether concepts are atomic or not, 
Burton-Roberts’/Groefsema’s criticism might be dismissed on the grounds that it is 
irrelevant because RT actually allows that concepts are compositionally constituted. I 
argue that the cognitive process of deterministic decoding of lexical concepts is 
redundant even if concepts are taken to be compositionally constituted.   
With loose uses like (3) (‘The steak is raw’) the redundancy of decoding seems 
quite clear. If concepts are compositionally constituted, then the concept encoded by the 
word raw is that of not being cooked, whereas the concept communicated by the use of 
this word in the context of (3) is that of being cooked but not enough. In line with 
Carston’s own argument, the communicated concept cannot be pragmatically derived 
from the encoded lexical concept because, if something has been cooked even for a 
short period of time, then it is not the case that it has not been cooked. Thus, even on a 
compositional analysis, the concept of not being cooked is needlessly decoded only to 
be dropped and replaced with an ad hoc concept.  
The situation with concept narrowing seems less straightforward but is not less 
problematic for RT. Consider (4) and (5) again. Given the availability of a 
compositional analysis in RT, RT could argue that in (4) and (5) the communicated ad 
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hoc concepts are pragmatically derived from lexical concepts because they entail the 
lexical concept of causing death.
11
 In (4) the concept of causing death by an 
intentionally acting human agent entails the concept of causing death, and so does the 
concept of causing death by a chemical reaction at a cellular level in (5). Translating 
this into RT’s metalanguage, the fact that the concepts KILL* and KILL** entail KILL 
suggests that both can be seen as pragmatically derived from the lexical concept KILL. 
Prima facie, on a compositional analysis, instances of concept narrowing make a case 
for the existence of deterministically decodable linguistic semantic content which is 
then pragmatically modulated to yield a more specific concept.  
However, the problem for RT is that if KILL* is compositionally constituted by 
the primitive concepts that KILL is composed by, the primitive concepts that compose 
KILL have to be pragmatically derived in deriving KILL*. This means that the 
structured concept KILL must be pragmatically derived (as compositional part of 
KILL*), after it has been deterministically decoded. In other words, in RT the concept 
of causing death has to be activated twice by two distinct cognitive processes. Arguably, 
this makes the activation by the process of decoding redundant (especially in the light of 
problems discussed in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2). The point is that if the primitive concepts that 
compositionally constitute a complex general concept of causing death have to be 
pragmatically derived, it means that they can be pragmatically derived; and if they can 
be pragmatically derived, then they do not have to be deterministically decoded.  
Consider now a case where the communicated concept is not assumed to be 
more general or more specific than the purported lexical concept, but rather the same. In 
RT, concept adjustment is a ‘free’ pragmatic process. This means that there is nothing 
in the linguistic form such as to indicate that it must be carried out (Carston 2010: 242-
243). Carston (ibid.) illustrates the ‘free’ nature of concept adjustment with the use of 
the word dance in the following example. 
(6) Children in most cultures dance spontaneously. 
According to Carston (ibid.), the use of dance in (6) communicates a general concept of 
dancing (i.e. a concept devoid of any particularities such as specific movements). As 
                                                          
11
 Two brief comments are in order here. Fodor (1970) objects to the idea that the word kill can be 
compositionally defined in terms of cause to die. The first point is that I assume that RT could 
compositionally analyse the word kill in (4) and (5) because compositional analysis is allowed in RT (as 
discussed in 2.1.3.1). The second point is that Fodor’s (1998, 2008) claim that the content of conceptual 
correlates of words is atomic and referential cannot be maintained for the reasons discussed in chapter 1. 
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dance also happens to encode this general concept, there is no need for ‘adjustment’ 
here.  
The problem for RT is that in cases like (6), the linguistic system first 
deterministically decodes the encoded concept and then, on the basis of contextually 
available information, the pragmatics module infers that this and no other concept is 
being communicated. The point is that concept adjustment/modulation may not be 
necessary, but perceiving that no further adjustment is required is itself a pragmatic 
inference (from context). Thus, in cases like (6) one and the same concept is activated 
twice by two distinct processes, decoding and inferring. Because the relevant concept 
has to be pragmatically inferred anyway, and because there are so many problems with 
linguistic semantics, I argue that it is the process of decoding which is redundant. 
2.1.4 Interim summary 
The point I have been making so far is this. The notion of linguistic semantics is posited 
in aid of saying that there is some constant semantic property of a word which 
constrains the search for speaker-intended meaning. But there are compelling arguments 
that linguistic semantics is a poorly defined construct (section 2.1.1), which is 
impossible to acquire (section 2.1.2) or if possible to acquire, it is unnecessary in 
utterance interpretation because post hoc and, in principle, not shared (section 2.1.2). 
Furthermore, the process of deterministic decoding of such content is redundant 
regardless of the strength of RT’s commitment to Fodor’s (1998, 2008) atomism (2.1.3). 
In cases of loose use like (3) decoding is redundant; if the ad hoc concept is logically 
unrelated to the lexical concept, the lexical concept cannot constrain the search for the 
communicated ad hoc concept – a point acknowledged by Carston (2002: 28). In cases 
of the so-called ‘concept narrowing’ and where the purported lexical concept is the 
same as the communicated concept, decoding is redundant because the concept that is 
decoded has to be pragmatically inferred anyway.   
As mentioned, RT’s insistence on the existence of linguistic semantics appears 
to rest on cases where the communicated concept is assumed to be more specific that 
the lexical concept from which it is allegedly derived. In cases like this, if linguistic 
semantics existed it could constrain the search for ad hoc concepts. However, the 
intuition that the ad hoc concept is logically related to a lexical concept arises only 
when the a priori assumption (A) is made. In other words, an ad hoc concept like KILL* 
can be seen as logically related to a lexical concept KILL only if one assumes that a 
lexical concept KILL exists.  
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 Now, it is undeniable that, for example, a specific concept of causing death by 
an intentionally acting human agent (as in (4)) is logically related to a more general 
concept of causing death. However, we cannot and should not (in the light of the 
problems with the notion of linguistic semantics discussed so far) extrapolate from this 
fact to the existence of specifically linguistic semantic level. Similarly, the undeniable 
fact that the word kill in (4) and (5) is used to communicate partially overlapping 
concepts, should not lead us to conclude that this overlap (the intersection) constitutes 
evidence for the existence of linguistic semantics.  
I argue that there is no linguistic semantics (and no lexical concepts) and that 
utterance interpretation is a wholly pragmatic, inferential enterprise. But if I want to 
argue that, I need to face two lines of criticism; (a) If words do not have meaning in 
virtue of encoding linguistic semantics as their constitutive property, then how do they 
mean?; (b) If there is no linguistic semantics constraining word use and interpretation, 
then how do we ever communicate successfully? In the next section, I argue that the 
Representational Hypothesis’ (e.g. Burton-Roberts 2012) definition of meaning-as-
relation invalidates criticism (a) and that Hintzman’s (1986) multiple-trace theory of 
memory and information retrieval invalidates (b).  
2.2 Utterance interpretation without linguistic semantics 
In this section, I first introduce the notion of words as linguistic ‘pointers’ to 
conceptual space and discuss the incompatibility of the ‘pointer’ metaphor with the 
double-interface view of language. Along with the Representational Hypothesis, I 
reject the double-interface view and adopt the semiotic (in the sense of Peirce) notion 
of a pointer. I introduce the Representational Hypothesis and endorse its definition of 
meaning-as-relation (to semantic content) as well as its stance on the nature of 
semantics. Finally, I argue that the mechanics of the representational account can be 
implemented in terms of Hintzman’s (e.g. 1986) multiple-trace theory of memory. I 
discuss some advantages of a wholly pragmatic, inferential account of utterance 
interpretation over a two-step (i.e. decoding and inferring) model like that of Relevance 
Theory’s.  
2.2.1 Saussurean/Chomskyan linguistics  
As discussed earlier, RT’s distinction between deterministically (i.e. necessarily, 
always) decoded lexical concepts and ad hoc concepts is motivated by the traditional 
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double-interface assumption whereby linguistic signs have meaning in virtue of being 
partly constituted by semantic properties. Because in RT it is in virtue of the decoding-
inferring distinction that linguistic signs are argued to have some specifically linguistic 
meaning, the decoding-inferring distinction is also dictated by the double-interface 
view. 
However, Burton-Roberts (e.g. 2009, 2011) argues that the double-interface idea 
itself is problematic and redundant. The next section places the problems with linguistic 
semantics and lexical concepts in the context of the double-interface view of language.  
2.2.1.1 Linguistic semantics and the notion of a pointer 
Fodor’s lexical-conceptual isomorphism (discussed in 1.1) is a very strong version of 
the claim that natural languages ‘inherit’ their semantics from the semantics of thought 
(e.g. Fodor 1998: 9). However, as argued in 1.1.2, even a brief consideration of cross-
linguistic data provides strong evidence that Fodor’s lexical-conceptual isomorphism is 
untenable (e.g. the existence of referential equivalents such as English shallow and 
French peu profond). Furthermore, isomorphism is incompatible with the following 
claims of Fodor’s: 
Quote 2: English inherits its semantics from the contents of the beliefs, desires, 
intentions, and so forth that it’s used to express, as per Grice and his followers. 
Or, if you prefer (as I think, on balance, I do), English has no semantics. 
Learning English isn’t learning a theory about what its sentences mean, it’s 
learning how to associate its sentences with the corresponding thoughts. (Fodor 
1998: 9) 
Quote 3: […] only thought has content, strictly speaking. (Fodor 2001: 2)  
Quote 4: Quite possibly English has no semantics, some appearances to the 
contrary notwithstanding. (Fodor 2008: 99) 
 
Strictly speaking, the claim that natural language expressions ‘inherit’ their semantics 
from the semantics of thought is incompatible with the claim that natural language (e.g. 
English) expressions have no semantics at all. One has to make a choice between these 
two contrary claims. In the light of problems with Fodor’s lexical-conceptual 
isomorphism (which supply an argument against the ‘inheritance’ account), it becomes 
necessary to consider carefully the assumption that linguistic expressions have no 
semantic properties.  
It is also important to notice that the same tension – regarding the ascription of 
semantic properties to linguistic expressions – is present in Relevance Theory (e.g. 
53 
 
Sperber & Wilson 1998, Carston 2002: 360). Despite positing linguistic semantics as 
mediating between linguistic forms and ad hoc concepts, Carston (e.g. 2002: 330, 360) 
occasionally speaks of linguistic encodings as ‘pointers’ to conceptual space. This is 
interesting because in the case of ‘pointers’ we are not dealing with linguistic semantic 
content, but with pragmatic constraints on the processing of an utterance. This is made 
clear in Carston’s discussion of Blakemore’s account of discourse markers, quoted 
below. 
Quote 5: Blakemore found that rather than making conceptual contributions 
to some other level (implicatures), they [discourse markers] appear to function 
more like filters on, or pointers to, the pragmatic inferences the hearer is to 
carry out. (Carston 2002: 160-161, my emphasis)  
 
If pointers do not make ‘conceptual contributions’ to utterance interpretation, it means 
that they are not constituted by semantic/conceptual properties. In fact, even though for 
Blakemore (1992) discourse markers encode procedural semantics (but not conceptual 
semantics), it is not clear that Carston uses the pointer metaphor to talk of any sort of 
encoding. According to Carston (2002: 360-363), it may be that a word (p.360) or even 
the lexical form (p.361) ‘points to a conceptual region or maps to an address (or node, 
or gateway, or whatever) in memory’ and that ‘this pointing or mapping provides access 
to certain bundles of information’. But to entertain the idea that it is the lexical form 
which ‘points’ to specific regions in memory is to entertain the idea that linguistic 
expressions ‘have meaning’ without having linguistic semantics as their constitutive 
property. This is to deny the rationale for positing linguistic semantics. As was the case 
with Fodor, the problems with Relevance Theory’s notion of linguistic semantics 
suggest that the notion of a linguistic expression as a pointer needs to be seriously 
considered.
 
Interestingly, Carston (2002: 363) thinks that this choice ‘doesn’t make 
much difference’ and she in fact continues to attribute conceptual properties to words.  
Significantly, Chomsky (2003: 303) too has expressed a view of linguistic 
expressions as ‘pointers’ to conceptual space. Occasionally, Chomsky (e.g. 2000a: 61) 
has also argued that in language acquisition children ‘label’ already available concepts, 
‘with much or all of their intricacy and structure predetermined’. Whereas the notion of 
words as ‘pointers to’ or ‘labels for’ concepts seems appealing (especially in the light of 
the problems with Fodor’s account and Relevance Theory), there does seem to be a 
problem with its application on Chomskyan account. 
As observed by Burton-Roberts (2007), pointers or labels, in principle, do not 
have the properties of what they point to or what they label. When I point with my 
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finger at a tree, my finger does not partake the properties of that tree. Similarly, a label 
on a bottle of wine does not have the properties of that bottle, nor of the wine. A price 
label on a supermarket shelf is not the price itself, it just points at (communicates) what 
the price is. It does not have the properties of the price either; the properties that a price 
label has can be: made of paper, made of plastic, made of printer or ball-pen ink, 
perhaps even self-adhesive. Prices, on the other hand, are clearly not made of plastic, 
etc., nor can they ever be self-adhesive. To have a pointer or a label, then, is to have 
something other than what they point to or label.   
The problem, already signposted in 1.2.4, is that if words are pointers to 
conceptual space, then it is at least conceptually unnecessary to attribute to them the 
properties that they point to, i.e. semantic/conceptual properties. The view of words as 
pointers is thus incompatible with the double-interface view of linguistic expressions as 
constituted by phonological and semantic properties (<PNON, SEM>). One has to make a 
choice between them.   
I have already suggested that the problems with Fodor’s lexical-conceptual 
isomorphism and the problems with Relevance Theory’s notions of linguistic semantics 
and lexical concepts require that the view of words as pointers be carefully considered. 
Chomsky’s double-interface view of language is relevant here because, as argued 
earlier, it is the double-interface claim itself that imposes the claim about the existence 
of encoded semantics. Therefore, if it can be shown that the double-interface idea itself 
is problematic and redundant, we have compelling arguments to reject it along with its 
implications.  
In fact, Burton-Roberts (e.g. 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012; Burton-Roberts & Poole 
2006a, 2006b) argues that the double-interface view of language is: 
- unnecessary on semiotic grounds 
- insufficient on conceptual grounds, and  
- impossible on sortal grounds (i.e. it constitutes a category mistake) 
I will now discuss Burton-Roberts’ arguments against the double-interface view of 
language.  
2.2.1.2 Problems with the double-interface view of language 
As observed by Burton-Roberts (2011), the Chomskyan double-interface view of 
language is closely tied up with the traditional, Saussurean, view of a linguistic sign. 
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For Saussure, a linguistic sign is composed of two parts: a sound image (phonology) on 
the sound side and a concept (semantics) on the meaning side. For Chomsky: 
Quote 6: […] there are sensorimotor systems that access one aspect of an 
expression and there are conceptual-intentional systems that access another 
aspect of an expression, which means that an expression has to have two kinds 
of symbolic objects as its parts. These objects can be regarded as a kind of an 
interface between the language faculty and other systems of the mind-brain. 
(Chomsky 2000b: 9, my emphasis) 
 
The relation that a sound image and a concept have with respect to one another and with 
respect to the sign that they together make up is a part-part (i.e. mereological) relation. 
The nature of the relation between the sound image and the concept is arbitrary. This is 
why the concept CAT, for example, is ‘expressed’ by different words in different 
languages – cat in English, gato in Spanish and kissa in Finnish.   
Burton-Roberts (2012) points out that the mereological (part-part) idea is 
conceptually insufficient to account for meaning; there is nothing in the mereological 
relation itself between a sound image and a concept that distinguishes it from the 
mereological relation between a bottle and a cork or a table leg and a table top. 
Crucially, the mereological relation does not explain why a concept (i.e. semantics) 
should be related to a sound image – it has nothing to say about meaning. Therefore, 
Burton-Roberts (ibid.) argues, it was necessary for Saussure to supplement the 
mereological idea with the semiotic (signifier-signified) idea; in a semiotic relation, the 
sound image is a signifier and a concept is a signified.  
Burton-Roberts also argues that these two ways – mereological and semiotic – of 
thinking about the relation between the sound image and the concept are incompatible. 
Whereas the mereological, part-part relation is a symmetric (two-way) relation (the 
sound image is as much part of the sign as the concept is; they are co-parts), the 
semiotic relation is antisymmetric and it goes from the sound image to the concept.   
Relatedly, Burton-Roberts (2009, 2011) argues that the mereological idea is 
impossible for several reasons. First of all, parts in a mereological relation constitute a 
separate object – just as table legs and a table top constitute a table, so a sound image 
and a concept are taken to constitute a linguistic sign. In this sense, Saussurean sign is 
partly constituted by what it is a sign of, i.e. a concept. However, a semiotic relation is 
different in that it treats the relation between a sound image and a concept in purely 
relational terms – there is no separate object constituted by the two relata. It follows 
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from the semiotic relation then, Burton-Roberts argues, that there is no object 
constituted by the sound properties and the meaning properties.  
Indeed, the mereological idea of a sign is problematic if linguistic signs are to be 
‘realised’ – i.e. produced – in speech. Whereas it is plausible for a sound image to be 
‘realised’ as a sound in speech, it seems inconceivable that a concept or a combination 
of a sound image and concept could be realised as a sound. For example, it is possible to 
‘realise’ as a sound (i.e. to utter) a phonologically constituted object like [not], but it is 
impossible to ‘realise’ as a sound (i.e. to utter) the logical functor of negation (Burton-
Roberts 2007).   
The reason why it is possible to produce in speech the former but not the latter is 
their sortally different natures. Whereas phonology (a sound image) is grounded 
exclusively in phonetics (i.e. it can be interpreted in articulatory-perceptual terms), 
semantics (a concept) is grounded exclusively in conceptual-intentional terms. It is 
these different groundings and their sortal (i.e. categorical) incompatibility that make it 
impossible for the sound image and the concept to be combined into one object. Burton-
Roberts (2011) argues that Saussurean arbitrariness follows from the sortal 
incompatibility of a sound image and a concept – any relation that holds between 
sortally incompatible properties must be arbitrary (i.e. non-natural).  
Now, Chomsky (e.g. 2000b) reconstructs the Saussurean view of a sign by 
adopting the mereological idea; lexical items are taken to be double-interface syntactic 
objects constituted by phonological and semantic properties, but no semiotic relation is 
posited between the two kinds of properties. However, Burton-Roberts (2009, 2011) 
emphasises that the sortal incompatibility of phonological and semantic properties is 
actually acknowledged in Chomskyan linguistics by the principle of Full Interpretation. 
This principle predicts that semantic properties are only interpreted at LF, an interface 
between UG and the conceptual-intentional system, and phonological properties are 
interpreted only at PF, an interface between UG and sensorimotor systems. As observed 
by Burton-Roberts (ibid.), double-interface syntactic objects, i.e. objects constituted by 
phonological and semantic properties are not, however, interpretable at any of the two 
interfaces. Even though double-interface objects enter the syntactic computation, the 
two kinds of properties are separated at Spell-Out to satisfy the principle of Full 
Interpretation. This means that words, or linguistic items, as reconstructed in 
Chomskyan linguistics, i.e. as objects mereologically constituted by phonological and 
semantic properties, are not interpretable. The question that Burton-Roberts (ibid.) thus 
asks is why such double-interface objects should be posited if it is acknowledged that 
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the two properties are sortally incompatible and hence mutually un-interpretable. From 
a methodological perspective, the question is: why posit double-interface objects only to 
split them?  
The discussed problems with the mereological relation raise an important issue. 
If words cannot be constituted by both sound and meaning properties, what are words 
and what is the relation between the two kinds of properties? The answer, as argued by 
Burton-Roberts (e.g. 2007), lies in the semiotic relation – an issue I turn to now.  
2.2.2 Conventional representation: meaning as relation to semantics  
In the previous section, I discussed Burton-Roberts’ criticism of the double-interface 
idea on the grounds that it is (i) insufficient to account for meaning in language as it 
needs to be supplemented by the semiotic relation and (ii) impossible on sortal grounds 
– a fact which is acknowledged in Minimalism by its need to split phonological and 
semantic properties. A further argument of Burton-Roberts’ is that the double-interface 
idea is actually unnecessary to account for meaning in language. In order to account for 
meaning in language, the mereological relation has to be supplemented (as it is for 
Saussure) by an arbitrary, i.e. non-natural, conventional, semiotic relation, whereby the 
sound properties function as a signifier and the meaning properties (concepts) function 
as a signified. Burton-Roberts argues that the explanatory power of the semiotic relation 
renders the anyway problematic mereological relation conceptually unnecessary. In 
what follows, I concentrate on this, perhaps the most important, criticism of the double-
interface idea – the claim that it is unnecessary. I introduce the Representational 
Hypothesis, a framework which is motivated by the problems with the double-interface 
tradition and which develops the semiotic idea.   
Let us consider first how meaning in general arises. The first thing to observe is 
that many things other than words are meaningful to us without our wanting to say that 
they have semantic content. For example, a footprint on the sand ‘is meaningful’ to 
Robinson Crusoe; it means to him that someone has been there. It is an indexical sign, 
i.e. a natural sign which gives rise to meaning independently of (communicative) 
intention. Even though we take the footprint to be meaningful, we would not like to 
attribute any semantic content to it. The same goes for symbolic signs, like the one in 
figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1: National speed limit applies 
                                                
The symbolic sign ‘national speed limit applies’ does not have conceptual/semantic 
properties. It ‘has meaning’ for a person A because when A is driving a passenger car 
on a motorway and A sees it placed next to the road, this sign gives rise to the thought 
in A’s mind that A can speed up to 70 m/h. Meaning here arises in virtue of a semiotic 
relation between a physical sign with no semantic content and a 
semantically/conceptually constituted thought.  
I opened this chapter with the discussion of the notion of a pointer. This notion 
is relevant here because the view of words as pointers to conceptual content suggests a 
view of words as symbolic signs. The Representational Hypothesis (e.g. Burton-Roberts 
& Poole 2006a, 2006b; Burton-Roberts 2012) is a development of the idea that 
utterances of linguistic expressions – i.e. sounds utilised by speakers in communicating 
thoughts – are symbolic signs.   
2.2.2.1 The Representational Hypothesis 
The Representational Hypothesis (henceforth RH) rejects Saussure’s notion of linguistic 
sign and adopts C.S. Peirce’s notion of linguistic sign. The two notions of linguistic sign 
are compared in the figure below.  
Figure 2.2: Saussure’s and Peirce’s notions of linguistic sign 
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As discussed earlier, for Saussure (and for Chomsky) the linguistic sign is partly 
constituted by what is a sign of – i.e. semantics. This notion motivates the assumption 
that linguistic expressions have meaning as their constitutive property (i.e. linguistic 
semantics) and gives rise to the problems discussed in 2.1 and 2.2.1.2. The RH develops 
C.S. Peirce’s notion of linguistic sign where the signifier and the signified are in a 
purely semiotic relation and do not constitute (as they do in the Saussurean and 
Chomskyan traditions) a separate superstructure. For Peirce and for the RH, the 
linguistic sign is other than what it signifies – it is the sound utilised for communication 
which is the linguistic sign (Burton-Roberts 2007, 2012).  
In the RH specifically, sounds of particular languages function as symbolic signs 
which are used to conventionally REPRESENT internalist conceptual/semantic content 
(i.e. structured thought). One of the central claims of the RH is that natural languages 
are Conventional Systems for the Physical Representation of thought (henceforth 
CSPRs). Significantly, the RH (e.g. Burton-Roberts & Poole 2006b) distinguishes 
between the object represented (representatum) – i.e. structured thought – and the 
physical phenomena that it is represented by (representans). The representatum (x) is 
generated by the Language of Thought (LOT), whereas CSPRs define what counts as a 
(morpho-phonetically) well formed representans (R(x)). The relation between x and 
R(x) is that of conventional representation, where R(x) ≠ x.  
In the RH, the representatum (x) is innate and invariant across the species
12
. By 
contrast, how it is represented (defined by particular languages/CSPRs) involves 
massive variation. It is precisely because the representational relation between R(x) and 
x is non-natural and conventional that different CSPRs are constituted by different 
representational conventions. The following figure is a sketch of the representational 
architecture of mind.   
                                                          
12
 The representatum (x) can only be innate and invariant across the species in the sense that it is 
generated by innate and invariant LOT (more on this shortly). I will argue in chapter 3 that thought itself 
(representatum) can only ever be holistic/individualistic.  
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Figure 2.3: Representational architecture of mind
 
In the RH, particular languages (i.e. CSPRs) are constituted by representational 
conventions
13
 which define what counts as a well formed linguistic sign/representans 
(they specify what counts as an appropriate morpho-phonetic form) and mediate the 
relation between a morpho-phonetic form and a structured concept/representatum (they 
specify what counts as an appropriate representans for a given concept).
14
 Thus, 
speakers abide by representational conventions in doing two things: (i) constructing a 
symbolic representation and (ii) representing structured concepts (thought). It is this 
second (ii) application of representational conventions which is fundamentally involved 
in meaning and which I am concerned with.  
2.2.2.2 Meaning-as-relation 
The RH’s semiotic account of the relation between sounds and conceptual structures 
brings with it a radical change in the understanding of what it is for a word to mean 
something. In the RH, having meaning does not equal having semantic properties. 
Words clearly are meaningful but do not have meaning or semantics as a constitutive 
property; words themselves have no conceptual attributes. Only thought has 
conceptual/semantic properties.  
                                                          
13
 Convention governs any relation which is not physically, logically, or in any sense naturally, necessary.  
14
 I later argue that crucial to the definition of the RH’s convention is Hintzman’s (1986) multiple-trace 
theory of memory, which I discuss in 2.2.3. For that reason, I cannot define RH’s convention before 
introducing Hintzman’s model. In the meantime, conventions can be thought of in terms of what they are 
for.   
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The argument of the RH is that uttered words are symbolic signs. Like other 
symbolic signs (e.g. the ‘national speed limit applies’ sign discussed earlier), and like 
signs in general, words are meaningful without having semantic properties attributed to 
them. In the RH (Burton-Roberts 2007, 2012), meaning and semantics are different. 
However, they are related in the following way:  
Meaning is not a property of anything, but a relation for someone between 
X (anything, including phonetic phenomena) and what has semantic content 
Y (thought and only thought) 
 
There are three important points in this definition. First, linguistic signs (like other 
signs) in and of themselves are not meaningful. They only “have”15 meaning for 
someone. Second, thought is the only locus of semantic content. Linguistic signs, like all 
other signs, do not have semantic properties. Third, a linguistic sign is meaningful for 
the hearer (H) if and only if it leads H to have a thought. Meaning of any sign lies in the 
relation it has to a thought in a cogniser’s mental world.  
An uttered word leads H to have a thought if and only if H recognises the 
communicative intention of the speaker and H knows the representational conventions. 
For illustrative purposes, let us consider again the symbolic sign ’national speed limit 
applies’ (figure 2.1). If a person A, who is well versed in the Highway Code, sees a pile 
of ’national speed limit applies’ road signs stack up on the side of the road, A will not 
think that A can speed up to 70 m/h (or 60m/h if A is driving a vehicle with a trailer) 
because A does not recognize a communicative intention – A knows that the pile of 
signs was left on the side of the road by a road maintanance crew rather than 
intentionally used to communicate something. Conversely, recognizing a 
communicative intention (in virtue of understanding that a sign, which is placed on a 
pole on the side of the road, has been placed there to signify something) will not lead a 
person B to have a thought that B can speed up to 70 m/h (or 60m/h) if B has not learnt 
the Highway Code (i.e. the conventions). Thus, for a ’national speed limit applies’ sign 
to ”have” meaning, three conditions must be met: (i) the sign must be used with a 
communicative intention (here to speed up to 60 or 70 m/h, depending on the context), 
(ii) the communicative intention must be recognised by a person, and (iii) the person 
who recognizes the communicative intention must know the relevant convention.  
                                                          
15
 I am using inverted commas here to emphasise that in the RH meaning is not equivalent to the encoding 
of semantic properties. In the RH, linguistic signs “have” meaning insofar as they lead cognisers to have a 
thought.  
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Coming back to linguistic signs, in the RH, linguistic signs are purely 
phonetic/physical phenomena – they do not have any conceptual/semantic content. 
Phonetic phenomena “have” meaning for someone, on a given occasion of use because 
they give rise to particular semantically constituted thoughts (in virtue of recognising 
communicative intention and invoking a representational convention).
16
  
In 2.1.4, I suggested that my argument that there is no linguistic semantics (and 
no lexical concepts) and that utterance interpretation is a wholly pragmatic, inferential 
process needs to face two potential criticisms. The first was that if words do not have 
meaning in virtue of encoding linguistic semantics as their constitutive property, then 
words cannot have meaning. I argue that the Representational Hypothesis’ definition of 
meaning-as-relation invalidates this criticism. In making the unambiguous distinction 
between semantics (i.e. the content of thought and only thought) and meaning (i.e. a 
relation to semantics), the RH offers a way of saying that linguistic signs do not 
have/encode semantic properties, reconciling this with the fact that uttered words are 
meaningful. The RH explains how linguistic signs, like other signs, “have” meaning, i.e. 
lead cognisers to have a (semantically constituted) thought, without attributing the 
anyway problematic linguistic semantic properties to linguistic signs.  
In rejecting the notion of linguistic semantics, I reject the notion of meaning-as-
property (henceforth ‘meaning/semantics’) which follows from the double-interface 
tradition, and endorse Burton-Roberts’ notion of meaning-as-relation (henceforth 
‘meaning’).  
2.2.2.3 Semantics in the Representational Hypothesis 
In the RH, meaning in language is a relation for someone between a phonetic 
phenomenon and semantic content (of thought); sounds are used in aid of 
conventionally representing semantic content generated by a radically internalist, innate 
system which the RH identifies as LOT.
17
 In the RH, talking about semantics equals 
talking about thoughts and the concepts they are composed of.   
The RH (Burton-Roberts 2011) assumes that humans from birth have some kind 
of direct but deeply subconscious access to concepts (I shall call this PRIMARY ACCESS). 
It seems plausible to assume that Chomsky (2000b: 76) reports on primary access to 
                                                          
16
 The distinction between meaning and semantics is independently motivated. Burton-Roberts (2012) 
argues that a thought itself may have meaning (i.e. may lead a cogniser to a further thought) and that the 
meaning of a thought is different from the thought’s semantic content. I return to this point in chapter 5. 
17
 The RH’s position is that there is LOT, but, in contrast to claims made in Fodor (1998, 2008), its 
concepts have a compositional, internalist content. The arguments presented in chapter 1 support the 
RH’s position.  
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thought when he talks about thinking without language, thinking which is ‘hard to 
articulate’ (Quote 2, chapter 1). The RH argues that what is acquired in acquiring a 
particular language (CSPR) is another, more conscious, though indirect (because 
mediated by a particular language) kind of access to concepts (SECONDARY ACCESS); the 
acquisition of a particular language allows for the activation (to be contrasted with 
Fodor’s acquisition) of concepts in a more or less conscious mental life.   
In the RH (2012), concepts represented in communication are taken to be 
structured. It is helpful, I think, to identify the primitive components of such a 
conceptual structure as Jackendoff’s (2002) ‘quarks’ – i.e. concepts ‘ineffable’ in 
isolation. Such conceptual quarks and structures defined over them (generated by LOT) 
are not acquired but innate.  
Burton-Roberts (2011, fn 16) argues that concepts are prior to and hence 
independent of language acquisition during which they are activated and accessed by 
proxy (i.e. labelled by a representational label). Note that, in the RH, conceptual 
’quarks’ are posited on independent principled grounds: if sound is to function as a sign, 
there must exist something it is a sign of, namely a signified, independently of the fact 
of signification. In other words, that there be a concept to signify is a precondition for 
signification (Burton-Roberts 2012).  
The existence of this conceptually necessary precondition supplies another 
argument against the double-interface view of language and in favour of the account 
proposed by the RH. Burton-Roberts (2012) observes that for Saussure concepts exist 
only as constituents of linguistic signs (i.e. double-interface objects) and, therefore, that 
thought is couched only in the signs of a natural language. The problem is that if 
concepts exist only as parts of linguistic signs, the set of concepts must be arbitrary 
since signs are arbitrary. This is an extreme version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis – on 
the Saussurean double-interface view of language, thought is completely determined by 
particular languages. The RH’s representational relation between linguistic signs and 
concepts, in particular its unambiguous distinction between linguistic signs and 
concepts, predicts that the set of entertainable concepts, and so thought, is delimited by 
human nature. It is the secondary access to such pre-linguistic thought that is mediated 
by and hence delimited by the conventions of a particular language.
18
    
                                                          
18
 Kjøll (2009) also argues for an unambiguous distinction between words (i.e. linguistic signs) and 
concepts. Kjøll’s point, however, is not that it is only concepts which have semantic content. Kjøll argues 
that whereas concepts have externalist semantic content á la Fodor, words have internalist semantic 
content.   
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In acquiring secondary access to pre-linguistic thought, one acquires a system 
for conventional representation (CSPR) of thought. Acquiring such a system allows for 
thinking/computing by proxy.
19
 This is possible because acquiring a particular language 
allows for the labelling
20
 of the activated conceptual structures (i.e. making an 
association between a sound and a particular structure). In this sense, a label ‘packages’ 
an intricate conceptual structure and gives us a short-cut to it (Burton-Roberts 2011). 
Sounds utilised by a particular language give us access to such a ‘package’ if 
constituent concepts are associated with another sound in that particular language (if 
they, too, are labelled). However, if there is no such association for a constituent 
concept, we are dealing with conceptual ‘quarks’. ‘Quarks’, thus, are ‘ineffable’ in the 
sense that they are not labelled. 
Now, compositional theories of concepts have often been criticised for not being 
able to specify what such compositional content might be (e.g. Fodor 1998, Laurence & 
Margolis 1999). The RH’s distinction between primary (subconscious) and secondary 
(more conscious) access to thought offers an explanation of why speakers of particular 
languages are (often) unable to ‘define’, or represent, compositionally constituted 
semantic/conceptual content. In essence, the fact that particular languages do not give us 
a (more conscious) access to conceptual quarks does not mean that quarks do not exist – 
it only means that speakers cannot represent compositional content in a particular 
language (c.f. Chomsky 2000b: 76). But this fact does not necessarily preclude (as it 
does for Fodor) the existence of such content. From the RH’s perspective, inability to 
define is an almost unavoidable consequence of the advantage conferred by lexical 
‘packaging’.  
I opened this chapter with the discussion of the notion of a pointer. The RH’s 
overall contribution to the discussion about linguistic pointers is the following. The idea 
that linguistic signs are pointers to a conceptual space is plausible if and only if we 
assume that pointing can be understood in terms of the semiotic (in the sense of Peirce) 
relation of conventional representation.  
The consequences of adopting the RH’s account of representation and, 
consequently, its claim that words do not have meaning as a constitutive property are 
very radical. The way in which CSPRs mediate between sounds and conceptual 
                                                          
19
 Thinking/computing by proxy equals using ‘the representations themselves as proxies for what they are 
representations of’ (Burton-Roberts 2011). For illustration, Burton-Roberts offers a comparison with an 
arithmetical calculation with the use of pen and paper, where the calculation is performed over 
conventional symbols rather than arithmetic concepts.  
20
 I will say more about labelling in 2.2.3.2. 
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structures (figure 2.3) does not involve positing double-interface objects and, therefore, 
it does not involve positing a distinction between deterministic decoding and 
contextually-constrained inferring. This gives rise to the question of how CSPRs 
mediate between acoustic events and conceptual structures. It also invites the second 
criticism of the argument that there is no linguistic semantics, namely the worry that 
without linguistic semantics to constrain word use and interpretation, it is difficult to 
explain how we ever communicate successfully. If there is no linguistic semantics to 
mediate between acoustic events and conceptual structures – no ‘common core of 
meaning’ – cannot words, in principle, mean anything? Doesn’t utterance interpretation 
without linguistic semantics uninvitingly look like a Humpty-Dumpty enterprise?  
In the next section, I argue that the underlying mechanism for how CSPRs 
mediate between sounds and structured concepts can be cashed out in terms of a 
multiple-trace theory of memory (e.g. Hintzman 1986, 1988, 2008). In the light of 
Hintzman’s (1986) model, I will argue that the Humpty-Dumpty worry is unwarranted.  
2.2.3 Hintzman’s multiple-trace theory of memory  
Hintzman’s (1984, 1986, 1988, 2008) multiple-trace theory offers a model of memory 
and information retrieval from memory. It is relevant to theories of utterance 
interpretation insofar as utterance interpretation is an activity which involves the 
retrieval of (relevant) information from memory. The overarching question that 
Hintzman is concerned with is how abstract (generic) knowledge is related to specific 
(episodic) experience. Hintzman disagrees with a view (e.g. Tulving’s 2002) that 
abstract, unitary representations of a category are stored in a functionally separate 
generic memory system. On Hintzman’s view, generic knowledge does not have a 
special status and is not stored in a functionally separate memory system, but can be 
retrieved on-line from a pool of episodic memory traces. Hintzman’s model has serious 
implications for linguistic theory as, like the RH, it dispenses with the decoding-
inferring distinction. I explain this in the remainder of this section.  
2.2.3.1 Memory traces and echo retrieval 
On Hintzman’s theory, each experience, including linguistic experience is stored as a 
separate memory trace. As for the question of what memory traces consist in, Hintzman 
assumes that experiences are internally represented as an active configuration of 
primitive properties. By ‘primitive properties’ Hintzman means anything from 
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modality-specific sensory features (e.g. basic colours and odours), simple emotional 
tones, properties accessible by more than one modality (e.g. intermittency, spatial 
location) to primitive abstract relations (e.g. before, same as).
21
 Similar experiences will 
share certain configurations of properties. Hintzman (1986: 412) argues that such 
primitive properties are distinct from the ability to ‘label’ them in that they are not 
acquired through experience. Given that for Hintzman (1986: 412) primitive properties 
that constitute memory traces are innately specified, I think it is not misguided to think 
of Hintzman’s primitive properties as primitive concepts, or Jackendoff’s (2002) 
‘conceptual quarks’ (i.e. concepts ineffable in isolation) and of Hintzman’s 
configurations of primitive properties as ‘structured concepts’.  
In a linguistic context, Hintzman’s model predicts that every communicative 
event to which a person attends – such as hearing an uttered word – will leave a new 
memory trace (an association between a mental representation of an acoustic event – a 
word form – and a structured concept). Such a trace will co-exist in memory with other 
occurrences of the same word form and associated structured concepts. Using the ‘label’ 
metaphor mentioned above, we can say that there will be aggregates of memory traces 
storing information about associations between a given word form, which we may call 
an acoustic ‘label’22, and structured concepts.   
Hintzman (1986) distinguishes between PRIMARY MEMORY (PM) and 
SECONDARY MEMORY (SM). PM is the active representation of (a record of) the current 
experience and SM is a pool of largely dormant memory traces. PM and SM interact in 
the following way.  
The active configuration of primitive properties in PM (i.e. current experience) 
constitutes a RETRIEVAL CUE or PROBE which is sent to all traces in SM, which it 
activates according to their similarity to the probe (where similarity depends on the 
extent to which the traces in SM and the probe share the primitive properties). PM then 
receives a single reply or echo from SM. The echo that emanates back from SM is a 
pattern of most strongly activated properties and it is the echo that, for Hintzman, 
corresponds to the interpretation of a word on a particular occasion of use.
23
 Depending 
                                                          
21
 It is not clear whether Hintzman thinks of the properties as multi-modal or whether he considers them 
to be some kind of a unicode, able to access and bind different modality representations. My 
interpretation is that of a unicode, or multi-dimensional code, of the sort assumed by Baddeley (2000) to 
be involved in integrating information in episodic long-term memory and episodic buffer.  
22
 ‘Labelling’ is discussed in more detail 2.2.3.2.  
23
 Hintzman (1986) actually uses the term ‘meaning’ to refer to occasion-specific interpretations 
(retrieved echoes). To avoid confusing Hintzman’s meaning-qua-echo with meaning/semantics (or indeed 
meaning-as-relation), I do not use the term ‘meaning’ in the sense of Hintzman’s echo.  
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on the structure of the probe, the information retrieved from SM can be of different 
degrees of abstractness.   
Hintzman (1986, 2008) argues that the process of echo retrieval can retrieve ‘the 
essence’ of what, for example, dogs are from individual memory traces. When cued 
(e.g. when asked to think of a definition of a word, or on hearing a generic statement), a 
generic concept (i.e. a schema) of a dog can be retrieved on-line by cumulative 
activating of all traces and cancelling out the properties that are not shared by the traces. 
On this view a schema is ‘a temporary, dynamic structure that springs into being when a 
retrieval cue occurs’ (Hintzman 1986: 424). The crucial point is that the retrieval of 
such abstract/schematic echo – like all instances of echo retrieval – is necessarily 
context-dependent. In other words, echo retrieval can yield ‘different nuances, different 
levels of abstraction, or entirely different meanings of a word by addressing different 
subsets of stored contextual features’ (2008: 25). This means that on a generic use of a 
word the individuating properties of traces, such as temporal and spatial location 
properties, will be cancelled out. The experience, Hintzman (1984: 241) remarks, will 
be abstract and devoid of specific details. The crux of Hintzman’s theory is that the 
retrieval of such an abstract/schematic concept does not, in any sense, happen by some 
default – the process underlying it is the same as the process underlying the retrieval of 
more specific concepts.   
This context-sensitivity follows from the nature of the probe. The probe, 
Hintzman (1986: 420) emphasises, consists not only of the mental representation of a 
relevant acoustic event but also of its context. The echo retrieved by such context-
sensitive probes, i.e. a function of the particular subset of episodic traces activated by 
the probe, is thus necessarily context-sensitive too, whether schematic or not.  
In Hintzman’s model then there is no room for context-independent conceptual 
schemas/general concepts necessarily mediating utterance understanding. The general 
mechanism of echo retrieval handles cases where general concepts are retrieved and 
cases where they are not retrieved.
24
 On Hintzman’s model, the existence of general 
concepts (as memory traces) does not amount to the existence of linguistic semantics – 
                                                          
24
 More recently, similar claims have been made by Barsalou (e.g. 2005, 2012), who argues that 
abstractions are dynamically derived temporary online constructions. Indeed, Barsalou (2005: 417) goes 
on to suggest that abstraction is a skill rather than a structure; he argues that ‘what develops permanently 
is not a fixed summary representation, but a skill for interpreting instances effectively and efficiently’. 
The Hintzman/recent Barsalou view is in opposition to the traditional view (e.g. Barsalou 1982, Smith & 
Medin 1999) that categorisation of memory traces is impossible without some sort of abstract ‘summary 
representation’ (which corresponds to the notion of a lexical concept). 
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memory traces do not ‘resolve’ themselves into a schema which is then 
deterministically accessed in utterance interpretation (contrary to claims made by 
Carston (2002: 364-365)).  
The idea that both general concepts and more specific conceptual structures are 
retrieved by the very same contextually-constrained process is particularly important in 
the context of Relevance Theory. As mentioned, RT’s distinction between linguistic and 
real semantics is cashed out in terms of two types of cognitive processes – deterministic, 
context-independent decoding of linguistic meaning (whether schematic or full-fledged) 
and pragmatic inferring of speaker meaning. Hintzman’s model effectively undermines 
this distinction, making the process of utterance interpretation radically contextualist 
and wholly pragmatic/inferential.   
Before I illustrate Hintzman’s account with some examples, I discuss his notion 
of ‘labelling’ in the light of the Representational Hypothesis. 
2.2.3.2 A note on labels 
Hintzman (1986: 412) argues that what happens in so-called ‘word meaning acquisition’ 
is establishing of a relation between an acoustic event on the one hand and a 
configuration of primitive properties on the other. What is acquired is the ability to 
‘label’ primitive properties. Now, Hintzman (ibid.) does not say much about the process 
of acquiring this ‘labelling’ ability, but, since I intend to apply his model to utterance 
interpretation, it is important to make a brief comment on that.  
According to Burton-Roberts (2012), there are three conditions for an acoustic 
event to be recognised as a linguistic signifier for a conceptual structure: (a) convention, 
(b) semiotic intention, and (c) inferentially derived recognition of (a) and (b). These 
conditions are fundamental to the process by which an acoustic event comes to function 
for a hearer (H) as a semiotic label in the following way. 
If in a linguistic context, a relation is to be established between a given acoustic 
event and some conceptual structure, H must infer that there is a relation between the 
acoustic stimulus and the conceptual structure which is being currently entertained in 
H’s mind. More specifically, H must infer that the speaker (S) produced the acoustic 
stimulus with the intention of leading H to entertain a particular conceptual structure.  
For illustrative purposes, let us imagine that an infant learns to associate the 
acoustic event [p
h
en] with a mental representation of an enclosure in which it is often 
put, complex emotions it gives rise to (i.e. sometimes boredom, sometimes happiness, 
sometimes fear) etc. Presumably, for the infant to learn that association, the parents 
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must have made the sound [p
h
en] more than once in the context in which the infant 
could make that association, and the infant must have recognised the parents’ 
communicative intention. Now, being able to discern the similarity of new experiences 
of uses of [p
h
en] with old experiences means that the infant has recognised/relies on a 
communicative convention. The point is that an acoustic event becomes a semiotic label 
for a given cogniser in virtue of the cogniser’s recognition of a communicative intention 
and convention experientially associated with a given acoustic event. Once the 
convention is recognised (more on convention shortly), similar memory traces will be 
stored under the same morpho-phonetic label. At this stage in our scenario, a morpho-
phonetic label [p
h
en] has multiple memory records associated with it.   
Now, records of experiences in a linguistic context are not stored under a 
particular morpho-phonetic label based exclusively on the morpho-phonetic properties 
of the relevant acoustic event. For example, in our scenario there is an infant in whose 
mind the morpho-phonetic label [p
h
en] has been established and is associated with an 
aggregate of records of experiences with an enclosure (or enclosures). This association, 
which is bound up with the infant’s recognition (even if below the level of 
consciousness) of communicative intention and convention, will influence the 
interpretation of new experiences of uses of the morpho-phonetic label [p
h
en]. In the 
initial stage thus, if someone is holding a writing instrument in their hand and says to 
the infant that it is a pen, the infant will interpret the communicative intention in 
accordance with the already established associations. For example, the infant may think 
that the person wants the infant to put the object that the person is holding in their hand 
in the enclosure.  
Presumably, at some point the infant will come to notice inconsistency/ 
contradiction in uses of [p
h
en]; mental representations that certain uses of [p
h
en] give 
rise to will not be congruent (in terms of similarity of primitive properties they are 
composed by) to those stored under the already established morpho-phonetic label 
[p
h
en]. In simple terms, some utterances of [p
h
en] will not be associated with 
experiences of an enclosure but with experiences of the action of writing or doodling. 
At some stage, the infant will recognise that the communicative intention associated 
with the utterances of [p
h
en] is different in different contexts. In recognising the 
difference in communicative intention, the infant will recognise the difference in 
communicative convention and, arguably, a separate aggregate of memory traces will be 
established – this aggregate will share the morpho-phonetic label [phen] with the old 
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one, but will be separate precisely because the memory records are not compatible in 
terms of the primitive properties they are composed of.    
This simple scenario illustrates the role of the recognition of communicative 
intention and convention in the acquisition of what we may call the ‘labelling’ ability. It 
seems to me that the importance of the labelling ability is best appreciated when 
considered in relation to Burton-Roberts’ (2012) argument (discussed in 2.2.2.3) that 
what is acquired in so-called language acquisition is no more and no less than a 
particular kind of access to conceptual structures. On this account, the establishing of a 
morpho-phonetic label consists in the ‘packaging’ of various intricate conceptual 
structures in one aggregate of multiple traces and gives a short-cut to them, allowing for 
faster and more efficient processing. In 2.2.3.4, I say more about how the notion of 
communicative conventions construed in terms of a multiple-trace theory of memory is 
different from standard models (e.g. RT) and why, I believe, it is better. In the 
meantime, I discuss some advantages of a wholly inferential account and illustrate the 
application of Hintzman’s wholly inferential model to utterance interpretation with 
some examples.  
2.2.3.3 Some advantages of a wholly inferential account 
Perhaps the most straightforward advantage of a wholly inferential account is the fact 
that it does not posit deterministic decoding, which is most obviously unnecessary in 
cases like (3) (The steak is raw). Given that there is no logical relation between the 
alleged lexical concept of not being cooked and the communicated concept of being 
cooked but not long enough, even RT must admit that here successful communication 
relies solely on the power of pragmatic inference. Consider now example (7), uttered 
during a phone conversation between two friends who together attended a comedy show 
last week. 
(7) That comedian killed me. 
The information communicated by the utterance of (7) is that the comedian was 
hilarious or very entertaining. Hintzman’s model predicts that the utterance of (7) may 
activate the concept of being very entertaining without first activating the concept of 
causing death.
25
 This is possible because the noun comedian (co-text) constrains the 
                                                          
25
 This is compatible with Gibbs’ (2002) and Hamblin & Gibbs’ (2003) observation that, given the right 
context, even novel non-literal forms may be processed as quickly as or more quickly than their literal 
counterparts. I return to this issue in chapter 5. 
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cognitive search in that it activates the theme of entertainment
26
, whereas the 
demonstrative that (co-text) further narrows it down to an experience which is familiar 
to both the speaker and the hearer. Quite plausibly, the relevant cognitive context is 
such that the hearer already knows that the speaker enjoyed the show (by watching her 
reactions at the show). Furthermore, the presence of the pronoun me in the co-text and 
the perceptual presence of the speaker in the situational context exclude the possibility 
of the speaker having been murdered by the comedian.  
It needs to be emphasised that I am arguing against deterministic decoding of a 
concept which is, purportedly, associated by default (i.e. invariably) with a given 
morpho-phonetic form. In other words, I allow that for some hearers the utterance of (7) 
may initially activate the concept of causing death, and that the utterance of (3) may 
initially activate the concept of not being cooked. Whether it does or does not depends 
on many (contextual) factors. For example, it is undeniable that some conceptual 
structures may be more easily accessible than others due to frequency effects (e.g. 
Dąbrowska 2004: 25-27). However, the existence of frequency biased interpretations – 
sometimes referred to as ‘dominant meanings’ (e.g. Gibbs 2002) or ‘attractors’ (e.g. 
Barsalou 2005) – does not amount to the existence of linguistic semantics. Firstly, from 
the existence of attractors, it does not follow that it is language, and not thought, which 
hosts them, or that it is the linguistic processes, and not the pragmatic processes, which 
access them. Secondly, deterministic activation of such attractors would not always be 
an efficient interpretive strategy (as I will shortly show). Indeed, Barsalou (2005: 416) 
argues that various factors (e.g. contextual evidence) may inhibit attractors and facilitate 
other interpretive strategies. Consequently, the interpretation process remains highly 
dynamic even if there are frequency-based attractors. Let me illustrate this with example 
(3) (The steak is raw).  
If the conversation of which (3) is part takes place among two people who often 
dine together and where the hearer knows that the speaker likes his steak well done, the 
utterance of (3) will most likely activate the concept of being cooked not long enough. 
If, however, the hearer of (3) is a vegetarian who has heard stories about people eating 
raw meat (e.g. steak tartare) but does not know what such dish looks like, the utterance 
of (3) may initially (i.e. before clarification or further evaluation of the context) activate 
the concept of not being cooked.  
Consider now a scenario such that (3) is uttered in a context where on a plate is 
not an English steak but steak tartare, and where the hearer, well accustomed to English 
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 This would normally contrast with the theme activated by the expression such as the mafia boss.  
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steaks, is unaware of the fact that some people do eat, and some restaurants do serve, 
meat that has not been cooked. Also in this situation, the concept which is initially 
activated in the mind of the hearer is likely to be that of not being cooked for long 
enough. If, on the other hand, the hearer is familiar with steak tartar, the concept 
activated in his mind on hearing (3) in such context will most probably be that of not 
being cooked. 
The point is that a wholly inferential account, on which utterances are 
interpreted in relation to a contextually constrained background of individualistic 
beliefs and associations, allows us to explain such variations. Furthermore, it offers a 
more efficient account of processing – it does not require that the irrelevant concept 
NOT COOKED be decoded where there is clear contextual evidence to the contrary. At 
the same time, the contextually constrained process of echo retrieval accounts for why 
very often what the speaker communicates and what the hearer takes her to 
communicate ‘converge’ to a sufficient27 degree. Because the process of echo retrieval 
is contextually constrained, not all memory records are involved in the derivation of the 
echo, only those relevant to a particular conversation in a particular context between 
particular interlocutors.
28
 Hintzman’s (e.g. 1986) contextually constrained process of 
echo retrieval, combined with Burton-Roberts’ (2012) definition of meaning-as-relation, 
make assumption (B) – that H converges (to a sufficient degree) on what S 
communicates despite there being no shared linguistic semantic content – plausible.  
Needless to say, a wholly inferential account abides by Occam’s Razor in cases 
where the alleged lexical concept is the same as the communicated concept. As 
mentioned, RT’s problem with utterances like (6) (Children in most cultures dance 
spontaneously) is that the very same concept of dancing is activated by two distinct 
cognitive processes – it is deterministically decoded and then it has to be pragmatically 
inferred anyway. In contrast, Hintzman’s model predicts that, on hearing the utterance 
of (6), a generic concept of dancing is retrieved because the context is such as not to 
trigger the activation of a more specific concept – relevant here is the presence of bare 
nominal children and the quantifier most in the co-text. Such generic concept does not 
have to be deterministically decoded first as there are enough clues in the context to 
pragmatically derive it. 
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 Convergence has to be sufficient enough to co-ordinate the interlocutors’ actions, including the very 
action of communicating. 
28
 This radical contextualism is compatible with arguments put forward by Bilgrami (1992). Bilgrami’s 
account will be discussed in chapter 3. Horton & Gerrig (2005) is an important development of the point 
that the knowledge of one’s interlocutor places immediate constraints on utterance interpretation. This is 
discussed in detail in chapter 5.   
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Similarly, a wholly inferential model has an advantage over a two-step model of 
utterance interpretation like RT in cases like (4) (When Mr Cerezo, before his election, 
stood up against successive military regimes the rightists tried to kill him) and (5) (… 
one of the mechanisms by which phagocytes kill intercellular organisms is the 
production of reactive oxygen intermediates), where the alleged lexical concept is more 
general than the ad hoc concept purportedly derived from it. As mentioned, the problem 
for RT is that if KILL* analytically implies, i.e. is compositionally constituted by KILL, 
the concept KILL has to be retrieved by two distinct cognitive processes.  
In contrast, a wholly inferential model predicts that the concept of causing death 
is pragmatically inferred as part of the concepts communicated by (4) and (5) without 
being first decoded. The process of pragmatic inference is sufficient to derive the 
subtleties of different concepts which are in part constituted by the concept of causing 
death. These subtleties are inferable from the context of (4) and (5). In (4) there are 
several aspects relevant to arriving at the intended interpretation. First of all, the verb 
kill here is interpreted in the context of the co-text such as stood up against, military 
regimes and the rightists. The co-text thus restricts the conceptual search to the hearer’s 
knowledge of extreme political/military regimes and their treatment of opposition. In 
this context, the concept of causing death by a human agent intentionally acting upon a 
patient is highly relevant and thus easily accessible. In (5), the concept of causing death 
does not involve the concept of an intentional act of a human agent, but of biochemical 
reactions at a cellular level. This is inferable from the co-text (e.g. phagocytes, 
intercellular organisms), but the relevant conceptual space may have also been 
activated by preceding discourse. This, again, satisfies Occam’s Razor. 
 However, what is controversial about cases of the so-called ‘concept narrowing’ 
is that the uses of the word kill in (4) and (5), and in fact many other uses of this word, 
do undeniably share ‘a common core of meaning’ – the concept of causing death. From 
an RT perspective, this seems to be almost tangible evidence for the existence of 
encoded semantics (if we disregard all the problems with this notion I have discussed so 
far). But is it? 
 I have already mentioned that instances like (4) and (5) can only be considered 
as evidence for linguistic semantics if one assumes that there exists linguistic semantics 
(assumption (A)). If no such assumption is made, (4) and (5) illustrate a situation where 
two uses communicate distinct specific concepts which are compositionally constituted 
by the same generic concept. In terms of a multiple-trace memory model, mental 
records of such uses (i.e. memory traces) are constituted by partially overlapping 
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properties. Thus, the intuition that (4) and (5) share some ‘common core of meaning’ 
arises from the partial overlap of conceptual structures; it can be explained without 
making the anyway problematic claim that such an intersection is functionally 
independent (i.e. deterministically decoded by the language module). Apart from all the 
problems discussed earlier, why else should we not extrapolate from the existence of 
partially overlapping properties to the existence of linguistic semantics? Consider (4) 
again, repeated here for convenience.  
(4) When Mr Cerezo, before his election, stood up against successive military 
regimes the rightists tried to kill him.  
RT tells us that before pragmatic processes go to work, not only does the language 
module access lexical semantic content of the words, but it also compositionally 
combines them into a logical form. Now, a wholly inferential account predicts that the 
preceding discourse, situational context as well as co-text provide sufficient evidence to 
constrain utterance interpretation so that by the time the speaker utters the word kill, the 
cognitive space of military regimes and their ways of dealing with opponents is 
activated in the mind of the hearer, allowing for a specific interpretation of this 
particular use. On a two-step model like RT, however, the interpreter is assumed, by the 
terms of the theory, to ignore all that until the logical form is deterministically decoded. 
On RT’s terms, the preceding discourse, situational context and co-text come out as 
merely secondary ‘evidence’ with respect to the primary evidential function of the 
allegedly encoded semantics.
29
   
Importantly, a wholly inferential account is also supported by the consideration 
of compositionality, a principle which is supposed to explain productivity (i.e. the 
infinite expressive power) of a particular language. In the context of RT’s distinction 
between lexical and ad hoc concepts, the compositionality principle should operate at 
the linguistic semantic level if it is to explain productivity of language. Accordingly, 
RT’s compositionality principle operates to combine the encoded semantic content of 
linguistic expressions into a logical form. The resulting structurally complex logical 
form delivered by the linguistic module serves as an input to pragmatic processing. 
However, there is evidence which shows that compositionality does not take place at 
any context-independent level.   
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 In this sense, RT weakens its own claim (e.g. Carston 2002: 99-100) that pragmatics is much more 
substantially involved in meaning in language than Grice (1989) thought was the case. I return to this 
point in chapter 4.   
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For example, Recanati (2005) argues that the compositionality principle applies 
after the pragmatic processes have done their work. In other words, pragmatic processes 
do not operate ‘globally’ on a compositionally constituted ‘output of the grammar’. The 
order is actually reverse to what Relevance Theory predicts – pragmatic processes are at 
play before the compositionality process applies. Consider (8) and (9) below (taken 
from Recanati 2005). 
(8) There’s a lion in the courtyard. 
(9) There’s a stone lion in the courtyard. 
Let us assume that (8) is to be understood as communicating that what is in the 
courtyard is not a real animal but a representation, or statue, of a lion. The pragmatic 
inference that leads us to interpret the word lion in the sense of a statue is often referred 
to as REFERENCE TRANSFER. In the case of (9) too, we are dealing with reference transfer 
– we understand that what is said to be made of stone is a representation, or statue, of a 
lion, not a real animal. This fact, Recanati (ibid.) argues, shows that reference transfer 
must take place before the composition rule applies to the noun-noun (stone lion) 
construction. The evidence is this. The interpretation that we get for (9) is: (a 
representation of a lion) that is made of stone. But this interpretation is only possible if 
reference transfer occurs before the two expressions, stone and lion, are combined. If, 
however, reference transfer applied globally, i.e. after the compositionality process was 
applied at the linguistic semantic level, the interpretation we would get is: a 
representation of (a lion that is made of stone). The absurdity of the result, Recanati 
argues, seriously undermines the view that compositionality applies at the linguistic 
semantic level.  
It may be argued that this criticism is not applicable to RT given RT’s 
underdeterminacy thesis and its emphasis on the pragmatic contribution to grasping the 
proposition explicitly expressed. However, in the light of the discussed RT’s instability 
about the propositional nature of logical form and truth-theoretic properties of lexical 
concepts (section 2.1), the underdeterminacy thesis cannot be used as an argument 
against Recanati’s criticism. In my opinion, what Recanati’s argument challenges is not 
only the issue of compositionality at the linguistic semantic level, but, more 
fundamentally, the utility of the linguistic semantic level as such.  
Indeed, Recanati’s argument suggests that a much more radical 
underdeterminacy thesis is in order. As discussed earlier, in RT, communicated 
thoughts are underdetermined by linguistic signs in that linguistic semantic content by 
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which such signs are partly constituted needs to be pragmatically ‘enriched’ into real 
semantic content. A more radical underdeterminacy thesis is offered by the RH; in the 
RH, communicated thoughts are underdetermined by linguistic signs in that linguistic 
signs do not have semantic properties at all; pragmatic processing (along the lines of 
Hintzman, as argued earlier) gets an interpreter from a linguistic sign, which does not 
have any conceptual/semantic properties, to thought – the only locus of semantic 
properties.
30
  
In the final section, I discuss the difference between assumptions (A) (that H 
converges on what S communicates because they share linguistic semantic content) and 
(B) (that H and S converge despite there being no such linguistic semantic content) with 
respect to the question of what constitutes evidence in utterance interpretation. 
2.2.3.4 The role of acquisition context and communicative context in utterance 
interpretation  
The difference between assumption (A) (advocated by RT) and assumption (B) 
(advocated here) amounts to the difference in what is taken to count as ‘evidence’ in a 
communicative act. As discussed, in RT the evidential role that context plays in 
utterance interpretation is secondary in the sense of being post-decoding. I argue that the 
secondary role ascribed to contextual information follows from RT’s stand on what is 
acquired in so-called ‘word meaning’ acquisition. Let me explain this. 
On the assumption that the product of ‘word meaning’ acquisition is a context-
independent concept/schema, all contextually available information must be stripped 
out in the process of acquisition. But if what is acquired is context-independent and if 
the role of what is acquired is to guide future utterance interpretation (as in RT), it 
follows that utterance interpretation is fundamentally constrained by the context-
independent product of acquisition and that contextual information comes out as 
secondary evidence. On such an account, the relevance of contextual information (both 
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 This radical underdeterminacy thesis is related to the RH’s definition of parsing. In the RH (e.g. 
Burton-Roberts & Poole 2006a, 2006b), parsing consists in putting something (e.g. an acoustic event) 
which lacks conceptual/semantic content and structure (i.e. representans) into correspondence with 
something that has conceptual/semantic content and structure (i.e. thought), on the assumption that the 
relevant acoustic event was produced with the intention of conventionally representing a 
conceptual/semantic structure. Evidence for this conception of parsing comes from considering so-called 
‘structural ambiguity’ (Burton-Roberts & Poole 2006b); because anything that has or is a structure can 
only ever have one structure (e.g. it is impossible for the Eiffel Tower to have two structures at the same 
time), the possibility of ‘structural ambiguity’ (as in ‘Flying planes can be dangerous’) shows that the 
linguistic sign we are dealing with does not have/is not a structure. In the RH, ‘structural ambiguity’ 
arises because a CSPR allows one to parse the structure-less representans in two different ways.  
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incoming and that which is stored in memory) is conditional upon (i.e. preceded by and 
constrained by) the activation of the context-insensitive product of acquisition. In 
arguing against the notion of linguistic semantics and the deterministic process of 
decoding of such content, I am arguing against the claim that contextual information 
plays a merely secondary, i.e. post-decoding, evidential role.    
On the account advocated here, contextual information (both incoming and 
stored in memory) has a primary function in utterance interpretation. This is possible 
because what is acquired is not stripped of contextual information – on the contrary, the 
product of acquisition is the relation between a morpho-phonetic label and an aggregate 
of multiple memory traces, which are themselves context-sensitive. On this account, the 
interpretation of acoustic stimuli is a wholly pragmatic, inferential process of accessing 
a conceptual structure (or Hintzman’s echo) via the matching of the incoming 
contextual information (Hintzman’s probe) with that which is stored in memory traces. 
The role of the morpho-phonetic label in the process of utterance interpretation is to 
constrain the process of echo retrieval so that the incoming stimuli are matched not with 
any memory traces but with those already associated with the relevant morpho-phonetic 
label.
31
 Thus, it is the existence of the morpho-phonetic label (and not of some 
problematic notion of lexical concept) that allows for fast and efficient, contextually 
constrained, processing.  
In 2.2.3.2, I argued, in line with Burton-Roberts (2012), that the recognition of 
communicative intention and convention is essentially involved in the process whereby 
a mental representation of an acoustic event becomes a label for an aggregate of 
conceptual structures. Acquiring the relation between a morpho-phonetic label and an 
aggregate of conceptual structures consists, I argue, in acquiring a communicative 
convention. Such a construal of convention is necessarily individualistic because one of 
the relata is the record of individualistic experiences, but its acquisition is constrained 
by a cogniser’s observation of the communicative behaviour of others in particular 
contexts. Furthermore, the convention is also constrained by the H’s assessment of the 
convergence of the H’s interpretation with that intended by S – presumably, the 
convergence is assessed based on the degree of success of action co-ordination between 
S and H. The end effect is individualistic and hence divergent associations, along the 
lines of Chomsky’s individualism (discussed in 1.2), which play a primary evidential 
role (together with the incoming information) in the derivation of interpretation which is 
sufficiently convergent in a particular conversational situation with that intended by S. 
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 Presumably, the process is further constrained by the active cognitive background.  
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Burton-Roberts (2012) argues that conventions (i.e. CSPRs) LICENSE the use of 
sounds as symbolic (representational) signs. In this sense, a word is defined by Burton-
Roberts as a symbolic license/rule for the use of sounds as symbolic signs. In the light 
of the arguments presented in 2.2.3, I argue that a word as a license/rule/convention is 
to be understood as a multiple-trace aggregate in the sense of Hintzman (1986). 
2.3 Conclusion 
I ended chapter 1 by saying that the tension between Chomsky’s double-interface 
claims (which make room for encoded semantics) and his I-assumptions (which make 
no room for encoded semantics) is the leitmotif of this thesis. The overall conclusion of 
chapter 2 is that this tension should be resolved by rejecting the double-interface view 
and endorsing the individualistic direction.  
In particular, I have argued that the process of utterance interpretation is a 
wholly pragmatic inferential process. First, I discussed the problems with Relevance 
Theory’s notion of linguistic semantics and lexical concepts. I argued that the 
introduction of full-fledged lexical concepts (i.e. concepts with truth-theoretic 
properties) leaves RT with no principled distinction between lexical and ad hoc 
concepts. Secondly, I argued that even if acquired, lexical concepts are either 
unnecessary in utterance interpretation (because post hoc) or cannot constitute adequate 
evidence for the intended interpretation (because individualistic). Thirdly, I argued that 
the process of deterministic decoding of linguistic semantics/lexical concepts is 
redundant in cases of loose use, cases of so-called concept narrowing and when the 
communicated concept is the same as the purported lexical concept.  
 I then argued, in line with Burton-Roberts’ Representational Hypothesis (e.g. 
2012), that linguistic signs can “have” meaning even if one rejects the traditional 
double-interface view of linguistic signs and with it the traditional assumption that 
linguistic signs have meaning in virtue of encoding linguistic semantic content. I 
endorsed Burton-Roberts’ (ibid.) view of meaning-as-relation to semantic content of 
thought and his representational account of the relation between sounds used by 
speakers and conceptual structures represented by their use.    
I argued that utterance interpretation can be successfully constrained (without 
evoking the anyway problematic notion of linguistic semantics) by adopting Hintzman’s 
(e.g. 1986) multiple-trace theory of memory and information retrieval. Finally, I 
suggested that a multiple-trace model correctly predicts that contextual information 
(both incoming and stored in memory) places immediate constraints on utterance 
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interpretation. This allowed me to define a representational convention in terms of an 
association between a morpho-phonetic label and an aggregate of multiple memory 
traces.   
The last point I want to make concerns a recent claim (Urquiza 2011) that 
Relevance Theory is actually compatible with Hintzman’s multiple-trace theory of 
memory (contrary to arguments in Carston 2002: 375). Urquiza (2011) argues that 
Hintzman’s model can be used in RT as a model for the pragmatic process of lexical 
concept adjustment/modulation. There are several observations to be made here. Firstly, 
Hintzman’s model is a radically contextualist model of utterance interpretation – thus, 
to argue that it applies post-decoding contradicts the very rationale for adopting a model 
like that. The point is that to argue that a radically contextualist model works, and works 
well, is to argue that deterministic decoding is redundant. Thus, whereas I share with 
Urquiza (2011) my enthusiasm for Hintzman’s model, her proposal is simply 
inconsistent in the light of her commitment to linguistic semantics/lexical concepts and 
thus to traditional (and standard RT’s) notion of ‘word meaning’ (i.e. meaning-as-
property).   
I argue that assumption (B) (that there is no linguistic semantics) is much more 
plausible than (A) (that there is linguistic semantics) and that the information available 
in the context of the acquisition of a representational convention and in the context of 
utterance interpretation constitutes the primary (the only) evidence for utterance 
interpretation. As argued in this chapter, linguistic semantics is a highly problematic 
and redundant notion. On the view endorsed here utterance interpretation does not 
proceed from what is (controversially) shared to what sufficiently converges, but from 
what diverges to what sufficiently converges.  
 In the next chapter, I look at philosophical legacy in thinking about linguistic 
semantics. I discuss narrow and wide kinds of mental content (e.g. Putnam 1975, Burge 
1979) and their relation to RT’s notion of linguistic semantics. In the light of my 
discussion of various philosophical proposals, I maintain the RH’s claim that there is 
only one kind of mental/semantic content and argue that such content is necessarily 
holistic/individualistic. I argue that holism is not a problematic approach to meaning 
and semantics, contrary to claims made by its opponents (e.g. Fodor & Lepore 1992).  
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Chapter 3. Unleashing holism 
 
3.0 Introduction 
Most generally, the doctrine of semantic holism states that the meaning/semantics of an 
expression is relative to the entire system containing it (Lepore 1999). Put differently, 
semantic holism suggests that the meaning/semantics of an expression is determined by 
its place in the network of beliefs constituting entire theories or even a cogniser’s entire 
belief system (Block 1998a, Pagin 2006). Consequently, a holistic meaning/semantics 
of an expression is dependent on ‘all or most other’ expressions (Block 1995), a point I 
elaborate shortly. 
 Semantic holism may, but does not have to, be a consequence of the assumption 
that there is no distinction between logical (i.e. analytic) and encyclopaedic (i.e. 
synthetic) inferential relations (Block 1995). Fodor (1998, 2008), for example, rejects 
both the analytic-synthetic distinction and semantic holism and argues for semantic 
atomism. However, as argued in 1.1, Fodor’s atomism cannot be maintained.   
Importantly, the rejection of both the analytic-synthetic distinction and atomism 
has holism as its consequence. If there are no logical constraints on inferences licensed 
by a given word, the meaning/semantics of a word is, in principle, the sum of unlimited 
inferences the word may give rise to. For example, on a holistic account of semantic 
content, the word cat may have the concept of my neighbour as part of its 
meaning/semantics if my neighbour happens to have a cat (let us call it inference level 
I). But if this is the case, then the meaning/semantics of the word cat is indirectly 
dependent on the inferential relations that my concept of my neighbour may enter into. 
For example, the meaning/semantics of cat may be indirectly dependent on the 
inferential relation between MY NEIGHBOUR and OPHTHALMOLOGIST if my 
neighbour is an ophthalmologist (let us call it inference level II). Given that the concept 
OPHTHALMOLOGIST may licence an inference to the concept HOSPITAL (inference 
level III), we see that the meaning/semantics of the word cat is indirectly linked to the 
concept of hospital. When critics say that, on holistic approaches, the 
meaning/semantics of a term is defined relative to entire theory or belief system, what 
they have in mind is that the meaning/semantics of a word depends on inference levels 
I, II and III as well as the conceptual relations which inference level III gives rise to, 
and so on and so forth. Let me refer to this cross-relational characteristic of holistic 
81 
 
meaning/semantics as the NETWORK EFFECT. In essence, the network effect manifests 
itself in that if meaning/semantics is dependent on a cogniser’s so-called encyclopaedic 
knowledge, word meanings/semantics is interdependent on many (‘all or most’) other 
words’ meaning/semantics. 
Another consequence of rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction (in 
conjunction with rejecting atomistic accounts á la Fodor) is the lack of any objective, 
cross-speaker shared semantic content. Since people’s knowledge about what the world 
is like differs depending on their idiosyncratic experiences, it is very unlikely that the 
meaning/semantics of any single word will ever be the same for any pair of 
interlocutors. For example, the word water will be related to complex beliefs about its 
chemical composition in the mind of a person who is chemically informed, but not in 
the mind of a person who is chemically ignorant (Bilgrami 1992). On a holistic 
approach thus the meaning/semantics of any word relies on, because it is couched 
within, an individual’s psychology. I will refer to this consequence of holism as the 
RADICAL INDIVIDUALISM
1
. Indeed, the network effect and radical individualism 
contribute to what I referred to in chapter 2 as the ‘Humpty-Dumpty worry’; if word 
meaning/semantics is cross-relational and individualistic, how do speakers ever 
communicate successfully? 
In this chapter, I argue that a holistic account of mental content is inescapable 
and, in fact, not as problematic as critics (especially Fodor & Lepore 1992) argue. First, 
I introduce (the complexities of) the ontological distinction between wide and narrow 
kinds of mental content in 3.1.1. Then, in 3.1.2, I discuss the relation between various 
philosophical notions of mental content and Relevance Theory’s (RT) linguistic 
semantics. I argue that RT’s preoccupation with the search for shared semantic content 
(in the sense of cross-context stability) has resulted in an account of mental content 
which is contradictory in philosophical terms. In 3.2, I argue that all philosophical 
notions of shared content, namely causal-externalist wide content, social-externalist 
wide content and non-truth-theoretic narrow content, are problematic and that holism is 
the only plausible thesis about mental content. In 3.3, I endorse Bilgrami’s (holistic) 
thesis about the unity and locality of content. I discuss how Bigrami’s philosophy fits in 
with the wholly inferential model of utterance interpretation I argued for in chapter 2. 
Finally, I discuss how, in the light of Bilgrami’s thesis and the Representational 
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 The network effect and radical individualism are conceptually distinct but closely related aspects of 
holism.  
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Hypothesis, we can and should distinguish between a domain of concepts and a domain 
of associations between semiotic labels and concepts.  
3.1 Kinds of mental content 
In chapter 2, I discussed the question of whether it is possible to account for mutual 
understanding between interlocutors in communication without positing the level of 
linguistic semantics. This question concerned the existence of context-independent 
lexical concepts, purportedly shared among members of the same speech community 
(e.g. Carston 2002). Now, linguists’ preoccupation with shared linguistic semantic 
content has intertwined with philosophers’ interest in WIDE and NARROW kinds of 
conceptual content (e.g. Putnam 1975, Burge 1979). In this section, I introduce the 
distinction between wide and narrow content, discuss problems related to this 
distinction and their relevance to my argument that there is no linguistic semantics.   
3.1.1 Revisiting shareability: wide content and narrow content 
The broadest characterisation of the wide-narrow distinction is in terms of the 
externalist-internalist distinction: wide content is defined in terms of the relation that 
thoughts (and their components, i.e. concepts) bear to mind-external things and 
properties, and narrow content is defined solely in terms of mind-internal conceptual 
relations (e.g. Bach 1996).  
 The wide-narrow distinction was introduced by Putnam (e.g. 1975), who argued 
that the content of many natural kind concepts, like WATER, depends not only on a 
cogniser’s internal, i.e. psychological state but also, and importantly, on what is going 
on in the mind-external environment. To show this, Putnam devised a thought 
experiment known as the Twin Earth experiment. Putnam imagines a place, called Twin 
Earth, where everything is exactly as it is on Earth except one thing. On Twin Earth the 
substance called water is not H2O but XYZ, i.e. it is chemically composed by some 
other stuff. Despite this chemical difference, water and twin-water look superficially the 
same, both fall from the sky and fill up rivers and lakes, both quench thirst, both are 
called water, etc. Putnam argues that when a man from the Earth (Oscar) and his Twin 
Earth doppelganger (twin-Oscar) both think that water quenches thirst, they may be in 
identical psychological states (i.e. identical in the narrow sense) but, because their 
thoughts have different (wide) contents, they actually have different thoughts with 
different conditions of application: one is about water quenching thirst and the other is 
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about twin-water quenching thirst. Putnam’s conclusion about the term water is that 
Oscar and twin-Oscar use water to express different concepts, whose contents are 
constituted by mind-external things and properties. This holds regardless of the fact 
that, for Oscar and twin-Oscar, water and twin water have the same phenomenological 
properties (i.e. they subjectively seem the same in terms of appearance, taste, smell, 
etc.). 
 There are several points about Putnam’s argument which are relevant to my 
discussion. Putnam defines conceptual content in relational (referential) terms – the 
content of a concept is wide, i.e. it is determined by what it relates (refers) to in the 
mind-external world. In doing so Putnam rejects the doctrine of psychologism, i.e. he 
rejects the idea that ‘knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain 
psychological state’ (Putnam 1975: 219). Putnam (1975: 227) famously argues that 
‘’meanings’ just ain’t in the head’ because what is in the head – i.e. the 
psychologistic/narrow – fails to account for varying contexts (e.g. H2O versus XYZ). 
Now, when Putnam (e.g. 1975: 221) talks of narrow psychological states, he means 
psychological states which are independent of the mind-external environment in a 
(methodological) solipsist sense (see section 1.1). Putnam’s narrow-wide distinction is 
thus a distinction between internalist and externalist notions of conceptual content and 
as such its legacy is evident today in the Chomsky-Fodor debate (discussed in chapter 
1).  
 As observed by Swiatek (2012), Putnam’s criticism was directed at the privacy 
or non-publicity of word meaning/semantics; for Putnam, meaning/semantics cannot be 
‘in the head’ precisely because it is (has to be) publicly available for the purposes of 
communication. The Twin Earth experiment was designed to show that the relational 
wide content, unlike the narrow content, is sufficiently fine-grained to account for 
context variability (i.e. it co-varies with the context). Relational wide content is 
supposed to be publicly available in that it is dependent on the mind-external objective 
reality.  
 Another idea introduced by Putnam (1975) with respect to the public availability 
of meaning/semantics was the socio-linguistic hypothesis about the division of 
linguistic labour. Putnam (1975: 228) argued that the meaning/semantics of words is 
crucially social in character – it is ‘possessed by the collective linguistic body, even 
though [it is] not possessed by each individual member of the body’2. The ‘division of 
                                                          
2
 Actually, the assumption that ‘meanings’ are not possessed by each individual shows that they are not 
collectively shared. I discuss this point further in section 3.2.3. 
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labour’ manifests itself in the fact that in order to establish the meaning/semantics of a 
word we often (need to) rely on the judgement of 'expert' speakers, where expert 
speakers are those members of a speech community who have acquired ‘correct’ – in 
the expert’s sense – conditions for the application of a given word. For example, a 
‘correct’ condition for the application of the word water (on Earth) is that water applies 
to H2O.   
 In this context, Putnam discusses his own incomplete grasp of the words elm and 
beech. Putnam observes that his concepts of elm and beech are exactly the same, i.e. 
what he knows about elms and beeches does not make it possible for him to distinguish 
between the two kinds of trees. Because – in fact – it is known that these two words 
have different meanings/semantics, Putnam (1975: 226) argues that what is in his mind 
cannot be identified as the meanings/semantics of elm and beach respectively. Based on 
this observation, Putnam concludes that meanings/semantics cannot be equated with 
someone’s idiolect but are determined by the conventions of public language, which in 
turn are determined by deference to experts. This is another sense, on top of the 
relational sense discussed above, in which meaning/semantics is publicly (i.e. 
objectively) available and another sense in which content is thought to be wide, i.e. 
determined by factors which are independent of an individual mind.  
 Relational wide content, which is individuated by causal co-variances in the 
mind-external environment, can be referred to as CAUSAL-EXTERNALIST CONTENT, 
whereas social wide content, which is ‘the sociolinguistic state of the collective 
linguistic body to which the speaker belongs’ (Putnam 1975: 229) can be referred to as 
SOCIAL-EXTERNALIST CONTENT.
3
    
 Putnam’s social-externalist conception of meaning/semantics was developed by 
Burge (1979), who argued that meaning/semantics is individuated accordingly with 
some community norms. To show this, Burge devised a thought experiment where a 
man called Al believes that the word arthritis refers to a disease affecting joints (which 
is ‘correct’ in the expert’s sense) as well as muscles (which is ‘incorrect’, i.e. not what 
experts mean by this word) and that he has developed arthritis in his thigh. Now, Cal – 
Al’s Twin Earth doppelganger – also believes that arthritis is a disease of joints and 
muscles, but unlike in Al’s speech community, in Cal’s Twin Earth speech community 
the word arthritis is in fact used by experts to refer to a disease affecting both joints and 
muscles. Burge argues that even though both Al and Cal believe that arthritis is a 
disease of muscles, Al’s belief is false whereas Cal’s belief is true. This shows, Burge 
                                                          
3
 This terminology is borrowed from Bilgrami (1992). 
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(1979: 106) continues, that what Al and Cal believe is different and therefore that the 
content of their beliefs is partly a matter of external social environment. The crux of 
Burge’s argument is that the ‘misuse’ of the word arthritis by Al can only be properly 
explained when we assume the existence of meaning/semantics constituted by 
community norms, i.e. social-externalist wide content; Burge claims that without such a 
norm, it would be impossible to know that Al has misused the term but Cal applied it 
correctly.  
 The interesting difference between the two types of wide content is the 
following. The social-externalist enterprise, through its overt reference to a speech 
community, seems primarily interested in the stability of concepts qua linguistic objects 
and their role in the explanation of ‘correct’ (Cal’s) and ‘incorrect’ (Al’s) linguistic 
behaviour. The causal-externalist content, however, especially as presented by Fodor 
(1998, 2008), is a much stronger thesis which has been developed to allow for mental 
generalisations across human species and across slices of time in a cognitive 
development of one person.
4
 Differences apart, we can nevertheless see that both types 
of wide content have been devised with some notion of shareability in mind (more on 
shareability shortly). Indeed, both types of wide content have been posited as linguistic 
semantics in Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1998, Carston 2002).  
 As for the notion of narrow content, it has been developed in two ways: it can be 
described as a function from context to wide content (as in Perry 1977) or it can be 
defined in terms of a conceptual role, i.e. in terms of a concept’s inferential connections 
with other concepts (as in Block 1986).  
 On the first (Perry’s) characterisation, the narrow-wide distinction parallels the 
distinction between content which has no truth-theoretic properties, and that which has 
truth-theoretic properties, respectively (Recanati 1993: 66). Accordingly, Perry (1977) 
argues that narrow content, which can be entertained, is to be characterised as an 
incomplete thought (or sense), whereas wide content, which can be apprehended, is a 
complete (and thus truth-evaluable) thought. Different thoughts (different wide 
contents) may be apprehended in different contexts by entertaining the same narrow 
content (or sense), and conversely, the same thought (the same wide content) may be 
apprehended by entertaining different senses. For example
5, the narrow content of ‘My 
pants are on fire’, when entertained on a particular occasion by Paul, gives rise to the 
                                                          
4
 In fact, Putnam’s narrow-wide distinction was designed as a thesis about the content of linguistic 
expressions and was only subsequently employed in theories of concepts as such (as argued by Brown 
2011). 
5
 These examples are taken from Recanati (1993: 66). 
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thought that Paul’s pants are on fire. But the same narrow content entertained on a 
particular occasion by Fred gives rise to the thought that Fred’s pants are on fire. 
Conversely, both Paul and Fred can apprehend the thought that Paul’s pants are on fire 
by entertaining different narrow contents: ‘My pants are on fire’ and ‘His pants are on 
fire’, respectively. The way in which non-truth-theoretic narrow content plays a role in 
the commonsense explanation of behaviour is illustrated by Perry with the following 
scenario.  
Quote 1: When you and I entertain the sense of "A bear is about to attack me," 
we behave similarly. We both roll up in a ball and try to be as still as possible. 
Different thoughts apprehended, same sense entertained, same behavior. When 
you and I both apprehend the thought that I am about to be attacked by a bear, 
we behave differently. I roll up in a ball, you run to get help. Same thought 
apprehended, different sense entertained, different behavior. (Perry 1977) 
 
A similar scenario can be envisaged for Recanati’s example. The identity of narrow 
content of ‘My pants are on fire’ makes Paul and Fred behave in the same way (both 
run around in frenzy), whereas the difference in narrow content (‘My pants are on fire’ 
apprehended by Paul and ‘His pants are on fire’ apprehended by Fred) makes them 
behave in different ways (Paul runs around in frenzy, Fred throws a blanket over Paul). 
According to Perry (1977), it is the non-truth-theoretic narrow content (sense), and not 
the truth-theoretic thought apprehended, which is tied to human action and thus 
implicated in explaining and predicting actions.
6
 Importantly, when narrow content is 
construed as a function from context to wide content, it is narrow content – rather than 
wide content – which is tied to linguistic expressions in a stable way. On this 
characterisation, wide content is unstable (or fine-grained) as it changes depending on 
contextual co-variances. Thus, the implications that Perry’s distinction has for the 
notion of linguistic semantics contradict those made by Putnam’s distinction. Indeed, 
Perry’s characterisation of the narrow-wide distinction seems to underlie the standard 
Relevance Theory’s distinction between shared (non-truth-theoretic) linguistic 
semantics and (truth-theoretic) real semantics (section 2.1).  
 Significantly, the non-truth-theoretic narrow content may also be seen as a 
schema. Recanati (1993: 209) observes that narrow content of a thought episode can be 
characterised as ‘not a complete representation, but a schema whose contextual 
                                                          
6
 Perry’s argument cannot be maintained. If I entertain the same narrow content ‘His pants are on fire’ but 
apprehend different thoughts about (a) Mark, who’s my friend, and (b) Tom, who I hold a grudge against, 
I may rush to help Mark but laugh at Tom. It is Perry’s wide content, thus, that explains my differing 
actions.  
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enrichment yields a complete representation’; narrow content is ‘what we get when we 
abstract from the ‘objective’ component contributed by the environment’. As a schema, 
narrow content is non-truth-theoretic because it is stripped of contextual detail. In other 
words, it is not ‘fully representational’ (Recanati 1993: 210).7 As discussed in 2.1.2.1, in 
line with linguistic underdeterminacy thesis, Relevance Theory (e.g. Carston 2002: 364-
365) has also defined linguistic semantics in terms of schemas.  
 On the second (Block’s) characterisation, narrow content is construed in terms 
of inferential roles that a concept has in a cogniser’s mental life. Block (1998b) 
observes that an inferential role theorist has the option of constraining a set of 
inferences in which a given concept participates so as to distinguish between content-
constitutive and non-content constitutive connections and argue that narrow content is 
molecular – i.e. it consists in logical (analytic) relations (e.g. Block 1986). However, the 
main challenge for the molecular approach to narrow content is to find a non-arbitrary 
way to distinguish a determinate narrow content for each concept (Bach 1996, Fodor 
1998) – a criticism I agree with.  
 The other option, endorsed by Block (1995) is to argue that the narrow-wide 
distinction is a distinction between holistic (private, individualistic) content and shared 
(causal or social) externalist content, respectively. I return to this proposal in 3.2.1.  
 When discussing shareability of linguistic semantic content (chapter 2), I 
distinguished two ways in which such content is supposed to be shared: across speakers 
and across contexts. The kind of shareability invoked by the notions of social-externalist 
and causal-externalist wide content corresponds to this linguistic sense of shareability 
qua stability or sameness across speakers and across contexts. Crucially, however, it 
does not apply to Perry’s notion of wide content, as for Perry wide content changes 
depending on contextual co-variances (e.g. ‘My pants are on fire’ uttered by Paul versus 
Fred). This gives rise to the question of why Perry’s wide content is actually considered 
to be wide and, relatedly, whether the notion of shareability qua speaker and context 
stability or sameness is defining of the wide content.  
 In fact, it is not. There is another – more fundamental – kind of shareability 
involved in the philosophical notion of wide content. It is the sense of shareability qua 
non-privacy or public availability of mental content to other individuals. Indeed, 
Putnam’s (1975) wide-narrow distinction was devised in order to explain how 
                                                          
7
 Whereas schemas are context-independent, they do not seem to be independent of the mind-external 
environment since schemas are, presumably, acquired in experience (see 2.1.2.1). In this context, it is 
interesting to consider Bach’s (1996) comment that one challenge for the proponents of narrow content is 
to ‘specify narrow contents informatively, rather than by abstraction from wide contents’.  
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meaning/semantics is (has to be) non-private but publicly available for the purposes of 
communication. The notion of wide content is not as much about stability (though 
compatible with it), as it is about non-privacy afforded by what is mind-external. 
Causal-externalist content is supposed to be publicly available in that it is, by definition, 
constituted by relations to the mind-external objective reality. Social-externalist wide 
content is supposed to be publicly available because it is, by definition, determined by 
the conventions of public language, which in turn are determined by deference to 
experts. Perry’s wide content is supposed to be publicly available because, by 
definition, it depends on (and thus varies with) contextual co-variances. What these 
three notions of wide content have in common is that, regardless of the issue of stability, 
they are all shared in the sense that they are publicly available because in one way or 
another dependent on the mind-external objective reality. This dependence of wide 
content on the mind-external reality is what makes it truth-theoretic (i.e. truth-
evaluable). Therefore, it is the notion of shareability qua public availability, and not qua 
stability, that distinguishes wide content from narrow content. 
 The point that shareability qua stability is not defining of wide content is best 
illustrated by the following quote from Block (1998b): 
Quote 2: According to the external factor, 'Superman flies' and 'Clark Kent flies' 
are semantically the same since Superman = Clark Kent; the internal factor is 
what distinguishes them. But the internal factor counts 'Water is more greenish 
than bluish' as semantically the same in my mouth as in the mouth of my twin on 
Twin Earth. In this case, it is the external factor that distinguishes them. 
 
Wide content in the Superman = Clark Kent scenario can be referred to as COARSE-
GRAINED wide content, whereas wide content in the Twin Earth scenario can be referred 
to as FINE-GRAINED wide content (see e.g. Fodor & Lepore 1992: 169). Whereas coarse-
grained wide content is stable, fine-grained wide content changes with contextual co-
variances, of which the Twin Earth scenario is a rather extreme example.
8
  
                                                          
8 Indeed, the coarse-grained versus fine-grained discrepancy in the wide content of the word water is 
apparent even here on Earth. Social- and/or causal-externalist wide content is supposed to enable theorists 
to say that whoever uses the term water on Earth to refer to H2O does so ‘correctly’, and whoever uses 
this term to refer to XYZ does not. It might be argued that the notion of wide content explains successful 
communication (members of the same speech community use the term water to refer to H2O) and 
miscommunication (application of the term water to a substance other than H2O is a false application of 
this term). From a linguistic semantic perspective, to say that H2O is the meaning/semantics of the word 
water is to say that the word water applies to all instances of H2O regardless of any contextual co-
variances – i.e. regardless of whether we are dealing with a rain droplet or a puddle of rain, water in a 
lake or in a cup, water flowing in a river or from a tap, etc. From this perspective, H2O as the wide 
content of the word water is more coarse-grained than all such co-variances; it underlies all mind-external 
co-variances it is acquired from and is cross-context shared/stable. At the same time, however, wide 
content has to be fine-grained to account for all contextual co-variances and determine the correct 
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  Indeed, the fact that narrow content can also be shared/stable (with the 
exception of holistic narrow content) shows that shareability qua stability cannot be 
defining of wide content.  
 In the next section, I look at the relation between various kinds of mental content 
posited by philosophers and RT’s notions of linguistic semantics and real semantics.  
3.1.2 Philosophical legacy in Relevance Theory’s notions of content 
The relation between different philosophical ways of thinking about mental content and 
the pursuit of linguistic semantics seems to rest crucially on the issue of shareability qua 
(speaker and context) stability. We have seen that all philosophical notions of mental 
content, except for holistic narrow content, can be characterised in terms of the notion 
of shareability qua stability. For this reason, it is perhaps no surprise that the notion of 
linguistic semantics has been characterised in terms of every kind of mental content 
which philosophers have argued to be shared/stable. In fact, when approached from a 
philosophical perspective, it transpires that Relevance Theory’s notion of linguistic 
semantics is characterised in terms of (a) causal-externalist wide content, (b) social-
externalist wide content and (c)-(d) two sub-types of non-truth-theoretic narrow content. 
 As already mentioned (section 2.1), Relevance Theory’s distinction between 
linguistic semantics and real semantics was originally characterised in terms of a truth-
theoretic value or lack of it. Now, at the level of a lexical concept, non-truth-theoretic 
linguistic semantic content may take the form of a logical entry, which is a set of 
internalist deductive rules
9
 or a schema. The non-truth-theoretic linguistic content 
constituted by analytic relations is compatible with the notion of non-truth-theoretic 
narrow content. Such content is non-truth-theoretic because it is, by definition, not 
dependent on and hence non-representational (in Fodor’s sense of representational, 
section 1.1) of the mind-external environment. As for schematic non-truth-theoretic 
narrow content, RT’s lexical schemas perfectly match Recanati’s (1993: 209) definition 
of narrow content in terms of on object ‘whose contextual enrichment yields a complete 
representation’. Relevance Theory’s characterisation of linguistic semantics in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
application of the word water in a particular context. For example, when a person A utters ‘This water 
stinks’ when holding up a glass of water, the context is such as to determine that the word water applies to 
the water in the glass, rather than to water in the reservoir that can be seen through the window. The wide 
content of the thought expressed by this utterance must be much more fine-grained than the mere H2O. 
Yet, both – the coarse-grained ‘H2O’ and the fine-grained ‘H2O plus impurities in the glass which the 
speaker is holding up’ – are called ‘wide’ content.  
9
 This holds on the assumption of the analytic-synthetic distinction. 
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logical relations can be found in Carston (e.g. 2002: 9) and as schemas in Carston (e.g. 
2002: 375).    
 However, as argued in 2.1, there is an instability in RT as to whether linguistic 
semantics is truth-theoretic or not. Thus, Carston (2010) proposes that many lexical 
concepts are ex full-fledged concepts – by assumption, concepts with Fodor’s (1998, 
2008) referential content (section 2.1.3.1). Carston’s reference to Fodor is important 
because, if full-fledged lexical concepts are defined in terms of Fodor’s concepts, then 
linguistic semantics is defined in yet another – this time – causal-externalist terms. 
Indeed, things get even more complicated because RT’s, especially Sperber & Wilson’s 
(1998), reference to ‘meanings’ which are ‘encodable in the public language’ and 
Carston’s (e.g. 2002: 18) reference to concepts encoded in ‘the public language system’ 
point to the characterisation of linguistic semantics in a social-externalist wide sense.  
 This brief survey reveals that Relevance Theorists, in their project of defining 
linguistic semantics, are concerned with shareability qua stability, remaining undecided 
about the truth-theoretic value of such content. From this perspective, Perry’s notion of 
wide content cannot constitute the linguistic content precisely because it is not stable 
across contexts. This is alarming – since wide content is defined mind-externally and 
not in terms of stability (as narrow content can also be stable), it follows that both 
social-externalist and causal-externalist kinds of wide content are compatible with 
Perry’s definition of wide content. Philosophically speaking, Perry’s definition applies 
to social-externalist wide content and causal-externalist wide content. It is only when 
one focuses on stability (i.e. tries to apply the notion of wide content to the study of 
linguistic meaning/semantics) that wide content as characterised by Perry is seen as 
different from social- and causal-externalist notions of content and that the coarse-
grained and fine-grained distinction becomes significant. 
 Now, when theories of communication use wide content, they do so for two 
purposes. The first is that of playing part in the explanation of utterance interpretation 
and the second is that of having a role in the explanation of word meaning/semantics 
acquisition. In principle, the two processes, of word meaning/semantics acquisition and 
utterance interpretation, are inter-dependent – how one interprets utterances depends in 
part on what word meaning/semantics one has acquired. Ideally, thus, we should be able 
to explain the two processes with just one notion of content. There is, however, a 
methodological assumption that makes the two processes different – whereas both word 
meaning/semantics acquisition and utterance interpretation take place in context, on 
traditional approaches (e.g. Relevance Theory) the product of word meaning/semantics 
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acquisition is context-independent. In other words, whatever is acquired is not only 
acquired in a variety of circumstances (in context), but it is also an abstraction from this 
variety of circumstances (abstraction from context). Only coarse-grained content fits 
such an approach to word meaning/semantics acquisition. 
 However, as argued earlier, the discrepancy between coarse-grained and fine-
grained perspectives on wide content is merely forced upon us by the methodological 
assumption that there exists some shared/stable content which is abstracted from 
contextual co-variances. This assumption gives rise to two problems.  
 The first problem – already discussed in 2.2.3.4, is that it imposes a non-uniform 
and paradoxical explanation of word meaning/semantics acquisition and utterance 
interpretation where contextual co-variances are ignored in acquisition only to become 
significant in utterance interpretation. Perry’s definition of wide content, and thus the 
content’s public availability in terms of context dependence is important because it 
draws attention to the ‘evidential’ role of (public availability in terms of) the context, 
which is variable and dynamic. It thus supports my argument (section 2.2.3.4) that 
contextual information (both incoming and stored in secondary memory) plays the 
primary evidential role in utterance interpretation.
10
 I return to this point in 3.3.  
 The second problem concerning the discrepancy between coarse-grained and 
fine-grained perspectives on wide content relates to the way in which the narrow-wide 
distinction applies to Relevance Theory’s shifting positions on mental content. This is 
what I turn to now. 
 The distinction between coarse-grained and fine-grained wide content becomes 
particularly important, and complex, in Relevance Theory. As mentioned, for 
philosophers, wide content is something which is objective, non-private and truth-
evaluable. This holds for wide content as defined by causal-externalists, social-
externalists and by Perry (1977). Wide content thus is contrasted with internalist, 
private and thus non-truth-evaluable content. The wide-narrow distinction is traceable in 
the original RT’s distinction between linguistic and real semantics in terms of truth-
theoretic value or lack of it. As long as linguistic semantics is maintained to be non-
truth-theoretic and real semantics truth-theoretic, RT’s distinction and the wide-narrow 
                                                          
10
 Even though I endorse the idea of public availability in terms of context-dependence (and in spite of its 
variability), I do not endorse the narrow-wide distinction, to which Perry is committed. I say more about 
these issues in 3.2 and 3.3. 
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distinction seem consistent.
11
 In this scenario (interpretation 1), the relation between 
RT’s distinction and the wide-narrow distinction is as follows. 
INTERPRETATION 1 
linguistic semantics  real semantics 
non-truth-theoretic narrow content  causal-externalist wide content 
On interpretation 1, RT’s notion of linguistic semantics parallels the philosophical 
notion of non-truth-theoretic narrow content. As such, it may be seen as constituted by 
either analytic relations or schemas (3.1.1). Given Carston’s (2002, 2010) frequent 
reference to Fodor (1998, 2008), it seems reasonable to assume that real semantics is 
constituted by Fodor’s causal-externalist, i.e. referential content. But this interpretation 
raises a problem for RT. Whereas non-truth-theoretic narrow content is, by definition, 
cross-context shared/stable, it does not support truth-evaluation in the way required by 
philosophers. This is because non-truth-theoretic narrow content is internalist.
12
 One 
may think that this is not a problem for RT because RT has always claimed that it is real 
semantics that has truth-theoretic value – and, on interpretation 1, this is satisfied by 
adopting Fodor’s causal-externalist wide content. However, as discussed in 2.1, RT 
substantially deviates from Fodor’s theory. Unlike Fodor, RT claims that concepts are 
more numerous than word meanings/semantics. Indeed, Carston (2010) argues that LOT 
hosts ad hoc concepts, i.e. concepts which are constructed through personal inference. 
Ultimately, RT’s re-interpretation of Fodor’s LOT is so extreme that RT’s real 
semantics can no longer be said to host concepts constituted by Fodor’s causal-
externalist wide content. This is because RT’s real semantics, despite references to 
Fodor, is not shared but individualistic/holistic. It is the locus of a cogniser’s subjective 
point of view. Given RT’s re-interpretation of Fodor’s notion of a concept, the relation 
between RT’s distinction and the wide-narrow distinction is as follows (interpretation 
2).  
INTERPRETATION 2 
linguistic semantics  real semantics 
non-truth-theoretic narrow content  individualistic/holistic psychology 
                                                          
11
 However, the notion of non-truth-theoretic linguistic semantics cannot be sustained for the reasons 
discussed in section 2.1.  
12
 But it is not so apparent with schemas – see footnote 7.   
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Evident here is that the amendments to interpretation 1 leave RT without a notion of 
content which allows for truth-evaluation (linguistic semantics is non-truth-theoretic 
and real semantics is private). Given this problem, as well as arguments against non-
truth-theoretic semantics discussed in 2.1.1, RT’s more recent characterisation of 
linguistic semantics in truth-theoretic terms seems to be an inevitable move. Indeed, by 
defining linguistic semantics in terms of full-fledged concepts – by definition, Fodorian 
causal-externalist content – and, on top of that, by arguing that encoded word 
meaning/semantics is publicly available to a given speech community (Sperber & 
Wilson 1998, Carston 2002), RT seems now doubly armed against the problem arising 
for interpretation 2 (but, as discussed, RT’s deviation from Fodor questions RT’s 
causal-externalism). The relation between RT’s distinction and the wide-narrow 
distinction now looks as follows (interpretation 3). 
INTERPRETATION 3 
linguistic semantics  real semantics 
causal/social-externalist wide content  individualistic/holistic psychology 
Construing linguistic semantics in terms of wide content may have solved the problem 
which arises for interpretation 2; however, it seems at odds with the philosophical 
legacy. On the one hand, RT has shared causal- and/or social-externalist linguistic 
semantic content, which can function just as RT theorists want it to – i.e. as a piece of 
‘evidence’ (e.g. Carston 2002: 365) for the thought communicated by a given utterance 
in a given context. But what about the individualistic/holistic content of real semantics? 
Well, even though real semantics on interpretation 3 cannot be publicly available 
because it is private, RT still needs to maintain that its content is truth-theoretic – after 
all it is THE REAL semantics. To see the full scale of RT’s problem here, we need to look 
at interpretation 3 from the perspective of the distinction between coarse-grained wide 
content and fine-grained wide content. 
INTERPRETATION 3A 
linguistic semantics  real semantics 
causal/social-externalist wide content  individualistic/holistic psychology 
coarse-grained wide content/  fine-grained wide content 
                           fine-grained wide content 
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Interpretation 3A represents the current state of affairs in RT. Word meaning/semantics 
is constituted by some coarse-grained wide content (of ‘public language’) and by fine-
grained full-fledged lexical concepts, i.e. concepts whose content is sensitive to external 
co-variances (because they are pragmatically constructed). The fine-grained content is 
publicly available in virtue of its context-sensitivity, but at the same time individualistic 
because constructed through personal inference. As such, linguistic semantics is both 
public and private. Indeed, the same conflict is evident in RT’s characterisation of real 
semantics (and was identified in Interpretation 3 as a conflict between privacy and truth-
theoretic value of real semantics). Like linguistic semantics, real semantics is private, 
because individualistic, and wide in the fine-grained sense, because its content is 
derived in contexts – i.e. it is sensitive to mind-external co-variances relative to which 
its truth can be evaluated. The problem is that to argue that a semantics is both public 
and private seems inconsistent.  
 Now, the private-public inconsistency involved in the notion of fine-grained 
wide content is (in a way that will become clear in 3.3) unavoidable. I will later argue 
(and in a sense agree with RT) that there is nothing conceptually wrong in mental 
content being private/individualistic and publicly available at the same time. Indeed, it 
seems to follow from Perry’s characterisation of wide content: if, as Perry argues, 
narrow content is a function from context to wide content, then wide content is derived 
on the basis of (private) narrow content and (publicly available) context.
13
 However, the 
problem I have with Perry’s and RT’s accounts is that they assume two kinds of 
content. Notice that if Perry’s notion of wide content (i.e. content which is publicly 
available in virtue of its context-sensitivity) can be applied to holistic content, no other 
notion of content seems necessary. I return to this point in 3.3. 
 The issue of RT’s instability about the nature of linguistic semantics in particular 
and mental content is general has been discussed at some length in chapter 2 and in this 
chapter. All in all, I think that in allowing individualistic content (i.e. full-fledged 
lexical concepts) into linguistic semantics, RT (e.g. Carston 2010) has made the right 
choice insofar as it counts as a step towards the conclusion that shared/stable content is 
not conceptually necessary and that real semantics is the only kind of semantics. In this 
respect, my criticism of RT is aimed at their, unnecessary, in my opinion, adherence to 
shared/stable content.  
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 Indeed, Perry’s wide content seems to match RT’s real semantics (with the exception of interpretation 
1). 
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 In chapter 2, I argued that, from a linguistic perspective, the notion of 
shared/stable content – i.e. linguistic semantics – is problematic and unnecessary to 
account for meaning in language. In the next section, I argue that, also from a 
philosophical perspective, the notions of shared/stable content – i.e. non-truth-theoretic 
narrow content, causal- and social-externalist wide content – are problematic. I argue 
that holism is the only plausible account of mental content and show that the problems 
envisaged for holism by its opponents (e.g. Fodor & Lepore 1992) do not actually arise.     
3.2 All roads lead to holism 
In this section, I critically evaluate two-factor approaches to semantics, i.e. approaches 
which endorse the wide-narrow distinction. I reject all notions of shared/stable content 
and argue that holism is the most plausible account of mental content. 
3.2.1 Two-factor semantics 
As mentioned in 3.1.1, one way in which narrow content has been defined is in terms of 
Block’s (e.g. 1986) notion of CONCEPTUAL or INFERENTIAL ROLE SEMANTICS14 
(henceforth C/IRS). This treats of inferential relations that a given concept or 
proposition bears to other concepts or propositions in a cogniser’s belief system. The 
main purpose of positing such internalist content is to provide psychological 
explanation of a cogniser’s behaviour – the assumption being that what is ‘in the head’ 
(i.e. a mental state) has functional (e.g. behavioural) consequences (Fodor & Lepore 
1992). The C/IRS narrow content, however, is not the only kind of content that Block 
(ibid.) posits. Block’s argument is that both narrow and wide kinds of content are 
needed if certain puzzles about meaning/semantics and reference are to be resolved. 
Following Putnam (1975), Block assumes that wide content is necessary if the Twin 
Earth puzzle is to be resolved. However, wide content cannot be all there is to 
meaning/semantics because it cannot on its own handle the so-called Frege’s cases.   
 Frege (1960) famously drew attention to the fact that if mind-external reference 
is all there is to meaning/semantics, the substitution of co-referring expressions in a 
sentence should preserve its truth value. That, however, is not the case in opaque 
contexts. Consider (1) and (2) below, where expressions the morning star, the evening 
star and Venus all refer to the same planet in the mind-external world.   
                                                          
14
 Conceptual role semantics is concerned with the content of concepts (i.e. sub-propositional entities), 
whereas inferential role semantics is concerned with the role a proposition plays in a set of inference 
patterns (Pagin 2006).  
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(1) Mary knows that the morning star is Venus. 
(2) Mary knows that the evening star is Venus. 
In a scenario where Mary knows that the morning star and Venus are co-referential 
expressions, but is unaware of the fact that the evening star is co-referential with them 
too,  (1) comes out as true whereas (2) comes out as false. Cases like this, where the 
substitution of co-referential expressions does not preserve the truth value, are abundant 
(e.g. Cicero=Tully, Superman=Clark Kent, Köln=Cologne, etc.). They all point to the 
conclusion that something mind-internal has a role to play in the explanation of 
meaning/semantics. Block’s (1986) proposal incorporates both externalist and 
internalist observations in an approach that can be referred to as a TWO-FACTOR (i.e. 
internalist/narrow plus externalist/wide) SEMANTICS. This approach came in for severe 
criticism from Fodor & Lepore (1992). 
 One of the problems that Fodor & Lepore (1992: 170) have with Block’s two-
factor approach is that there is nothing in Block’s framework that ‘keeps the two factors 
stuck together’ – the narrow and wide kinds of content are independent of each other. 
On the one hand, this independence allows that Oscar’s and Toscar’s water terms in 
Putnam’s scenario have different wide contents despite having the same narrow content. 
Conversely, it also allows that the terms the morning star and the evening star, despite 
having a single wide content, may have two distinct narrow contents (as was the case 
with Mary in (1) and (2)). On the other hand, this independence worries Fodor & 
Lepore (1992: 170), who argue that, if wide content and narrow content are 
independent, nothing in the theory prevents there being an expression that has narrow 
content appropriate to 4 is a prime but truth conditions (and thus independent content) 
appropriate to water is wet (Fodor & Lepore 1992: 172). The two-factor approach thus 
does not resolve what can be called the CONTENT-REFERENCE PROBLEM.
15
  
 Another problem that Fodor & Lepore (1992) have with two-factor semantics 
relates directly to holism. As discussed in 3.1.1, C/IRS theories have a choice to 
constrain narrow content to some set of content-constitutive inferences or not to 
constrain it and argue for holistic narrow content. According to Fodor & Lepore (1992), 
both solutions are problematic. 
 The most common way to constrain narrow content to content-constitutive 
inferences is to adopt the analytic-synthetic distinction. This immediately brings us back 
to Fodor’s (1998, 2008) criticism of that distinction (discussed in 1.1). Put simply, 
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 As discussed in 1.1, Fodor’s referential account faces a similar problem. I return to this point in 3.2.2.  
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Fodor thinks that C/IRS cannot be defined in terms of the analytic-synthetic distinction 
because there is no way of deciding which inferences are and which are not content-
constitutive. In the light of this, Fodor (ibid.) argues that any non-atomistic account of 
conceptual content inevitably leads to holism. And, according to Fodor, holism is 
problematic because (a) it does not satisfy the publicity constraint (which states that all 
humans share the same concepts), and relatedly (b) it does not offer a plausible account 
of compositionality of thought. Fodor & Lepore’s (1992: 176-177) argument is that 
(holistic) inferential roles are not compositional because they are constituted by 
whatever beliefs a cogniser happens to have, i.e. they are unconstrained. For example, if 
someone happens to believe that cows are dangerous – i.e. that an inference to 
DANGEROUS is part of the content of the concept COW – then an inference from 
BROWN COW to DANGEROUS should, by compositionality, be part of the content of 
BROWN COW. But that cannot be the case, so the argument goes, because ‘it doesn’t 
look as if the inference from “brown” or “cow” to “dangerous” is compositional’ (Fodor 
& Lepore 1992: 177). This leads Fodor & Lepore (1992: 181) to conclude that C/IRS 
suffers from a circularity problem: the only way to make C/IRS compositional is to 
adopt the analytic-synthetic distinction, but since there is no such distinction, C/IRS is 
an implausible theory because it cannot account for compositionality.  
 It must be noted, however, that there is also a certain circularity/inconsistency in 
Fodor & Lepore’s criticism of C/IRS; their argument that the inference from BROWN 
COW to DANGEROUS ‘doesn’t look’ compositional relies on the acceptance of the 
analytic-synthetic distinction – they actually write that the inference from COW to 
DANGEROUS is ‘clearly synthetic’ (Fodor & Lepore 1992: 178).  
 More fundamentally, however, and regardless of Fodor & Lepore’s stand on the 
analytic-synthetic distinction, their criticism of C/IRS is grounded in the publicity 
constraint. It is undeniable (and I’m sure Fodor & Lepore would agree) that if there is a 
COW  DANGEROUS inference in an individual mind, then, all things being equal, 
this inference may licence the BROWN COW  DANGEROUS inference. The latter 
inference arises from the fact that the concept BROWN COW has the concept COW as 
its component, i.e. it is compositionally constituted by it. For Fodor & Lepore (1992), 
the problem with the subjective/individualistic inference from BROWN COW to 
DANGEROUS is that it is subjective/individualistic. As Fodor & Lepore (1992) see it, 
the subjective/individualistic aspect of holism precludes explanation of the human mind 
and so makes the prospects for psychological generalisations/laws doomed to failure. 
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The crux of the problem is that, given holism, it is very unlikely that two cognisers will 
ever share a mental state with the same content. I dismiss this criticism in 3.3.  
 As signposted at the end of 3.1.2, I sympathise with (Block’s adoption of) 
holism but reject the argument that wide content is also necessary. The content-
reference problem identified for two-factor semantics by Fodor & Lepore (1992) is 
genuine. Given that two-factor semantics fails to resolve this problem (acknowledged 
by Block himself (1993, 1998b)), there are two directions which one may take in aid of 
resolving it. One may argue that there is only one kind of content and that this content is 
wide. This position is taken by Fodor (1998, 2008). Alternatively, one may argue that 
there is only one kind of content and that this content is holistic. This position, endorsed 
in this thesis, is taken by Bilgrami (1992). In the next section, I discuss problems with 
Fodor’s ‘solution’ to the content-reference problem and argue that contrary to claims 
made by Fodor, Fodor’s account is implicitly relying on two-factor assumptions. My 
arguments are supported by claims made in Bilgrami (1998b).  
3.2.2 Fodor’s referentialism revisited  
Fodor’s (1998, 2008) answer to the content-reference problem is the rejection of narrow 
content and with it of the wide-narrow distinction. For Fodor, referential (i.e. causal-
externalist) content is the only content there is (inferential roles are, by assumption, 
non-content constitutive).  
 However, I have argued in 1.1.1 that without internalist semantics, Fodor has no 
way of explaining why a given concept has the content it does – for example, why the 
concept CAT locks onto/refers to cats and no other things in the world. Briefly, Fodor’s 
problem was that the content of the concept (e.g. CAT) cannot determine the referential 
relation (between the concept CAT and cats in the world) because it is the referential 
relation that determines the content of the concept. This circularity problem, I argued, 
gives rise to Fodor’s (1998, 2008) mind-dependence thesis, which, in turn, commits 
Fodor to internalist, compositional semantics.  
 There are two interesting things to notice about this situation. Firstly, Block’s 
and Fodor’s accounts are, in fact, not so far apart – given Fodor’s (1998, 2008) mind 
dependence thesis and his re-introduction of internalist semantics, Fodor’s account is in 
effect a two-factor account.
16
  Given that, Fodor’s (1998, 2008) proposal has to face the 
content-reference problem just as Block’s account does. Secondly, if we combine 
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 Even though Fodor (2008: 86) explicitly denies that his account is a two-factor account.  
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Fodor’s mind dependence thesis with his overt rejection of the analytic-synthetic 
distinction, we simply get a holistic account of what is ‘in the mind’. Fodor’s proposal 
(especially as presented in 1998, 2008) thus cannot escape the charge of holism. My 
argument receives support from Bilgrami’s (1998b) observations. 
 Like any other theory of mental content, Fodor’s (1998, 2008) theory is 
supposed to be equipped well enough to account for the Frege cases (section 3.2.1). We 
have seen that Block’s solution to the problem of the substitution of co-referring 
expressions in opaque contexts was to posit the existence of narrow content on top of 
wide content. For Block, the substitution of co-referring terms fails in (1) and (2) 
because Mary’s terms the morning star and the evening star have different narrow 
contents. As for Fodor (1998, 2008), despite being covertly committed to internalist 
semantics (as argued earlier), overtly Fodor rejects the existence of narrow content.  
This means that Fodor cannot, at least overtly, say what Block does. What Fodor does, 
however, is argue that this problem has a syntactic solution; the concepts THE 
MORNING STAR and THE EVENING STAR have different constituent structures and 
that is why they can behave differently in opaque contexts. For Fodor, ‘syntax can do 
what senses were traditionally supposed to do’ (Fodor 2008: 61).  
 When it comes to primitive concepts, the solution is the same. For Fodor, the 
concepts CICERO and TULLY have exactly the same (referential) content, but they are 
syntactically different. For Fodor, it is the assumed difference in the syntax of these two 
concepts that allows for and explains situations where people believe that Cicero was a 
great philosopher, but Tully was not. The question that Bilgrami (1998b) asks is what 
makes the two concepts syntactically different in the first place. Presumably, it cannot 
be orthography or phonology since concepts are not the sort of thing that can be spelt or 
pronounced (see also Fodor 2008: 79).
17
 Bilgrami (ibid.) argues that even on the 
assumption that syntax solves these puzzles, syntax cannot solve them if it is 
independent of cognisers’ conceptual/inferential roles.  He writes: 
Quote 3: No amount of talk of the syntax of Mentalese or talk of brain-writing is 
going to avoid the route to syntax via interpretation of inferential behaviour. So 
if one insists that it is syntax that will solve the puzzles, then the proper way to 
proceed is to see functional role as the dog and syntax as the tail, with the former 
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 Furthermore, there exist puzzles where one and the same term has to correspond to two distinct 
Fodorian concepts, i.e. concepts with the same content but distinct syntaxes. An example is provided by 
the so-called Paderewski puzzle. Paderewski was a famous Polish pianist as well as Prime Minister. Thus, 
we can easily imagine a situation where a person who mistakenly believes that Paderewski the pianist and 
Paderewski the politician were two different people has a further belief that they have met Paderewski the 
politician, but not Paderewski the pianist in person. Fodor’s solution to this puzzle is to argue that this 
person has two syntactically distinct concepts which share the same content. 
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wagging the latter. There is no leaving functional role out, […] Of course, 
someone might protest that syntax, in general, is surely not to be thought of as 
exclusively posited on the basis of such things as inference and behaviour, even 
if causal and inferential role is. That is plausible. But if it is plausible, the lesson 
to be learnt from it is that one should not appeal to syntax to solve puzzles which 
are essentially puzzles that are defined upon the failures of rationality in 
inferences. (Bilgrami 1998b: 111) 
 
Fodor (2008: 87) argues that ‘concepts have both referents and a congeries of beliefs 
(etc.) in which they are embedded’, where the latter correspond to a concept’s role 
(including inferential role) in mental processes. He also argues that ‘theories about how 
minds represent things ought to be sensitive to data about which inferences one does (or 
doesn’t) accept’ (2008: 77). That said, the relation between concepts (and their formal, 
i.e. syntactic properties) and inferential roles is for Fodor one-directional; his claim is 
that ‘only formal differences among Mentalese expressions can affect mental processes’ 
(2008: 77). Bilgrami’s point is that Fodor cannot invoke the route from formal 
properties to mental processes without acknowledging the primacy of the route from 
mental processes to formal properties. But once the primacy of mental processes is 
acknowledged, there is no need to appeal to formal properties in solving the puzzles. If 
formal properties are nevertheless made use of, one ends up with the formal properties, 
i.e. the syntax, answering to the whole subjective/individualistic system of inferences. 
Fundamentally, Bilgrami’s argument (1998b) shows that if Fodor insists that inferential 
roles are not content-constitutive and invokes syntax to solve the puzzles, his notion of 
syntax is seriously compromised. The paradox is that Fodor’s goal of keeping the theory 
of mind free from individualism/holism has led him to an account where 
individualism/holism governs the formal properties of the mind.  
 Now, Fodor (2008: 86) explicitly denies that his account is a two-factor account. 
This is because for him all inferential roles are by definition non-content-constitutive, 
and referential content is the only kind of content. However, given my arguments in 1.1 
and here, as well as Bilgrami’s (1998b) criticism of Fodor, Fodor’s denial is untenable. 
Furthermore, his denial is circular – inferential roles are non-content-constitutive 
because semantics is referential and semantics is referential because inferential roles are 
non-content-constitutive. My conclusion is that regardless of what Fodor asserts, 
Fodor’s (1998, 2008) theory just is a two-factor theory with holistic narrow content 
(given his rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction). I argue that Fodor has simply 
failed to escape the charge of holism.  
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 In the next section, I argue that individualistic, and thus holistic, assumptions 
underlie the notion of social-externalist content.  
3.2.3 Problems with social-externalist content 
As discussed in 3.1.1, for theorists who posit social-externalist wide content, the misuse 
of a given word (e.g. arthritis) can only be properly explained when we assume the 
existence of content constituted by community norms – in this case by the way the 
experts use it. However, perhaps the most obvious objection to social externalism is that 
it gives rise to the problem of ‘incomplete understanding’ – according to a social-
externalist, an individual is ascribed thoughts composed by concepts of which this 
individual may have an incomplete grasp (Wikforss 2004).  
 A related problem is that the alleged social explanations of language use (and 
misuse) actually have an internalist-individualistic justification. Chomsky (2000a) 
observes that if a speaker uses, for example, the term arthritis, the hearer initially 
assumes that the speaker’s usage is like that of the hearer’s. In other words, the hearer 
assumes that the speaker uses the word to mean the ailment of joints. If the hearer 
realises that the speaker uses the term to mean something else, the hearer makes 
modifications to the interpretation as is required by the circumstances. Reference to 
‘public language’ or social-externalist content of the word ‘sheds no further light on 
what is happening between [interlocutors], even if some clear sense can be given to the 
tacitly assumed notions’ (Chomsky 2000a: 32).  
Chomsky also discusses some problems with the social co-operation and the role 
of experts in determining the reference of words. Chomsky shares the intuition that 
under some circumstances we can agree that what we are referring to when using the 
word elm, for example, is what is meant by some expert. But the expert to whom the 
speaker is deferring the reference of elm may be an Italian gardener who does not speak 
a word of English but yet is able to correct the speaker’s usage through his knowledge 
of Latin terms. The problem is, Chomsky (2000a: 71) observes, that it is impossible to 
derive a useful notion of ‘language’ or ‘language community’ from such considerations.  
 Chomsky’s internalism-individualism about word meaning/semantics is not 
incompatible with there being speech communities (in some imprecise sense). As 
Pateman (1987: 80) comments on Chomskyan general approach to the study of 
language, ‘nativism does not exclude the possibility of a sociolinguistics; what it does 
do is constrain its possible form’. The point is that because it is impossible to precisely 
define/delimit the notion of a speech community, the notion is of little theoretical 
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import in the explanation of the phenomenon we are interested in. Furthermore, an 
internalist-individualistic approach to word meaning/semantics offers insight into what 
is happening in cases of ‘misuse’ of a given word without making the implausible 
assumption that meaning/semantics is collectively shared by members of the same 
speech community. If anything happens to be shared, it is shared distributively 
(Pateman 1987: 91) and even then the distribution is non-uniform across individuals.
18
   
 Judging language misuse (or correct use) ultimately depends on our assumption 
that people do things the way we do, i.e. that they use words to communicate what we 
do in using them (Pateman 1987: 131). The judgement of correct use/misuse happens 
not in virtue of collective agreement, but distributive agreement, i.e. agreement 
grounded in internalist-individualistic terms. Burton-Roberts (2012) frames it in terms 
of ‘I-linguistic assumptions, […] amounting to an I-assumption about others’ words – 
effectively, the I-assumption that others implement the same conventions as ‘I’’.  
 Now, Chomsky’s individualism about words’ meaning/semantics is radical, as 
discussed in 1.2. Since radical individualism – together with the network aspect – is 
defining of holism (section 3.0), Chomsky’s arguments against social-externalism and 
for an individualistic explanation are, in effect, arguments for a holistic explanation.   
 The problems with both types of externalism that I have discussed in this section 
strongly suggest that holism underlies all externalist explanations. For this reason, 
holism is not merely one of the many possible options – it is, I argue, the only option to 
be seriously taken into account.  
3.3 ‘Problems’ with holism dismissed 
In this section, I defend holism against three criticisms it has come under (especially, 
Fodor & Lepore (1992)). First, I look at the ‘problems’ of mental generalisations and 
compositionality. Then, I dismiss the sense-reference ‘problem’ in the light of 
Bilgrami’s thesis about unity and locality of content. Finally, I discuss how a holistic 
account is compatible with the claim that meaning is publicly available.  
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 In the unlikely event that it were possible to investigate people’s mental contents, conceptual primitive 
by conceptual primitive, and if we found a single conceptual structure recurrent across individuals in 
association with a given semiotic label (see my discussion of RT’s process of ‘concept narrowing’ in 
2.1.3.2), we could not extrapolate from such an observation to the existence of collectively shared mental 
content. Relatedly, we could not extrapolate from such finding to the existence of the cognitive process of 
deterministic decoding of such content (see discussion in 2.2.3.3). 
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3.3.1 Holism meets the requirement for mental generalisations and compositionality 
Fodor & Lepore (1992) object that holism, as a thesis, lacks explanatory potential. This 
problem is exemplified by the inability of holism to state psychological generalisations 
such as: ‘The belief that one is in immediate danger causes release of adrenaline’. The 
problem identified here is that for holists there is nothing like the belief that one is in 
immediate danger, because each individual’s beliefs are subjective/individualistic. 
 However, Block (1998a) argues that holistic accounts of mental content are able 
to provide universally quantified laws, i.e. laws that generalise about contents without 
specifying them. He gives the following example of a universally quantified 
psychological law: ‘For any action a and any goal g, if one wants g and also believes 
that a is required for g, then one will try to do a’. This quantified psychological law has 
been stated without committing oneself to the existence of two agents having exactly 
the same goals.   
 Another argument in favour of such quantified laws is related to my criticism of 
Fodor’s atomicity (in 1.1.2). Fodor’s assumption that his theory allows for 
psychological generalisations like ‘The belief that one is in immediate danger causes 
release of adrenaline’ is based on his claim that the concept BELIEF is atomic and 
species-shared. The problem for Fodor – and for the explanatory potential of his 
psychological statements – is that (as I argued in 1.1.2), Fodor’s atomism, on which 
such generalisations rely, is theoretically and methodologically implausible. 
 Contrary to Fodor’s (1998, 2008; with Lepore 1992) claims, I argue that certain 
general psychological laws can be deduced by observing instances of 
subjective/individualistic inference patterns. For example, my earlier observation (3.2.1) 
that the fact that the existence of the subjective/individualistic COW  DANGEROUS 
inference licences the subjective/individualistic BROWN COW  DANGEROUS 
inference is subsumed under the following generalisation.   
(3)  ∀x (Y(x) & (z ⊂ x))  Y(z) 
(3) states that for all things x such that x has the property Y and z is a subset of x, it 
follows that z has the property Y. Accordingly, if someone believes that all cows are 
dangerous and that brown cows are a subset of the set of all cows, it follows that this 
person believes that brown cows are dangerous. Given (3), we can predict an infinite 
number of diverse subjective/individualistic inferences: from BROWN COW to 
DANGEROUS or CUDDLY or APPETIZING, from LITTLE POODLE to SCARY or 
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FRIENDLY or INCAPABLE OF RECURSIVE THOUGHT, etc. Similarly, we can 
predict that, all things being equal, a subjective/individualistic inference from COW to 
APPETIZING will not licence the inference from NOT COW to NOT APPETIZING, 
just as the subjective/individualistic inference from LITTLE POODLE to FRIENDLY 
will not licence the inference from NOT LITTLE POODLE to NOT FRIENDLY. This 
fact can be subsumed under the following generalisation. 
(4) [[∀x(C(x)) ⊂ ∀y(A(y))]  [z(C(z))  A(z)]]   
(4) states that it is not the case that if all things x which have the property C (e.g. cow) 
form a subset of all things y which have the property A (e.g. looks appetising), then if 
there is a thing z such that z does not have the property C, then z does not have the 
property A. In simple terms, (4) predicts that if all cows look appetizing but not all 
things that look appetizing are cows, then, if something is not a cow, it does not 
necessarily mean that it does not look appetising.  
 Furthermore, we can also predict that (4) will not hold if there is a logical 
relation of equivalence between the two variables, x and y. For example, it will not hold 
for inferences from THE PRESENT QUEEN OF ENGLAND (x) to THE PRESENT 
SUPREME GOVERNOR OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND (y). In cases of logical 
equivalence like that, the negation of one variable follows from the negation of the other 
and vice versa. This rule can be subsumed under the following formula, which is 
licensed by the truth-functional properties of logical equivalence.  
(5) (xy)  (xy)   
Just like the previous generalisations, so (5) predicts and explains a variety of 
inferences, including ones that are peculiar to particular cognisers. For example, (5) 
predicts that if someone happens to believe that the natural phenomenon of winds 
blowing at a speed of more than 40 kilometres per hour is always concurrent with the 
pressure drop by 230 hectopascals, then this person is bound to infer from the 
occurrence of one to the occurrence of the other (and vice versa) and also from the non-
occurrence of one to the non-occurrence of the other (and vice versa).   
 The point I am making here is that the probability or improbability of certain 
inference patterns with subjective/individualistic content can be predicted by reference 
to the laws of logic. This shows that holism about mental content is absolutely 
compatible with positing psychological generalisations, grounded in general rules of 
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logic, as laws underlying general human inferential patterns. I argue that given the 
availability and explanatory power of such laws, Fodor’s (1998, 2008; with Lepore 
1992) argument that holistic accounts hinder psychological generalisations and 
therefore thwart prospects for robust and explanatorily powerful psychological theories 
is unjustified.   
 A further, related, aspect of holism that Fodor & Lepore (1992) object to has 
already been mentioned in 3.0 as ‘the network effect’; the conceptual role of a mental 
symbol is such as to relate it more or less directly to many other (and though indirectly 
perhaps all) mental symbols within the same system, making the symbols mutually 
dependent for content. As mentioned in 3.2.1, Fodor & Lepore object to the network 
aspect of holism by arguing that it does not offer a plausible account of 
compositionality of thought.  
 Fodor & Lepore (1992: 182-183) argue that compositionality is normally 
determined locally; for example, the idea that syntax is compositional is the idea that the 
structural description of an expression is determined by the ‘[…] lexical items that it 
contains’. The problem for them is that, even if holism is compatible with some sort of 
compositionality, such compositionality is not determined locally but globally, i.e. by 
features of one’s whole belief system.  
 However, the ‘problem’ of global compositionality does not arise if one allows 
for immediate pragmatic constraints on inference.
19
 As discussed in 2.2.3, Hintzman’s 
(1986) context-dependent process of echo retrieval constrains pragmatic inference so 
that not all memory traces stored in secondary memory (i.e. not whole holistic system) 
resonate strongly enough to make contribution to the echo which is retrieved in the 
process of utterance interpretation (and which, for Hintzman, constitutes the 
interpretation of a given utterance). Thus, Hintzman’s account clearly shows that not all 
subjective/individualistic content is relevant to the retrieval of context-sensitive 
conceptual structures (i.e. thoughts). Add to this the fact that compositionality is a 
phenomenon which operates on contextually sensitive concepts (as convincingly argued 
by Recanati (2005), section 2.2.3.3), Fodor & Lepore’s (1992) objection to the global 
nature of compositionality involved in holistic accounts is, again, ill-founded.  
 The point is that a holistic account of mental content is compatible with and only 
with a local account of compositionality as long as it is combined with a radically 
contextualist account of utterance interpretation – like the one I argued for in 2.2.3. On a 
                                                          
19
 That is, the ‘problem’ arises if one – like Fodor and Lepore – fails to acknowledge the role of pragmatic 
constraints. 
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radically contextualist account – which presupposes holistic mental content – 
compositionality does not operate globally, i.e. it does not combine all imaginable 
inferential roles of a given concept, because all imaginable inferential roles of a given 
concept are constrained by contextual factors (those which are incoming and those 
which are stored in secondary memory). This, very roughly, means that if we are sitting 
in a restaurant eating steaks and I am telling you that I love beef so much that to me 
even the look of a cow grazing in a meadow is mouth-watering, I am not 
communicating to you, and you are not taking me to be communicating to you, all my 
(somewhat inconsistent) concerns about cruelty to animals in slaughterhouses. That is 
because, even though in my mind there are inferential routes from COW to 
APPETIZING, from COW to CRUELTY THAT ANIMALS ARE SUBJECTED TO IN 
SLAUGHTERHOUSES, and from COW to MILK, the second and third inferences are 
not constitutive of the thought I am communicating to you in that particular situation. 
Thus, contrary to what Fodor & Lepore (1992) argue, holism does not commit one to a 
global approach to compositionality. Indeed, holism implies that compositionality is a 
context-sensitive process (which is compatible with Recanati 2005).  
 In this section, I have dismissed two arguments that Fodor & Lepore (1992) 
have wielded against holism: (i) lack of prospects for psychological generalisations and 
(ii) commitment to global compositionality. There is one remaining issue that needs to 
be discussed. We have seen that both Block’s and Fodor’s accounts face the sense-
reference problem. In the next section, I argue that the content-reference problem does 
not arise on a holistic account. My argument is grounded in Bilgrami’s (1992) thesis 
about the unity and locality of content.   
3.3.2 Bilgrami’s unity and locality of content 
In this section, I introduce Bilgrami’s (1992) unity and locality of content thesis. I 
discuss its relevance to the sense-reference ‘problem’ and explain how Bilgrami’s thesis 
allows for public availability of meaning. However, I identify certain tensions in 
Bilgrami’s thinking about concepts and argue that they can be resolved by adopting the 
Representational Hypothesis’ account of semantics and meaning.   
3.3.2.1 Unity and locality of content  
Bilgrami’s (1992) unity of content thesis states that there is just one kind of content – 
holistic content. Crucially, however, Bilgrami argues that the holistic content as such 
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(i.e. content at the network level) is not involved in the explanation of behaviour 
(including linguistic behaviour). What it does is provide ‘a pool of resources’ for 
selective use in the interpretation of behaviour of others. Bilgrami (e.g. 1992: 10, 142-
144) calls the holistic level the ‘meaning-theoretic’, ‘aggregative’ or ‘idiolect’ level.  
Bilgrami’s (ibid.) locality of content thesis states that holistic content is 
constrained at the ‘local’ – i.e. context-specific – level and that it is this locally 
constrained content which plays a role in the explanation of behaviour.   
The distinction between aggregative and local levels can be illustrated with the 
word water. Let us assume that in the mind of a person A, the word water is associated 
with some phenomenological properties, complex beliefs about its chemical 
composition, the feeling of quenching thirst, the fear of drowning, etc. But in the mind 
of a chemically ignorant person B, the word water is associated only with 
phenomenological properties, the feeling of quenching thirst, the pleasure of swimming, 
etc. Bilgrami’s locality of content thesis states that in the context where a chemically 
ignorant person (B) and a chemically aware person (A) are drinking water from the tap 
to quench thirst, or when A is asking B for a glass of water, only the beliefs about 
quenching thirst properties of water will be relevant to the explanation of their 
behaviour. In this locality, A’s beliefs about the chemical composition of water or A’s 
associations of the term water with the fear of drowning are not selected from the 
specifications of the aggregative level. Thus, even though A’s and B’s beliefs associated 
with the term water are necessarily different at the aggregative (holistic) level, they may 
(and often do) converge at the local level.  
Bilgrami’s locality of content thesis offers a perspective on the ‘problem’ raised 
for the network and individualist aspects of holism – i.e. the criticism that ‘no two 
people are ever likely to have the same concepts since they will almost certainly 
associate different beliefs with their respective terms‘ (Bilgrami 1992: 10). Bilgrami 
(1992: 147) argues that this sort of criticism follows from the mistaken assumption that 
content at the holistic level plays a role in the explanation of behaviour.  
However, a particular shortcoming of Bilgrami’s account is that he (1992: 12, 
143) underestimates the importance of the aggregative level and suggests that, because 
this level summarises all individualistic beliefs associated with a given term, it is ‘of no 
specific interest or use at all’, that it has ‘no psychological reality’ and that it is merely a 
‘trumped up theoretical posit’. Perhaps this is why Bilgrami (1992: 145) worries that his 
account may be criticised for not offering a ‘clear principle’ on how the local content is 
‘distilled’ from the aggregative level.  
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I disagree with Bilgrami on this point and argue that the locality of content is not 
plausible unless it is acknowledged that the aggregative level is psychologically real. 
This is because the aggregative level is essentially involved in determining/constraining 
local contents. Crucially, I argue that Bilgrami’s aggregative level finds parallels with 
Hintzman’s (1986) trace aggregate level and, furthermore, that Hintzman’s process of 
echo retrieval offers a ‘clear principle’ for how Bilgrami’s local content is selected from 
the aggregative level.   
From Hintzman’s perspective, the locality of content thesis is satisfied by the 
context-sensitive process of echo retrieval. As discussed in chapter 2, on Hintzman’s 
account, the interpretation of acoustic stimuli is a wholly pragmatic process of 
retrieving a conceptual structure (i.e. the echo) via the matching of the incoming 
contextual information (i.e. the probe) with multiple traces stored in secondary memory 
(i.e. the trace aggregate level). This means that for the echo – which can be understood 
as Bilgrami’s local content – to be retrieved, there has got to be the trace aggregate level 
to match the incoming stimuli with. This suggests that Bilgrami’s aggregative level is 
much more than a ‘trumped up theoretical posit’ – in fact, it is necessary for the 
retrieval of local content. 
3.3.2.2 Bilgrami’s externalism and public availability of private thought 
Bilgrami (1992) argues that his locality of content thesis requires a special kind of 
externalism. This special kind of externalism, he goes on to argue, should allow for 
public availability of thought but, emphatically, should not amount to causal- or social-
externalist kinds of wide content, which Bilgrami rejects as implausible.   
Bilgrami (1992: 4, 200) argues that some form of externalism is necessary to 
explain how we are able to understand one another. In other words, it is necessary to 
allow for the public availability of belief and meaning. External environment is 
important, Bilgrami (1992: 6-7) argues, insofar as ‘one fixes concepts’ – that is, 
attributes concepts to other people (e.g. 1992: 7, 160) – by correlating the terms in the 
utterances, in which concepts are ‘expressed’, with saliencies in the environment in 
which these utterances are made. It must be pointed out, however, that for Bilgrami 
(1992: 134), ‘there is no way to think of concepts being individuated by external 
objects, except as constrained by an agent’s beliefs’. Accordingly, Bilgrami’s 
externalism amounts to the claim that the agent’s perceptions of (beliefs about) mind-
external environment are essential in attributing concepts to other agents. For Bilgrami 
(e.g. 1992: 160), the mind-external world plays an evidential role in that concepts are 
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attributed to agents by observing correlations between the uses of a particular term by 
agents and perceptions of external items in the context of these utterances. Thus, the 
sense in which Bilgrami’s (e.g. 1992: 160, 200) externalism allows for public 
availability of private thought – i.e. for ‘one mind’s access to another’s mind and its 
contents’ – is in virtue of it being communicated in context. Because this ‘access to 
another’s mind’ relies on context-dependence, it must, I assume, consist in pragmatic 
inference. Therefore, (perceived) mind-external context correlated with the use of a 
given term constitutes the evidence for pragmatic attribution of concepts, i.e. for 
inferring the intended interpretation of one’s interlocutor’s communicative behaviour. 
Bilgrami (e.g. 1992: 7) is careful to point out that finding the right mind-external 
saliencies to correlate with an agent’s use of a given term has to ‘fit in with’ the other 
contents one has already attributed to a given agent. Notice that for this to work, 
Bilgrami has to acknowledge the importance, and the evidential role, of the aggregative 
level: if the current contextual information ‘fits in with’ other contents attributed to a 
given agent, the contents attributed in the past must be stored somewhere. This 
‘somewhere’ is the aggregative level and the ‘fitting in’, I argue, happens through 
Hintzman’s (1986) process of echo retrieval. When the importance of the aggregative 
level is recognised, Bilgrami’s notion of public availability (or evidentiality) in terms of 
context-dependence corresponds to my argument (2.2.3.4) that contextual information 
(both incoming and stored in secondary memory) constitutes primary, indeed the only, 
evidence for intended interpretation.  
 Now, Bilgrami’s characterisation of public availability is reminiscent of Perry’s 
(3.1.1) characterisation of wide content, and thus the content’s public availability, in 
terms of its context dependence (and regardless of the notion of shareability qua 
stability). Perry’s wide content is dynamic – i.e. it co-varies/changes with context – and, 
at the same time, it is publicly available precisely because dependent on the mind-
external world, which (unlike someone else’s thought) is available to all of us for 
scrutiny. Of course, Bilgrami’s account differs from Perry’s in that Bilgrami rejects the 
problematic (as argued in 3.1 and 3.2) narrow-wide dichotomy. This rejection has 
serious consequences for the sense-reference problem which, as discussed in 3.2, arises 
for two-factor accounts (including Fodor’s, despite his claims to the contrary).  
 Bilgrami (e.g. 1992: 134, 140) argues that what ‘individuates concepts’ is not 
the mind-external world but agents’ conceptions of things (i.e. their beliefs). Indeed, 
Bilgrami (e.g. 1992: 32-33, 134) denies that the notion of reference has got ‘anything to 
do with meaning and content’. His externalism is not the claim that the mind-external 
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world provides, i.e. is constitutive of the content for concepts. Bilgrami’s externalism is 
the claim that the mind-external world provides evidence for inferring what the (non-
referential) content is. Thus, Bilgrami does not abandon externalism, but in rejecting 
reference restrains its function (Bilgrami 1992: 139-140). Having rejected reference, 
Bilgrami’s account effectively dissolves the sense-reference problem: there is no such 
problem, because reference is not content-constitutive (or, more precisely, there is no 
reference).  
3.3.2.3 Holism and concepts 
Overall, I am sympathetic to Bilgrami’s argument that the unified/holistic content is 
dependent on external environment but not constituted by it. Much of my agreement, 
however, depends on what really is the locus of externalism and holism and what 
exactly is meant by the term ‘concept’.   
 Given that for Bilgrami it is the local level which bears explanatory potential, 
his ‘concepts’ seem to be the context-dependent entities which are taken to be 
communicated by the speaker on a given occasion of use. Using RT’s terminology, 
Bilgrami’s concepts are ad hoc.20 Thus, when Bilgrami talks of ‘individuation of 
concepts’, what he has in mind is an inference from contextual information to concepts 
taken as communicated in a particular communicative situation. For Bilgrami, thus, 
concepts are temporal mental objects, dynamically constructed on the basis of context 
and a cogniser’s holistic belief system (i.e. the aggregate level). Bilgrami’s externalism 
about ‘individuation of concepts’ is not a thesis about conceptual content but about the 
inferring (attributing) of communicative intention – it is a relation between an uttered 
term and communicated concepts which is externally determined.  
The problem, for Bilgrami, is that he does not seem to be consistent in the 
distinction between concepts and their content (which is not the domain of externalism) 
and the inferring (attributing/individuating) of concepts (which is the domain of 
externalism). This is evident from Bilgrami’s stance on innateness and internalism. 
Consider the following quotes: 
Quote 4: What, in the evolutionary story, explains this fact about innate 
conceptual structure that the species is endowed with. There can be no answer to 
                                                          
20
 This interpretation seems to be right especially in the light of Bilgrami’s (1992: 12) argument that the 
locality thesis ‘dissolves the very idea of content composed of context-invariant concepts’. He (ibid.) 
argues that the locality thesis offers ‘a way out of the dogmas of a certain way of thinking which leave us 
on the one hand with a false distinction [wide-narrow] and, on the other, with an artificially tidy picture of 
the mind’.  
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this other than that which invokes adaptability to an external environment. […] 
Externalism, in the sense I have been insisting on, is, therefore, a core, an 
essential component, of the explanation that even the nativist is committed to. It 
is this core which is a necessary condition for the possession of these concepts. 
So even if nativism is true, externalism is still in the picture. (Bilgrami 1992: 
224-225)  
Quote 5: I must admit internalism still gives me bad nights […] internalism is a 
hidden commitment of the widespread belief in the necessity and viability of a 
notion of narrow content […] (Bilgrami 1992: 243) 
 
Bilgrami’s externalism – as presented in relation to the locality thesis – does not 
concern concepts and their content but the inferential ascription of communicated 
concepts (let me call it ‘ascriptive externalism’). Indeed, Bilgrami (e.g. 1992: 134) 
emphasises that ascriptive externalism is restrained by an agent’s beliefs about the 
mind-external world – the mind-external world determines ‘concept individuation’ 
insofar as it is the mind-external world as the agent perceives it (believes it to be). 
However, externalism as discussed in quote 4 concerns concepts and their content (let 
me call it ‘content externalism’). Bilgrami argues that if there is innate conceptual 
structure, it is there as an evolutionary response to the mind-external environment. In 
this sense, ontogenetic innateness phylogenetically presupposes externalism. This 
shows that Bilgrami is also concerned with content externalism. In fact, even though 
content externalism is compatible with nativism (quote 4), Bilgrami never explicitly 
acknowledges that, overall, his externalism is indeed very internalist.
21
 This is because, 
as Bilgrami explains in quote 5, internalism is too strongly associated with the narrow 
content and thus with the wide-narrow distinction, which he rejects. This worry of 
Bilgrami’s is also noteworthy because the wide-narrow distinction – especially as 
presented by Putnam, Burge, Block and Fodor – is a thesis about content and not 
ascription. If Bilgrami’s worries about internalism concern the wide-narrow distinction, 
then his worries about internalism concern conceptual content. The problem is that 
defining conceptual content as externalist but not referential and nativist but not 
internalist effectively leaves it undefined. Is there a way to resolve this externalist-
nativist schism?      
 Indeed, notice that even though Bilgrami (e.g. 1992: 6) distinguishes between 
concepts, on the one hand, and ‘terms in the utterances’ which ‘express’ concepts, on 
the other, Bilgrami uses ‘concept’ to talk of the ’counterpart’ to ‘term’. In the light of 
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 However, Bilgrami (2002) overtly sympathises with Chomsky’s (2000a) internalist-individualistic 
philosophy.  
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Bilgrami’s distinction between concepts and terms, his use of ‘counterpart’ suggests 
that even though concepts are not terms (are not equivalent to terms), the notion of a 
concept is evoked when the notion of an uttered term is evoked. This peculiar form of 
isomorphism may be, at least partly, responsible for the externalist-nativist schism.  
 The nature of Bilgrami’s problem becomes clear when we recall Burton-
Roberts’ (2012) signification precondition (section 2.2.2), which is a logically necessary 
requirement that, in any signification relation, a signified must exist prior to and 
independent of the fact of signification. In the linguistic context, this means that if an 
acoustic event (‘uttered term’) is to function as a sign for a concept, the concept must 
exist prior to and independent of the fact of signification. Thus, the Representational 
Hypothesis’ unambiguous distinction between linguistic signs and concepts highlights 
the lack of any necessary dependence between terms/linguistic signs and concepts. 
 If concepts were merely ‘counterparts’ to terms, as Bilgrami seems to suggest, 
there would be no place for concepts, and thus thoughts they compose, outside the 
communicative context. I do not think this is what Bilgrami has in mind, but it 
emphasises the point that defining concepts with respect to terms is problematic.  
When concepts are unambiguously distinguished from the way they might be 
said to function in language (i.e. from the way they are associated with linguistic signs), 
it becomes clear that the nativist stance about concepts and their content is compatible 
with an externalist stance (in the sense of Bilgrami’s ascriptive externalism) about 
meaning as defined in the Representational Hypothesis (2.2.2). Having acknowledged 
the signification precondition and the Representational Hypothesis’ notion of meaning-
as-relation, it becomes possible to see that Bilgrami’s externalism is not a thesis about 
concepts, but about meaning.  
Along the lines argued in chapter 1 and 2, and in line with the Representational 
Hypothesis, I propose that primitive concepts (i.e. Jackendoff’s quarks, Hintzman’s 
primitive properties) as well as the (compositional) capacity to combine them into 
structured concepts are innately specified. Together, primitive concepts and the 
compositional capacity constitute LOT. In this sense, the range of structured concepts 
which can be entertained
22
 (and assigned a semiotic label) is innately pre-determined. 
However, the range of structured concepts which are in an actual fact entertained (and 
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 I do not use the term ‘entertain’ in the sense of Perry (1977). Rather, an entertained concept is a 
concept that has a function in a mental life of an individual.  
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associated with a given semiotic label) is delimited by an individual’s experience and 
psychology
23
.    
Given the distinction between concepts and the way they function in language, it 
also transpires that holism (especially the network effect, on which below) is not a 
thesis about concepts and their content but about the associations between concepts and 
semiotic labels. Indeed, such an unambiguous distinction between concepts and the way 
they function in language sheds light on the analytic-synthetic distinction. Clearly, the 
analytic-synthetic distinction is impossible to maintain in the domain of associations 
between concepts and semiotic labels as these are holistic. But this may not be true of 
concepts in and of themselves. If primitive concepts as well as the compositional 
capacity are innately pre-determined, any structured concept is analytic, whereby 
analyticity is defined in terms of the concept’s compositional structure (i.e. its 
content).
24
  
However, much remains to be said about such a construal of analyticity. Notice 
that if we assume, as is normally assumed, that analyticity is to be defined in terms of 
the concept’s compositional content (its content-constitutive relations), the analyticity 
that we get is rather weak in the sense that it does not presuppose shareability qua 
stability. Any concept which composes any of our thoughts (communicated or not) 
comes out as analytic in the sense that its structure is constrained by a given locality. 
Therefore, it may be argued that what we are talking about here is not analyticity, but 
simply (local) compositionality. Notice also that analytic relations such construed are 
non-holistic in the sense that they are locally constrained and thus do not give rise to the 
network effect. However, it is clearly not the case that such analytic relations are not 
individualistic. It follows then that it is the network aspect of holism, but not radical 
individualism that distinguishes concepts from the way they are associated with 
semiotic labels. Indeed, this conclusion seems to follow naturally from the distinction I 
made earlier in this section between innately predetermined range of structured concepts 
which can be entertained (and assigned a semiotic label) and the experientially 
determined range of structured concepts which are in an actual fact entertained (and 
associated with a given semiotic label). Important though the issue of analyticity is, I do 
not expand on it here, but leave it as an area for further research.   
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 Though, of course, given that the range of concepts is innately pre-determined, individual experience 
will be constrained by the range of concepts with which the world can be experienced.  
24
 The claim that analyticity pertains to concepts in and of themselves is compatible with my 
interpretation of Chomsky’s stance on analyticity (1.2). But, of course, it is not compatible with 
Chomsky’s double-interface assumptions.   
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However, a conclusion which can be drawn at this point is that whereas semantic 
(i.e. mental) content at the aggregative level is holistic, meaning (in the sense of Burton-
Roberts) is local because it is contextually and thus externally (in the sense of Bilgrami) 
constrained to a degree which, all things being equal, allows for successful 
communication.  
3.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has engaged with two related issues. The first concerned philosophical 
legacy in Relevance Theory’s notion of linguistic semantic content. The second, more 
general, issue concerned the question of whether any philosophical notion of shared 
content can withstand the challenge of holism.  
As for the first issue, I argued that RT’s introduction of individualistic content 
(i.e. full-fledged lexical concepts) into linguistic semantics is inconsistent with their 
own view of linguistic semantics as shared/stable. However, I also argued that RT’s 
introduction of individualistic content into linguistic semantics is a right move insofar 
as it is a move towards a more radical conclusion that shared/stable content is in fact 
unnecessary to explain meaning in language.   
As for the second issue, I argued that all, wide or narrow, notions of 
shared/stable content are problematic. Having dismissed three criticisms of holism – the 
‘problem’ of mental generalisations, the ‘problem’ of compositionality, and the sense-
reference ‘problem’ – I maintained, in line with the arguments presented in chapter 2, 
that holism is the most plausible account of mental content.  
I further argued that Bilgrami’s unity and locality of content thesis, with its 
specific form of externalism, offers a compelling account of public availability of a 
personal thought in virtue of its being communicated in context. Bilgrami’s account of 
public availability of thought is important (especially in the context of RT’s 
introduction of individualistic content into linguistic semantics) as it effectively makes 
the wide notion of content conceptually unnecessary.   
Finally, I showed that the externalist-nativist tension present in Bilgrami’s 
proposal is due to lack of consistency in distinguishing between concepts and the way 
concepts function in language. I argued that approaching the externalist-nativist issue 
from the perspective of the Representational Hypothesis, not only resolves the tension, 
but it also demarcates the separate (though related) domains of holism (i.e. aggregative 
level relations between semiotic labels and concepts) and analyticity (i.e. concepts, 
whether communicated or not).   
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The arguments presented in this chapter and in chapter 2 make a strong case 
against a traditional two-step (deterministic decoding and then pragmatic inferring) 
account of utterance interpretation and for a wholly pragmatic, wholly inferential 
account of utterance interpretation – interpretation which is primarily (i.e. immediately) 
constrained by a personal (i.e. holistic) inference about the communicative intention of 
the speaker in a given conversational context.  
Importantly, an RH-based wholly inferential account which I propose endorses 
nativist assumptions about conceptual content (if only in the light of arguments 
presented in chapter 1 and here). Thus, it combines identity of LOT (i.e. primitive 
concepts and compositional capacity) among the human species with Bilgrami-type 
public availability of the conventional way in which linguistic signs are used to signify 
conceptual structures, which are allowed by shared LOT.
25
 In this sense, it is both the 
shareability of LOT among our species and Bilgrami-type notion of public availability 
of communicated concepts, which allow for successful communication without 
linguistic semantics. This conclusion ends the theoretical part of the thesis.  
In the second part, I investigate whether my theoretical arguments can and 
should be applied to linguistic analysis. In particular, I investigate whether the 
arguments put forward so far apply to the analysis of the relation between the linguistic 
sign if and material implication. In chapter 4, I argue that the claim that if semantically 
encodes material implication cannot be maintained even when supported by pragmatic 
explanation. I argue that material implication only ever applies in pragmatically inferred 
thought. In chapter 5, I offer a wholly inferential account of the interpretation of if. This 
account has certain implications for the explicit-implicit distinction.  
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 As discussed earlier, Fodor’s rejection of holism is motivated by the publicity constraint which seeks to 
account for the identity of concepts. Since for Fodor concepts just are word meanings/semantics, his 
publicity constraint effectively seeks to account for the identity of mental entities which are theoretically 
and empirically (see discussion of cross-linguistic data in section 1.1.2) dubious. My point is that even 
though publicity constraint is important, Fodor’s version of it applies to implausibly defined concepts.  
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Chapter 4. Does if encode Material Implication? 
 
4.0 Introduction  
In chapter 2, I argued that it is impossible and unnecessary to posit a specifically 
linguistic semantics and that the process of deterministic decoding of such content is 
redundant in accounting for meaning in language. In chapter 3, I argued that 
philosophical notions of shared content (i.e. non-truth-theoretic narrow content, causal-
externalist wide content and social-externalist wide content), which have been posited 
as linguistic semantics, should be rejected. I further argued that holistic content is the 
only kind of mental content there is. In this chapter, I discuss and then critically 
evaluate a more specific claim (e.g. Grice 1989, Noh 2000): that material implication is 
the encoded – i.e. linguistic – semantics of the word if. I have chosen this particular item 
for its significance to the distinction between (linguistic) semantics and pragmatics. 
Even though the claim that if semantically encodes material implication has been 
controversial in philosophy, semantico-pragmatic (i.e. two-step) accounts of the 
interpretation of if (e.g. Grice 1989) have taken some heat off that controversy. For that 
reason, semantico-pragmatic accounts of the interpretation of if may be thought of as 
one of the central achievements of pragmatic theory (e.g. Mauri & van der Auwera 
2012).   
However, I argue that it is impossible to maintain the claim that if semantically 
encodes material implication for two reasons. The first is that certain conditional beliefs 
involve radical deviations from material implication. Because such deviations occur at 
the level of belief, they cannot be explained away in terms of the conversational 
principles which are appealed to in aid of defending the claim that if semantically 
encodes material implication (4.2.1). The second reason concerns the problem of 
pragmatic intrusion into encoded semantics (4.2.2). This problem, I argue, arises with 
Grice’s (1989) and Relevance Theory’s (e.g. Noh 2000) accounts of conditionals. Both 
problems point to the conclusion that conditional beliefs and (or, rather, thus) the 
interpretation of conditionals is a matter of a wholly pragmatic and thus holistic 
inferential process.    
For brevity, I use the term ‘encoded semantics’ to mean linguistic semantics 
encoded by a given expression and thus deterministically decoded in the process of 
interpretation of an uttered expression.  
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4.1 Material Implication as the encoded semantics of if 
In 4.1.1, I introduce the logical operator of material implication and then, in 4.1.2, 
explain why it has been argued that material implication constitutes the encoded 
semantics of if. The discussion focuses on indicative conditionals. The main reason for 
this limitation is that, as I intend to show, the variation found in the interpretation of this 
group of conditionals suffices to illustrate my argument that semantic content is holistic 
and accessible solely through pragmatic inference. I use ‘’ for material implication, 
‘&’ for conjunction, ‘v’ for disjunction, ‘’ for negation, ‘’ for equivalence and ‘├’ for 
entailment.      
4.1.1 Facts about Material Implication 
The logical operator of material implication ‘’ connects two propositions p (the 
antecedent) and q (the consequent) such that the truth value of the complex proposition 
(pq) is a function of the truth values of the propositions it operates on (p, q). Material 
implication (henceforth MI) is a truth-functional operator, i.e. nothing other than the 
truth values of p and q are required to compute the truth value of (pq). The truth table 
for MI is given in (1) below.     
(1)  
 
 
 
 
This truth table states that (pq) is false (F) in situation 2, where the antecedent is true 
and the consequent false, and true (T) in all other situations. Thus, it follows that MI can 
be defined in terms of negation and conjunction as well as negation and disjunction in 
the following way.  
(2) (a) (pq)   (p&q)  
(b) (pq)  (p) v q 
As illustrated by (2b), the falsity of p or the truth of q entails the truth of the implication 
([p ├ (pq)]; [q├ (pq)]).  
 p q p  q 
1. T T T 
2. T F F 
3. F T T 
4. F F T 
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The truth table for MI licences two inferences: Modus Ponens and Modus 
Tollens, represented in (3) and (4) respectively.    
(3) Modus Ponens                          (4) Modus Tollens 
 
 
 
 
According to Modus Ponens, if (pq) and p is T, it follows that q is T. According to 
Modus Tollens, if (pq) and q is F, it follows that p is F.  
From the truth table for MI nothing follows about the truth value of p from the 
truth of q or about the truth value of q from the falsity of p. This means that if (pq) and 
q is T, the inference to the truth of p is invalid and that if (pq) and p is F, the inference 
to the falsity of q is invalid. These invalid inferences, which are called the Fallacy of 
Affirming the Consequent (FAC) and the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent (FDA) 
respectively, are represented in (5) and (6).     
(5)  FAC                                       (6) FDA 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Truth-functional semantics of ‘if’ 
It has been argued (e.g. Grice 1989, Smith & Smith 1988, Noh 2000) that MI constitutes 
the encoded semantics of natural language connective if. In this section, I explain why 
such claims have been made.   
The aim of truth-functional approaches to conditionals (e.g. Grice 1989) is to 
show that the truth-conditions of ‘if... then’ sentences are of a truth-functional kind. If 
this can be shown, the semantics of conditional statements can be explained in terms of 
MI.  
Crucially, the claim that MI constitutes the encoded semantics of if rests on the 
assumption that any deviation from MI in the interpretation of conditionals can be 
1. p  q 
2. p 
3. q 
1. p  q 
2. q 
3. p 
1. p  q 
2. p 
3. q 
1. p  q 
2. q 
3. p 
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explained in terms of pragmatic principles. In the Gricean tradition, any such pragmatic 
deviation should be amenable to explanation in terms of a conversational Cooperative 
Principle.  
I first introduce Grice’s distinction between semantics and pragmatics as well as 
his Cooperative Principle (4.1.2.1). In 4.1.2.2, I discuss examples whose interpretation 
seems to be predicted by MI in a straightforward way. In 4.1.2.3, I look at Grice’s 
analysis of some non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning of utterances of if (his 
Indirectness Condition) in terms of conversational implicature. Section 4.1.2.4 deals 
with biconditional (if and only if) interpretations of conditionals and 4.1.2.5 with a 
relevance theoretic account of metarepresentational uses in conditionals. This is 
followed by an interim summary in 4.1.2.6.  
4.1.2.1 Grice’s semantics and pragmatics 
Grice’s (1989) distinction between semantics and pragmatics can be defined in terms of 
the following list of dichotomies (adapted from Burton-Roberts 2005). 
Semantics  Pragmatics 
What is said  What is implicated 
Explicit  Implicit 
Context-free  Context-sensitive 
Truth-conditional  Non-truth-conditional 
 
For Grice, semantically encoded content is the truth-conditional content of a word and 
any expression composed of words. In uttering an expression, the speaker commits 
herself to the expression’s semantically encoded content (WHAT IS SAID); this means that 
such content cannot be cancelled without (creating a) contradiction, i.e. without 
contradicting what the speaker is committed to in uttering that expression. For Grice, 
semantic content (i.e. what is said) is context-invariant and it is EXPLICITLY 
communicated. In contrast, pragmatics deals with non-truth-conditional, context-
dependent aspects of ‘meaning’. Because of the non-truth-conditional relation of what is 
pragmatically inferred to what is linguistically encoded (i.e. explicit), pragmatically 
communicated aspects of ‘meaning’ can be cancelled without contradiction. 
Pragmatically communicated aspects of ‘meaning’ are not said/explicated but 
IMPLICATED by the saying of what is said/explicated. Consider the following example:   
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(7) a) Tom got up and read a paper. 
b) Tom got up and then read a paper. 
c) Tom got up and read a paper, but not in that order. 
For Grice, the word and semantically encodes the logical functor of conjunction. 
Accordingly, (7a) semantically encodes and hence explicitly communicates only that 
both conjuncts are true. Any suggested temporal (or causal) link between the two 
conjuncts (7b) is non-truth-conditionally linked to what is explicitly communicated and 
so can be cancelled without contradicting what is said/explicated (as in (7c)). For this 
reason, the temporal link (7b) is, for Grice, implicitly communicated – it is an 
IMPLICATURE.  
The implicature communicated by the use of and in (7) is classified by Grice as 
a Generalised Conversational Implicature (GCI). This kind of implicature arises 
generally, i.e. regardless of the particularities of a given context (Grice 1989: 37, 
Levinson 1983: 126). Nevertheless, it is context-dependent in the sense that it can be 
cancelled in a particular context, as shown in (7c).  
Another type of conversational implicature proposed by Grice is a Particularised 
Conversational Implicature (PCI). PCIs are implicated by exploiting the contexts in 
which utterances that give rise to them occur – were it not for the particular context, 
these implicatures would not arise. Consider (8). 
(8) a) A: Are you hungry? 
    B: I’ve had breakfast. 
b) B has had breakfast today. 
c) I’ve had breakfast – in my life, but not today. 
d) B is not hungry.  
e) I’ve had breakfast, but actually I’m still hungry. 
B’s utterance in (8a) gives rise to the implicature in (8b) – given that breakfast is a daily 
occurrence, when people say they have had breakfast they are generally taken to 
communicate that they have had breakfast on the day of the utterance. Because the 
implicature in (8b) would arise even in the absence of A’s question in (8a) – i.e. 
particular context is not necessary for it to arise – it can be classified as a GCI. This GCI 
is cancellable, as shown in (8c). But B’s answer in (8a) can also give rise to the PCI in 
(8d). It is a PCI because it can be derived only in the particular context of A’s question 
– take away A’s question and the PCI does not arise. Because PCIs are pragmatically 
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derived, they too can be cancelled without contradicting what was said/explicated, as 
shown in (8e).  
 The question that needs to be answered now is how conversational implicatures 
arise in the first place. To answer this question, Grice (1989) proposes that in 
conversation there is a tacit agreement between interlocutors to cooperate. This tacit 
agreement is explained by Grice in terms of a Cooperative Principle, a set of four 
Maxims – Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner – which speakers exploit (by 
obeying or flouting them) in order to give rise to implicatures. 
The maxim of Quantity concerns the quantity of information to be provided in 
conversation. It is divided into the following two sub-maxims: 
i. Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current purposes 
of the exchange) 
ii. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required1  
The maxim of Quality states to make one’s contribution true and its two sub-maxims 
are: 
i. Do not say what you believe is false 
ii. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence 
The maxim of Relation states to make one’s contribution relevant and the maxim of 
Manner to be perspicuous. This last maxim is further subdivided into: 
i. Avoid obscurity of expression 
ii. Avoid ambiguity 
iii. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity) 
iv. Be orderly 
Given Grice’s Cooperative Principle, the derivation of the GCI in (7) (Tom got up and 
read a paper) can be explained in terms of the maxim of Manner. By saying ‘S1 and S2’ 
the speaker of (7) is implicating and then because the speaker is assuming that the 
hearer takes her to be observing the maxim of Manner and thus will be able to infer that 
the speaker is presenting the events in a orderly way.  
 As for the PCI in (8), it can be explained in the following way. Speaker B in 
(8) (A: Are you hungry?; B: I’ve had breakfast) is implicating that she is not hungry by 
                                                          
1
 Grice (1989: 26-27) suggests that the second sub-maxim is disputable because its transgression merely 
amounts to ‘a waste of time’ or because its effect can be explained by the maxim of Relation.  
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exploiting the maxim of Relation – B assumes that A takes her to be observing the 
maxim of Relation and will thus be able to infer that B’s answer is relevant to A’s 
question.  
 In the following sections, I discuss Grice’s (1989) claim that if semantically 
encodes the logical functor MI and the related assumption that any deviation from MI in 
the interpretation of conditionals can be explained in terms of the Cooperative Principle.  
4.1.2.2 Simple cases 
Let us look at the extent to which natural language conditional sentences correspond to 
MI. Consider (9) below (taken from Edgington 2008).  
(9) If it’s a square, it has four sides. 
Let us refer to the if-clause as the ‘antecedent’, the matrix clause as the ‘consequent’ 
and the complex statement they together constitute as a ‘conditional’. Now, if the word 
if is truth-functional, we should be able to predict the truth value of the conditional from 
the truth values of the antecedent and the consequent. For (9), this prediction seems to 
be borne out. If both the antecedent and the consequent are true, the conditional is true. 
If the antecedent is true but the consequent is false, the conditional is false (it is 
impossible for a square not to have four sides). If the antecedent is false, the conditional 
is true regardless of the truth value of the consequent (if something is not a square, it 
may or may not have four sides). Consider also conditional (10), whose consequent is 
patently false, and (11), whose antecedent is necessarily true. 
(10) If Tom can drive a truck, then I am Mickey Mouse. 
(11) If two plus two equals four, then my client is innocent.  
In using (10), the speaker is communicating that she does not believe in Tom’s ability to 
drive a truck. This interpretation can be modelled by MI; on the assumption that the 
speaker of (10) is thereby saying something true (abiding by Grice’s maxim of Quality) 
and given that the consequent is patently false, the antecedent has got to be false if (10) 
is to be true. As for (11), the speaker here is communicating that it is certain that her 
client is innocent. This interpretation too can be modelled by MI; on the assumption that 
the speaker of (11) is saying something true and given that the antecedent is necessarily 
true, it follows from the truth table for MI that the consequent has got to be true as well; 
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that it is as certain that the speaker’s client is innocent as it is certain that two plus two 
equals four.  
4.1.2.3 Indirectness Condition 
Conditionals are generally used to communicate more than (pq). For example, in (9) 
there seems to be a consequential relation between x being a square (p) and x having 
four sides (q) such that the truth of q can be inferred from the truth of p. Grice (1989: 
58) refers to this extra, non-truth-functional, aspect of ‘meaning’ associated with 
conditionals as the INDIRECTNESS CONDITION and points out that this condition can be 
formulated in different ways: ‘that p would, in the circumstances, be a good reason for 
q’, ‘that q is inferable from p’, ‘that there are non-truth-functional grounds for accepting 
pq’.  
In order to maintain the claim that semantics of if is truth-functional, Grice 
needs to show that the Indirectness Condition is not part of the semantics of if, but that 
it is pragmatically inferred. In particular, Grice (1989: 60) argues that the Indirectness 
Condition is a GCI – it arises generally, but it is cancellable. Consider (12). 
(12) If you put that bit of sugar in water, it will dissolve. 
Grice (ibid.) argues that the Indirectness Condition GCI can be cancelled by adding a 
clause such as ‘though so far as I know there can be no way of knowing in advance that 
this will happen’. The addition of the cancellation clause, he goes on to argue, marks 
(12) as a guess or prophecy.  
Another reason for analysing the Indirectness Condition as an implicature is that 
it is not always present. Grice offers the conditional clause in (13) as an example. 
(13) Perhaps if he comes, he will be in a good mood. 
There are two possible interpretations of (13). On the first one, the Indirectness 
Condition is present and the speaker is, in Grice’s terms, implicating that p will be a 
reason for believing q. On the second interpretation, there is no Indirectness Condition 
implicature and the speaker is simply communicating something to the effect of ‘he will 
happen to be in a good mood’ – p merely materially implies q and there is no other 
relation between p and q beyond consistency.  
 But how does the Indirectness Condition arise (when it is present)? Grice (1989: 
61-62) argues that to say/explicate the very general (pq) is not normally taken to be 
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informative enough. Thus the saying/explicating of (pq) gives rise to the assumption 
that the speaker is violating the maxim of Quantity
2
. That, however, is counterbalanced 
by the assumption that the speaker is doing so because she is obeying the maxim of 
Quality, which states that one should have adequate evidence for what one is saying. 
The evidence in question is the Indirectness Condition. Grice’s (ibid.) proposal thus is 
that the saying/explicating of (pq) implicates that there is some evidence for the 
saying of it, i.e. that there is some non-truth-functional relation between the antecedent 
and the consequent.  
 Based on such arguments, Grice argues that the Indirectness Condition is not 
part of the semantics of if and that the semantics of if is truth-functional. However, 
Grice (1989: 77) concedes that ‘generally or at least in special contexts [it might be] 
impossible for a rational speaker to employ the conditional form unless, at least in his 
view, not merely the truth-table requirements are satisfied but also some strong 
connection [i.e. the Indirectness Condition] holds’. I return to this point in 4.2.  
4.1.2.4 Conditional perfection   
Another common interpretation of conditionals which is stronger than (pq) is the 
biconditional (i.e. if and only if) interpretation. Consider the following examples: 
(14) If you pass the exam, I’ll take you to a restaurant.  
(15) If you do something illegal again, we’ll lock you up.  
It may be argued that in uttering (14) the speaker is not actually (semantically) making 
any undertaking as to what she will do if the hearer fails the exam, only what she will 
do if the hearer passes the exam. This would make the interpretation of (14) compatible 
with the truth table for MI. According to MI, the promise is not broken if there is a meal 
following a passed exam (situation 1), if there is a meal despite a failed exam (situation 
3 – the speaker did not say what she would do if the hearer failed the exam) and if there 
is no meal because of a failed exam (situation 4). The promise is only broken if the 
exam is passed but there is no meal (situation 2).  
The same analysis is available for (15), where the conditional is used to make a 
threat. It can be argued that the speaker of (15) is not actually saying what she will do if 
the hearer refrains from doing something illegal, only what she will do if the hearer 
                                                          
2
 The Indirectness Condition implicature also seems to involve the assumption of the violation of the 
maxim of Relation. Grice (ibid.), however, does not mention the maxim of Relation in this context. 
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does something illegal again. This leaves open a possibility that the speaker will lock 
the hearer up even though he does not do anything illegal.   
However, as pointed out by Geis & Zwicky (1971: 652), the human mind has a 
tendency to ‘perfect conditionals to biconditionals’. In other words, ‘a sentence of the 
form X  Y invites an inference of the form X  Y’ – an inference modelled by 
equivalence. This tendency for CONDITIONAL PERFECTION is manifest in examples like 
(14) and (15).  
It has been argued that the phenomenon of conditional perfection (also known as 
BICONDITIONAL STRENGTHENING, i.e. strengthening of if to iff) can be analysed in terms 
of Grice’s conversational implicature (Comrie 1986, van der Auwera 1997). In 
particular, van der Auwera (1997) argues that it can be analysed in terms of Grice’s 
scalar quantity implicature, a kind of a GCI.   
Scalar implicatures involve semantic scales of entailment – this is why they are 
predictable generally, i.e. without reference to a particular conversational context. For 
example, ‘p and q’ is on a semantic scale with ‘p or q’ such that ‘p and q’ entails ‘p or 
q’. This semantic scale allows one to predict that by saying ‘p or q’ the speaker is 
conversationally implicating that, as far as the speaker knows, the stronger claim does 
not obtain, i.e. that ‘it is not the case that p and q’.  
Since the phenomenon of conditional perfection involves, it is assumed, a 
strengthening of material implication (pq) to equivalence (pq), and since (pq) 
entails (pq), the scale involving these two logical functors is the first one to 
investigate. However, the problem for the assumption that the [(pq) ├ (pq)] scale  is 
involved in conditional perfection is that the use of if in examples like (14) and (15) 
does not communicate the negation of the stronger if and only if (henceforth iff) by 
which it is entailed, but the assertion of it. This has led Levinson (e.g. 1983: 146-147) to 
suggest that at work here is a principle of informativeness, which in some circumstances 
allows speakers to implicate more than what is explicitly communicated. This principle 
is linked to the second sub-maxim of Quantity, which states that one should not make 
one’s contribution more informative than required. 
However, van der Auwera (1997: 267) criticises the principle of informativeness 
for its triviality; in principle, it should be at work whenever what is implicated involves 
what is said/explicated plus more. Van der Auwera (1997: 262) argues that the 
strengthening of if to iff can be explained in terms of Grice’s scalar GCI with reference 
to the following scale:  
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(16) … 
if p, q and if r, q and if s, q  
if p, q and if r, q 
if p, q   
In this scale, the higher assertions entail the lower ones. Thus, by saying if p, q, one is 
implicating that the conjunction of if p, q with another conditional which involves a 
different antecedent (r) but the same consequent (q) does not obtain. In other words, in 
saying if p, q, one is implicating that the truth of q does not follow from any other 
antecedent but p; q is T iff p is true. In van der Auwera’s (1997: 262) words, ‘when one 
supplies only the one sufficient condition p, one conversationally implicates that there is 
no second – and no third, etc. – sufficient condition’.3, 4  
 However, there is a problem with the assumption (van der Auwera’s and 
Levinson’s) that the iff interpretation can be explained with reference to a semantic 
scale. Scalar inference depends on the elements which form a scale being lexical items 
(e.g. Levinson 1983: 133), as is the case with and and or, all and some or excellent and 
good. But even though equivalence entails MI, equivalence is not lexicalised in English
5
 
(or any other language). Thus, the biconditional interpretation cannot be explained with 
reference to semantic scales. 
 Smith & Smith (1988) argue that the biconditional interpretation can be easily 
explained in relevance-theoretic terms. As discussed earlier, the challenge for truth-
functional approaches to the encoded semantics of if is that MI predicts that the 
consequent will be true irrespective of the truth of the antecedent. Smith & Smith’s 
(1988) solution is to use Relevance Theory’s (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 1995) notion of 
relevance, which is calculated in terms of positive cognitive effects and processing 
effort (as discussed in chapter 2). Smith & Smith (1988: 333) claim that in saying ‘if p, 
q’, the speaker is implying that (pq) for the following reason: if the hearer believed 
that (pq) and that (pq), she should have said “q” to spare the hearer unnecessary 
                                                          
3
 Even though van der Auwera (1997) explains conditional perfection in terms of Grice’s GCI, van der 
Auwera (1986) argues that if semantically encodes more in a way of relation between p and q than offered 
by a truth-functional account. For van der Auwera (1986), if semantically encodes a non-truth-functional 
sufficiency condition (that ‘p is a sufficient condition for q’). However, because the effect of van der 
Auwera’s (1997) conditional perfection GCI can be stated with reference to the sufficiency condition (one 
implicates that there is no other sufficient condition) or without reference to it (one implicates that the 
truth of q does not follow from any other antecedent but p), I assume that there is no relevant difference 
between the two approaches in this respect. See also footnote 12.  
4
 In other words, this scale is supposed to account for the implicature that a given sufficient condition is in 
fact necessary (see e.g. Horn 2000).  
5
 The closest English gets to equivalence is if and only if.  
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processing effort. Because the speaker did not simply say “q”, the hearer assumes that p 
must be interpreted as relevant to q.
6
 Smith & Smith (1988: 333) claim that this 
pragmatic explanation of biconditional strengthening makes it possible to defend the 
view that MI is the encoded semantics of if. I return to this point in 4.2. and in chapter 5 
(where I discuss the relevance of p to q in more detail).  
 It is important to point out that the uses which involve the iff interpretation do 
not form a homogenous group. For example, Comrie (1986: 78) argues that the iff 
interpretation is natural with prohibitives, of which the threat in (15) is an example. 
However, as exemplified by (14), this interpretation is also found with promises
7
. 
Furthermore, some uses of conditionals to communicate general truths (so-called 
‘universal conditionals’) may also involve the iff interpretation, as in (17), whereas 
others do not, as in (18)  
(17) Water begins to boil if it reaches 100°C.  
(18) If one is a man, one cannot get pregnant.  
The difference between (17) and (18) is that whereas in (17) the falsity of q follows 
from the falsity of p (Denying the Antecedent is a licit inference here), in (18) nothing 
about the truth value of q follows from the falsity of p (Denying the Antecedent is 
fallacious here). To complicate things more, (19) (due to Horn 2000: 319) and (20) are 
examples of conditional injunctions involving the iff interpretation.
8
  
(19) If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out. 
(20) If there is no other choice, amputate his leg. 
But not all conditional injunctions involve the iff interpretation. Consider (21).  
(21) If you want to make your parents happy, quit smoking.  
In (21), unlike in (19) and (20), the speaker does not seem to be communicating that the 
truth of q does not follow from any other antecedent but p – only that (pq).   
                                                          
6
 A similar proposal is advocated by Horn (2000: 309-310), who argues that, because the conditional 
assertion of if p then q contains more information than the assertion of q, p must be taken as relevant. 
According to Horn, what makes a condition relevant is its (communicated) necessity.  
7
 In chapter 5, I will actually argue that not all conditional promises (and, in fact, not all conditional 
threats) involve the iff interpretation.  
8
 Horn (2000) criticizes Dancygier & Sweetser’s (1997) account on which biconditional is built into the 
encoded semantics of predictive conditionals. As Horn’s (19) shows, non-predictive conditionals can also 
receive the biconditional interpretation.  
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 In summary, the iff interpretation cannot be explained by reference to 
Levinson’s informativeness principle (which invokes the [(pq)├ (pq)] scale) because 
of its triviality (as argued by van der Auwera 1997). Neither can it be explained with 
reference to van der Auwera’s (1997) scale, presented in (16). This is because 
equivalence is not lexicalised.
9
 Smith & Smith (1988) argue that it can be explained 
with reference to Relevance Theory’s notion of relevance. However, the iff 
interpretation is not restricted to any homogenous group of uses of conditionals. Thus, it 
remains to be explained under what conditions this interpretation arises.  
4.1.2.5 Relevance Theory on metarepresentational uses of conditionals  
The claim that MI constitutes the encoded semantics of if has been challenged by what 
has been referred to as ‘speech act domain’ (Sweetser 1990) conditionals or 
‘metarepresentational’ (Noh 2000, subsuming Horn’s (1989) ‘metalinguistic’) 
conditionals. Consider (22) (due to Noh 2000: 199).     
(22) [The door bell is ringing.] 
Mary to Jane: If that’s John, I’m not here. 
Given that Mary is in the location referred to by here, MI incorrectly predicts that the 
conditional in (22) should be true where the antecedent and the consequent are true. 
Relatedly, in (22) it is impossible to infer the truth of q from the truth of p or the falsity 
of p from the patent falsity of q. This means that the inference rules of MP and MT, 
which are licensed by MI, do not apply to this example.  
 As observed by Noh (2000: 178-179), conditionals with so-called ‘given’ 
antecedents, i.e. antecedents which are recoverable from context or known/accepted by 
the speaker and hearer, also often resist a truth-functional analysis. Consider (23). 
(23) A: Two and eleven makes thirty. 
  B: If two and eleven makes thirty, you need more work on maths. 
The problem posed by this example is that the antecedent of B’s answer in (23) is false. 
The truth table for MI predicts that if the antecedent is false, it does not matter whether 
the consequent is true or false for the whole utterance to be true. However, Noh (1996, 
2000: 189) observes that this simply is a wrong interpretation because B in (23) clearly 
                                                          
9
 A more fundamental problem with van der Auwera’s account is discussed in footnote 12. 
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is communicating that the hearer needs more work on maths, i.e. that the consequent is 
true.  
 However, Noh (1996, 2000) argues that the relevance-theoretic notion of 
metarepresentation actually allows one to retain MI as the encoded semantics of if even 
in examples like (22) and (23). 
 In Relevance Theory, the notion of metarepresentation involves the use of one 
representation to represent another, e.g. an attributed utterance or thought, which it 
resembles (e.g. Noh 2000: 185, 186). Following Sperber and Wilson (1995), Noh (2000: 
73) argues that resemblance is to be understood in terms of sharing analytic and 
contextual implications in a given context. Metarepresentation may resemble the 
metarepresented object in terms of content or form. Uses which exploit resemblance of 
content are called INTERPRETIVE USES, and those which exploit resemblance of form are 
called METALINGUISTIC USES. Consider examples below, taken from Noh (2000).   
(24) [The material in brackets represents American pronunciation of tomatoes] 
  A: I like tom[eiDouz]  
  B: If you like tom[eiDouz], you must be from America.  
(25) A: I loved her. 
  B: If you loved her, why didn’t you come to the party? 
(26)  [A is talking to B about her meeting with her supervisor] 
  A: Then what did she say? 
  B: The argument is invalid. 
Example (24) involves a metalinguistic antecedent; here B does not metarepresent the 
content of A’s utterance but its pronunciation10. This means that the attribution of 
pronunciation is included in the proposition expressed in the antecedent: the proposition 
expressed is something like ‘If you like things you call ‘tom[eiDouz]’’ or ‘If you say you 
eat ‘tom[eiDouz]’’ (Noh 2000: 190). Noh (2000: 187-189) argues that (25) and (26) are 
interpretive uses. In (25), the antecedent of B’s conditional metarepresents the 
proposition expressed by A’s utterance. More specifically, Noh (2000: 187) argues that 
the antecedent metarepresents A’s utterance including the higher-level explicature of ‘if 
you say/believe that …’. (26) is similar to (25) in that it is an interpretive use, but 
different in that it does not involve the interpretation of A’s utterance but the previous 
                                                          
10
 Other metalinguistic uses involve metarepresenting morphology, word stress, etc.   
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utterance(s) of the speaker’s supervisor. Noh (1996, 2000) argues that reanalysing 
certain conditionals in terms of attributive metarepresentational use provides a more 
explanatory and uniform account of their semantics and pragmatics. In fact, she argues 
that a metarepresentational approach allows one to maintain MI as the encoded 
semantics of all uses of if. 
 Importantly, Noh (2000: 189, 203, 211) argues that the truth value of a 
metarepresentational use is not established with respect to the truth value of what is 
metarepresented but with respect to the faithfulness of the metarepresentation to the 
metarepresented content or form. For example, B’s utterance in (26) is true if and only 
if it is ‘a faithful enough interpretation of what [B’s] supervisor said’ (Noh 2000: 189).  
 Noh’s point is best illustrated by example (23) (A: Two and eleven makes 
thirty; B: If two and eleven makes thirty, you need more work on maths). As discussed, 
the truth-functional relation between the antecedent and the consequent of (23B) cannot 
hold at the descriptive level – i.e. between the content of ‘two and eleven makes thirty’ 
and ‘you need more work on maths’ – because it does not explain how B is 
communicating that the consequent is T. On Noh’s (2000: 187) metarepresentational 
account, however, the antecedent in (23B) is used to metarepresent A’s utterance 
including the higher-level explicature of ‘if you say/believe that …’. At that meta-level, 
the antecedent is in fact true: whereas ‘two and eleven makes thirty’ is false ‘you 
say/believe that two and eleven makes thirty’ comes out as true. According to the truth 
table for MI, if the antecedent is true, the consequent has got to be true for the 
conditional to be true. For Noh, this explains why B in (23) is communicating that the 
consequent is T and allows maintaining the truth-functional semantics of if.  
 Similarly, Noh (2000: 199) argues that a metarepresentational treatment in 
terms of MI is available for (22) (If that’s John, I’m not here). In this example, it is the 
consequent, not the antecedent, which receives a metarepresentational analysis. Noh 
(2000: 199) argues that the consequent in (22) is metarepresenting ‘an utterance which 
the speaker wants the hearer to make in the situation described by the antecedent’. This, 
according to Noh (2000: 204), allows one to treat the relation between the proposition 
‘that’s John’ and the higher-level explicature ‘you tell him I’m not here’ in truth-
functional terms; the hearer of (22) is being requested to make the conditional true by 
making sure that q is T in a situation in which p is T.  
  However, there are problems with Noh’s metarepresentational analysis. I 
discuss them in 4.2.2.5.   
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4.1.2.6 Interim summary 
The goal of this section was to discuss reasons behind the claim that the word if 
semantically encodes MI. To this end, I first introduced Grice’s distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics and his Cooperative Principle (4.1.2.1). In 4.1.2.2, I discussed 
certain conditionals whose acceptability, it seems, can be explained in terms of MI 
without any reference to the notion of implicature. I then looked at certain 
interpretations which deviate from MI (Indirectness Condition in 4.1.2.3 and conditional 
perfection in 4.1.2.4) and discussed how such deviations are explained in pragmatic 
terms by reference to Grice’s Cooperative Principle. Finally, in 4.1.2.5, I discussed a 
relevance theoretic extension of a truth-functional analysis to metarepresentational uses.   
 In the next section, I argue that the claim that MI constitutes the encoded 
semantics of if is impossible to maintain.   
4.2 Why if does not encode Material Implication 
In this section, I argue that there are two general reasons why the claim that if encodes 
MI cannot be maintained. In 4.2.1, I discuss Edgington’s (2008) observation that certain 
conditional beliefs deviate from MI. In 4.2.2, I discuss the problem of pragmatic 
intrusion into encoded semantics. I argue that contrary to claims made in Carston (2000: 
99-100), Relevance Theory’s re-analysis of Grice’s explicit-implicit distinction does not 
resolve this problem.  
4.2.1 Deviations from Material Implication at the level of belief 
In 4.1.2.3 and 4.1.2.4, I discussed how, in the Gricean tradition, deviations from MI in 
the interpretation of conditionals have been explained in conversational terms. Some 
explanation has also been offered within the framework of Relevance Theory (Smith & 
Smith 1988). For example, one of the problems for truth-functional approaches is the 
logical fact that, since (pq) is equivalent to (p&q), (pq) entails the truth of its 
antecedent. Inconsistently with this logical fact, when someone says that ‘It’s not the 
case that if the peace treaty is signed, war will be avoided’, they are not communicating 
that the peace treaty will be signed. Thus, facts about what is communicated by the use 
of a conditional are at odds with the facts of logic.  
 Now, Smith & Smith (1988: 334) argue that there is a simple relevance-
theoretic solution to this problem. For them, a speaker who wanted to use (pq) with 
‘the conjunctive force’ of (p&q) would not be observing the principle of relevance: it 
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puts the hearer to unjustifiable effort. For this reason, Smith & Smith (ibid.) argue that 
the use of (pq) would not normally be interpreted as the assertion of what they call 
‘the troublesome conjunction’.  
 However, Edgington (2008) observes that certain deviations from MI in the 
interpretation of conditionals – including ‘the troublesome conjunction’ – cannot be 
explained in terms of conversational principles because they take place at the level of 
belief. The problem for an MI analysis arises due to the fact that, in thinking about the 
world, people often accept and reject propositions with different degrees of certainty.   
 Edgington (2008) considers a scenario in which a person A does not believe 
that ‘If the Republicans win, income tax will double’ and does not believe that ‘the 
Republicans will win’. In other words, A rejects both (pq) and p. In rejecting these, A 
accepts both (pq) and p, which are logically contradictory. Now, one of the logical 
facts about MI is that its truth is entailed by the falsity of its antecedent: p ├ (pq). 
Since p ├ (pq), MI predicts that a disbelief in Republicans’ winning (i.e. p) entails 
a belief that if they win, income tax will double (i.e. (pq)). But this is not the case with 
A’s beliefs; inconsistently with MI but nevertheless rationally, A can be almost certain 
that Republicans won’t win (i.e. certain that p), and find it unlikely that if they win, 
they will double income tax (i.e. certain that (pq)). The logical facts about MI are at 
odds with what a rational person can consistently believe or disbelieve – this cannot be 
explained in terms of conversational principles.  
 Similarly, Smith & Smith’s (1988) relevance-theoretic proposal does not 
explain why a cogniser may, contrary to the logic of MI but nevertheless rationally, not 
believe that the peace treaty will be signed and at the same time not believe that if the 
peace treaty is signed, war will be avoided.
11
 
 The problems discussed above arise in virtue of one of the paradoxes of MI, 
namely that the falsity of the antecedent is sufficient for the truth of the implication 
(hence, p ├ (pq)).12 In fact, this paradox is an example of a more general paradox of 
                                                          
11
 Nor can this fact be explained away in terms of Gricean Conversational Implicature. 
12
 This problem arises for truth-functional as well as non-truth-functional accounts of the encoded 
semantics of if (Edgington 2008). On non-truth-functional accounts, the conditional operator is modal 
(e.g. van der Auwera 1985: 184), which means that the truth value of a conditional cannot be predicted 
solely from the truth values of the simple propositions on which it operates. Non-truth-functionalists 
agree with truth-functionalists that when the antecedent is T but the consequent F, the conditional is F 
(situation 2 in the truth table for MI). However, they do not agree that the truth value of a conditional can 
be logically deduced in other situations. For example, van der Auwera (1985) requires some 
consequential relation (corresponding to Grice’s Indirectness Condition) to hold between p and q for if p 
then q to be T. Also, non-truth-functional approaches, like truth-functional approaches, make no 
prediction as to the truth value of the consequent when the antecedent is F (i.e. [p ├ (pq)] is valid on 
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MI, namely that a falsity or a contradiction materially implies any and hence every 
proposition.  
 Consider the following scenario (taken from Edgington 2008). A person B is 
sitting in front of a box. B knows that inside the box is a geometric figure. B can 
rationally assume that ‘it’s not the case that if it is a pentagon, it has six sides’: i.e. that 
(PS). The problem arises when B is told that the figure inside the box is not a 
pentagon: i.e. that P. B believes that (PS) and that actually P. Logically, to believe 
P and (PS) is contradictory because (PS) is equivalent to (P&S) which entails 
P. The problem for the applicability of MI to B’s rational patterns of thought is that 
since ((PS) & P) is contradictory, it can entail anything, including (PS) – 
logically, ((PS) & P)  (PS) is a valid formula. Thus, MI predicts that someone 
who believes of an unseen geometric figure that it is not the case that if it is a pentagon, 
it has six sides, but that actually it is not a pentagon may be wrong because it may be 
the case that if it is a pentagon, it has six sides. 
 Consider also the logical fact that (p&q)  (pq). Edgington (2008) 
imagines a scenario in which a person C is almost certain that it is not the case that C 
will be hit by a bomb and injured today. But at the same time C thinks it highly unlikely 
that if C is hit by a bomb, C will not be injured. In other words, C consistently and 
rationally believes that (p&q) and that (pq). The problem is that (p&q) and 
(pq) are logically contradictory. As a matter of logic, C should not be judged a 
rational thinker.   
 The next problem pointed out by Edgington (ibid.) concerns the logical 
paradox that all conditionals with T consequents are T. Logically, the truth of q is 
sufficient for the truth of (pq): q ├ (pq). The problem arises when a person D is 
almost certain, but not one hundred percent certain that q is T. For example, D is almost 
certain that Ed is in Rome (R) right now and rejects the conditional that if Ed’s plane 
has crashed on its way to Rome, Ed is Rome now (D rejects CR). The problem for a 
truth-functional approach is that D rejects (i.e. believes it is F) a conditional (CR), 
which according to MI is T. MI predicts that as long as the consequent is T (and D is 
almost certain that it is), the whole conditional is T – including a situation in which it is 
T that Ed’s plane has crashed on its way to Rome. Since logically R ├ (CR), how can 
one be certain that R, but find it unlikely that (CR)? This logical prediction, Edgington 
                                                                                                                                                                          
both approaches). Consequently, this problem with conditional beliefs arises for non-truth-functional 
approaches just as it does for truth-functional approaches.  
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(ibid.) argues, is incompatible with rational patterns of thought and the deviation of such 
rational patterns of thought from MI cannot be explained in conversational terms.
13
 
 Edgington (2008) also discusses the application of MI to conditional 
commands. Consider the following example: 
(27) If the patient is still alive in the morning, change the dressing. 
Since (pq)  (p v q), the command to make (27) true is logically equivalent to ‘Make 
it the case that either the patient is not alive in the morning, or you change the dressing’. 
Given that a disjunction is T if at least one of the disjuncts is T, a nurse may argue, on 
logical grounds, to have obeyed the command by making sure that the patient is not 
alive in the morning (p is T) and not changing the dressing (q is F).  
 Edgington (ibid.) observes that a truth-functional theorist may appeal to 
pragmatics in the resolution of the problem with conditional commands; it may be 
argued that the hearer of (27) ‘tacitly understands’ that killing the patient is not a 
reasonable or intended way to make the truth-functional conditional true. Edgington 
dismisses such a pragmatic explanation as unconvincing on the grounds that it is 
‘stretching pragmatics rather far’. In 4.2.2, I strengthen Edgington’s opinion by arguing 
that pragmatic accounts stretch pragmatics too far to be consistent with the claim that 
MI constitutes the encoded semantics of if. 
4.2.2 Pragmatic intrusion into encoded semantics 
As discussed in 4.1.2.1, Grice’s semantics-pragmatics distinction can be defined as 
follows:  
- Semantics concerns the content of what is said/explicitly communicated; it is 
context-free and truth-conditional 
- Pragmatics concerns the content which is not said but implicated (i.e. implicitly 
communicated); it is context-sensitive and non-truth-conditional with respect to 
what is said (the semantics)  
                                                          
13
 From another perspective, B accepts (R) and rejects (CR). To reject (CR) is to accept (CR), 
which equals accepting (C&R). However, to accept both R and (C&R) is to have logically 
contradictory beliefs.  
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However, Grice’s distinction between semantics and pragmatics and hence between 
explicit and implicit communication is problematic. In what follows, I discuss some 
problems with Grice’s distinction and its relevance to the study of conditionals.  
4.2.2.1 Grice’s circle 
Burton-Roberts (2005) argues that Grice’s notion of what-is-said, and hence of what is 
explicitly communicated, is vague with respect to two types of saying: A-SAYING and B-
SAYING. A-saying is the saying-of-“s”, i.e. it concerns the words uttered. B-saying is the 
saying-that-p, i.e. it involves an assessment of the explicitly communicated thought. 
Consider the following examples: 
(28) It’s twelve. 
(29) It’s cold. 
(30) Jest zimno. [Polish translation of It’s cold] 
In uttering (28), two people can A-say the same thing (i.e. utter the words “It’s twelve”), 
but B-say different things; e.g. one can B-say that it is midday and the other that it is 
midnight. Conversely, different A-sayings represented in (29) and (30) can be used to 
B-say the same thing, i.e. to explicitly communicate the thought that it is cold.  
 The problem for Grice is that to determine what is B-said, one needs to do a lot 
of pragmatic work, including reference assignment and disambiguation (Grice 1989: 
25). Consider (31) below. 
(31) She took it. 
In order to determine what the speaker of (31) B-said, the hearer needs to pragmatically 
derive (i.e. derive by reference to the context) the referents of she and it as well as the 
particular concept communicated by the word take (e.g. ACCEPT as in take the money 
or SWALLOW as in take the pill).  
 This Gricean problem of ‘pragmatic intrusion’ into what is semantically 
encoded – often referred to as ‘Grice’s circle’ (e.g. Levinson 2000: 186) – has important 
consequences for Gricean accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of conditionals.  
 In 4.1.2.3, I discussed Grice’s analysis of a causal-consequential or inferential 
relation between the antecedent and the consequent (Grice’s Indirectness Condition) in 
terms of a conversational implicature. Importantly, I pointed out Grice’s (1989: 77) 
acknowledgement that the use of conditionals by a rational speaker is motivated by the 
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speaker’s assumption that there is some ‘strong’ connection (i.e. the Indirectness 
Condition) – and not merely the relation of MI – between the antecedent and the 
consequent. Acknowledging this, I argue, amounts to acknowledging the problem of 
pragmatic intrusion into semantics. Consider (32), where the conditional is used to 
make an instruction.  
(32) If you press the red button, the conveyor belt will stop. 
Let us assume that in uttering (32) the speaker is instructing the hearer (an apprentice) 
how to stop a conveyor belt. If (32) is to be used as an instruction on how the apprentice 
is supposed to stop the conveyor belt, the speaker must be communicating that there is a 
causal-consequential relation between the antecedent and the consequent such that the 
truth of the consequent follows from the truth of the antecedent. Notice that for (32) to 
count as an instruction, it cannot possibly be used to communicate anything else in 
terms of truth values; it cannot communicate that the consequent will be true regardless 
of whether the antecedent is T or F because even though consistent with MI, it would 
not be instructive at all.
14
 Arguably thus, the thought communicated by the speaker – 
what is B-said – involves more than what is predicted by MI. Crucially, what is B-said 
involves the assignment of particular truth values and the assignment of particular truth 
values depends on the assumption that the stopping of the conveyor belt is a 
consequence of the pressing of the red button. In other words, what is B-said involves 
Grice’s Indirectness Condition.  
 A similar problem arises on a Gricean analysis of the iff interpretation of 
conditionals in terms of biconditional strengthening. Consider (33). 
(33) I’ll tell you something interesting, if you promise to keep it a secret. 
Arguably, the thought explicitly communicated by (33) – i.e. what is B-said – is not that 
the speaker will tell the hearer something interesting regardless of whether the hearer 
keeps it a secret or not (pq), but if and only if the hearer makes the relevant promise 
(pq). The problem for Grice is that if pragmatic processes are involved in the 
derivation of what is B-said (as in (32) and (33)), then, for Grice, pragmatic processes 
are involved in the derivation of semantic content. This Gricean problem of pragmatic 
intrusion into semantics constitutes the driving force behind Relevance Theory’s re-
analysis of the explicit-implicit distinction. In the next section, I give an outline of 
                                                          
14
 I return to this example in chapter 5.  
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Relevance Theory’s re-analysis of this distinction. Its implications for the theory of 
conditionals are discussed in 4.2.2.3, 4.2.2.4 and 4.2.2.5.  
4.2.2.2 Relevance Theory’s explicit-implicit distinction 
Relevance Theory diverges significantly from Grice in claiming that what is 
linguistically encoded does not equal what is explicit. In RT (e.g. Carston 1988, 2002), 
explicitly communicated content (i.e. explicature) is derived on the basis of what is 
linguistically semantically encoded and the context – the derivation of explicatures 
requires substantive pragmatic work. In particular, in order to derive the explicature, the 
hearer needs to assign reference, disambiguate ambiguous terms, supply ellipsis and 
derive ad hoc concepts from the purportedly encoded lexical concepts. In 
acknowledging the importance of pragmatic processing in the derivation of explicatures, 
RT rejects Grice’s distinction between context-free linguistically encoded semantics and 
context-sensitive pragmatics as defining of the explicit-implicit distinction.  
An explicature, in RT, constitutes what-is-said, but without identifying what-is-
said with what is encoded (i.e. RT’s explicature equals B-said). Implicature, on the 
other hand, is an implicitly communicated proposition which is pragmatically derived 
on the basis of what is explicated and the context. In Sperber and Wilson’s (1995: 182) 
words: ‘Any assumption communicated, but not explicitly so, is implicitly 
communicated: it is an implicature’. Whereas the speaker commits herself to what is 
explicated (Carston 2002: 123-124), implicature is a risky inference in the sense that, 
being implicitly rather than explicitly communicated, the speaker does not necessarily 
endorse it. Given that, it is reasonable to expect that, since the speaker’s endorsement is 
present in the case of explicatures, they should not be cancellable
15
, and that 
implicatures, freed from such commitment, should all be cancellable. This, however, is 
not the case.  
In RT, an explicature is said to be a DEVELOPMENT of the encoded logical form 
(LF) of the sentence uttered
16. Even though the notion of ‘development’ lies at the heart 
of RT’s explicature-implicature distinction, it is not a clearly defined term. The picture 
that emerges from Carston’s (1988) discussion is an account of development in logical 
terms (Burton-Roberts 2005); a communicated proposition is a development/enrichment 
of LF of an utterance if and only if it entails that LF. Thus, although explicit does not 
                                                          
15
 ‘Cancellable’ here means ‘cancellable without producing a contradiction of what is said.  
16
 In RT, the logical form of a sentence corresponds to the sentence’s encoded linguistic semantics.  
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equal encoded in RT, it still depends on what is encoded. As observed by Burton-
Roberts (2005: 397), this works in many, but not all, cases.   
For example, Grice’s GCIs are in general re-analysed in RT’s terms as 
explicatures. Thus, the temporal order GCI involved in the interpretation of (7a) (Tom 
got up and read the paper) is re-analysed as an explicature. This is because the 
pragmatically enriched ‘and then’ entails what is encoded by and, i.e. the truth of both 
conjuncts
17
. Also, on the assumption that the iff interpretation of conditionals involves 
the pragmatic strengthening of encoded MI to equivalence (as discussed in 4.1.2.4), it 
has to be re-analysed in RT as an explicature because equivalence entails MI (see e.g. 
Smith & Smith 1988: 333). Similarly, since the Indirectness Condition is for Grice a 
GCI, it too needs to be re-analysed in RT as an explicature.  
Conversely, Grice’s PCIs are (consistently with Grice) treated in RT as 
implicatures. For example, B’s answer in (8a) (A: Are you hungry?; B: I’ve had 
breakfast) communicates the PCI in (8d) – that B is not hungry. This PCI is in RT 
treated as an implicature. This is because (8d) does not entail what is linguistically 
encoded, i.e. that the speaker is not hungry does not entail that the speaker has had 
breakfast at some point prior to the utterance.  
RT’s reanalysis of Grice’s GCI in terms of an explicature is indicative of their 
rejection of the criterion of cancellation as defining of the explicit-implicit distinction. If 
Grice’s GCIs are explicatures then, since Grice’s GCIs are cancellable, explicatures 
must be cancellable. Indeed, RT (e.g. Carston 2002: 138) allows that explicatures can be 
cancelled.  
In this context, Burton-Roberts (2005) emphasises Carston’s (2002: 123-124) 
characterisation of explicatures in terms of ‘expressing… commitment’ and ‘overtly 
endorsing’ what is explicitly communicated. Burton-Roberts argues that the suggestion 
that explicatures can be cancelled is inconsistent with this characterisation of 
explicature since the speaker cannot cancel what she is committed to without 
contradicting herself.  
To complicate things further, the definition of explicature in terms of logical 
development of the encoded LF, combined with the exhaustivity of the explicature-
implicature distinction, means that RT has to allow that some implicatures cannot be 
cancelled. Consider the following example.  
                                                          
17
 Carston (2002: 256) entertains the idea that perhaps and ‘has no linguistic meaning at all’ (conceptual 
or procedural) and that the truth values of co-ordinated propositions fall out from syntactic co-ordination. 
I return to this point in 4.2.2.3.  
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(34) a) The judge is my father. 
  b) The judge is a man.  
(34b) cannot be regarded as explicated by an utterance of (34a) as it does not entail 
(34a). On the contrary, (34a) entails (34b). In other words, if one adheres to the logical 
(entailment) account of development, (34b) is not a development of (34a). In RT’s 
terms thus, there is no other alternative but to treat (34b) as a case of implicature (e.g. 
Carston 2002: 140). A general problem with this analysis is that (34b) is defined in 
mutually exclusive terms – it is both entailed by and implicated by (34a). This analysis 
goes against Grice, who defined implicature in non-truth-conditional terms. A particular 
problem with respect to the criterion of cancelation is that RT has to allow that there are 
some implicatures which cannot be cancelled because they are actually entailed by what 
is linguistically encoded.
18
 Consider now (35) below. 
(35) a) A: Have you invited any men to the function? 
      B: I’ve invited my father.  
  b) I’ve invited a man. 
Burton-Roberts (2005) argues that (34b) ought to be treated as an explicature since 
(34b) constitutes part of the truth-conditional content of the explicated proposition. 
Similarly, (35b) should be treated as an explicature of B’s answer in (35a). Burton-
Roberts’ point is that, if the truth-conditional content of (34a) and (35a-B) is treated as 
implicated, then all the truth-conditional content of the explicature would have to be 
regarded as implicated.
19
  
Burton-Roberts (2005) also points to the fact that the definition of development 
in terms of entailment is problematic for the analysis of negation. Compare (36) and 
(37).  
(36) a) I’ve had breakfast. 
  b) I’ve had breakfast today. 
(37) a) I’ve not had breakfast. 
                                                          
18
 As pointed out by Burton-Roberts (2005), Carston (2002: 140-141) argues that there is nothing wrong 
in the treatment of (34b) as an implicature because in RT concepts are atomic á la Fodor (1998). 
However, given the arguments presented in chapters 1, 2 and 3, this argument is not valid.     
19
  Burton-Roberts acknowledges that (35a-B) is not a STRICT ANSWER to A’s question in (35a). He argues 
that an answer is strict if and only if the communicated truth-conditional content is both sufficient and 
necessary to answer the question. Even though (35a-B) communicates a strict answer (because it is 
sufficient), it is not itself a strict answer (because it is not necessary). Burton-Roberts (ibid.) argues that 
his notion of strictness of an answer captures the indirectness of B’s response in (35a) without the 
problem associated with treating (35b) as merely implicated. 
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  b) I’ve not had breakfast today. 
(36b) above is analysed as an explicature of (36a) because (36b) entails the less specific 
(36a). With negatives, however, the relation of entailment holds in the opposite 
direction. Thus, in (37) above, it is (a) that entails (b) because (b) is less specific. This 
means that, given the logical definition of development, (37b) cannot – parallel to (35b) 
(I’ve invited a man) – be treated as an explicature of (37a). RT must analyse it as an 
implicature. This contrast in RT’s analysis of positives and negatives is counter-
intuitive – there is no reason, other than RT’s anyway problematic logical definition of 
development, for why the relevant temporal restriction should be explicated in (36) but 
implicated in (37).   
 Now, Recanati (1991) criticises RT’s treatment of some truth-conditions as 
implicatures. He calls attention to Carston’s (1991) Independence Principle, which 
states that if a communicated proposition entails or is entailed by the LF of the sentence 
uttered, it must be considered as part of what is explicated. However, given Carston’s 
(2002: 140-141) insistence that (34b) is an implicature (see footnote 18), the 
Independence Principle does not actually seem to play any role in defining RT’s 
distinction between explicatures and implicatures.   
 In summary, RT correctly rejects Grice’s distinction between encoded semantics 
and pragmatics as defining of the distinction between explicit and implicit 
communication. However, acknowledging the substantive role of pragmatics in the 
derivation of explicatures forces RT to reject (the principle of) cancellation as defining 
of the explicit-implicit distinction.  
As discussed, RT (Sperber & Wilson 1995, Carston 2002) defines explicature as 
a development/enrichment of the logical form of an utterance. But there are several 
problems with this definition. If development is defined in terms of entailment (such 
that X is a development of Y if and only if X entails Y), RT’s account gives rise to many 
inconsistencies: a) explicit content can be cancelled even though the speaker 
endorses/commits herself to it; b) there are cases which are logical developments but 
which are acknowledged in RT as implicatures; c) negative and positive utterances do 
not receive a uniform treatment.  
Carston (2002: 188-190) tentatively suggests that if the notion of development 
did not pertain to logical but rather cognitive strength, (34b) – and thus (37b) – could 
actually be treated as explicated. However, Burton-Roberts (2005: 398) points out that 
exchanging logical strength (i.e. specificity) for cognitive strength (i.e. specificity) does 
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not solve the problem since the cognitive is, for RT, the locus of logical (i.e. truth-
theoretic) properties. Cognitive strength should thus parallel logical strength.  
One solution to RT’s problems might be not to define development logically in 
terms of entailment. However, if development is not defined in logical terms, there is no 
definition of development. If there is no definition of development, there is no definition 
of explicature since explicature is defined in terms of development. If there is no 
definition of explicature, there is no definition of implicature. This is because in RT 
implicature is defined negatively with respect to explicature.  
 In this section, I have introduced RT’s re-analysis of Grice’s semantics-
pragmatics distinction and discussed problems with this re-analysis. In the next three 
sections, I look at its implications for the study of conditionals.  
4.2.2.3 Relevance Theory’s circle: the nature of linguistic semantics revisited 
In chapter 2, I discussed RT’s distinction between real and linguistic semantics in terms 
of truth-theoretic value or lack of it, respectively. In contrast to Grice, RT’s (standard) 
claim is that the encoded (linguistic) semantics is non-truth-theoretic – for RT, truth 
conditionality lies only in thought. Carston (e.g. 2002: 99-100) argues that the problem 
of ‘pragmatic intrusion’ does not arise once the explicit-implicit distinction is re-
analysed in Relevance Theory’s terms. Carston’s (ibid.) point is that the problem of 
‘pragmatic intrusion’ arises only if what-is-said is identified with linguistic semantics. 
As discussed in the previous section, RT identifies what-is-said with explicitly 
communicated content (i.e. explicature), but the explicitly communicated content is not 
identified with the encoded linguistic semantics (even though dependent on it). In 
(standard) RT, pragmatics is involved in the derivation of what is explicated, but the 
encoded linguistic semantics is ‘autonomous with respect to pragmatics’ (Carston 2002: 
99). Insofar as pragmatics is involved in the derivation of semantic content, it is in RT 
involved in the derivation of real, i.e. truth-conditional, semantic content of 
communicated thought. In what follows, I argue that Carston’s (ibid.) claim that 
encoded semantics is autonomous with respect to pragmatics is invalid. Crucially, if this 
claim of Carston’s cannot be maintained, the very rationale for positing linguistic 
semantics is lost.  
As discussed in chapter 2, RT’s account of the acquisition of linguistic 
semantics is post hoc in that it presupposes prior understanding of utterances. If, as RT 
(e.g. Carston 2002: 364-365) argues, linguistic semantics is abstracted from multiple 
memory traces of experiences of various uses of a given word, then some utterances 
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must be understood prior to the acquisition of linguistic semantics. It is clear that if 
some utterances are understood prior to the acquisition of linguistic semantics, they 
must be understood through and solely through pragmatic inference. In chapter 2, I 
argued that acknowledging that the understanding of utterances does not require the 
mediation of linguistic semantics equals acknowledging that linguistic semantics is 
unnecessary. However, this acknowledgement also gives rise to another problem for RT 
– the problem of pragmatic intrusion into encoded (i.e. linguistic) semantics. In 
principle, if linguistic semantics is abstracted from pragmatically inferred 
interpretations, linguistic semantics cannot be autonomous with respect to pragmatics. 
Thus, even RT cannot deny that it is pragmatic inference that gets an interpreter to the 
purported linguistic semantics.    
 Indeed, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, there is an instability in RT regarding 
the nature of linguistic semantics. Carston (2002, 2010) herself acknowledges that at 
least some lexical concepts are full-fledged, i.e. they are concepts which, before 
undergoing lexicalisation, had been constructed through (personal) pragmatic inference 
and which thus have truth-theoretic properties (are true or false with respect to a given 
state of affairs in the world). This, I argued, amounts to admitting that real semantics is 
not the only locus of truth-theoretic properties and raises a problem for Carston’s (e.g. 
2002: 365) claim that linguistic semantics constitutes ‘evidence’ for the intended 
interpretation. Here, I argue that allowing that at least some linguistic concepts (i.e. full-
fledged concepts) have been constructed through pragmatic inference is another respect 
in which Carston’s (2002: 99) claim that linguistic semantics is ‘autonomous with 
respect to pragmatics’ is implausible.  
 Also relevant here is RT’s definition of explicature in terms of logical 
development. For explicature to entail the LF (i.e. the linguistic semantics of a sentence) 
of which it is a development, the LF must be a propositional entity, i.e. it must be an 
entity with truth-theoretic properties. Since ‘implicature’ is in RT defined solely in 
contrast to ‘explicature’ (as discussed in 4.2.2.2), RT’s explicit-implicit distinction must 
rest on the assumption that linguistic semantics has truth-theoretic properties.  
 There is an interesting paradox involved here. Carston (2002: 99-100) argues 
that Grice’s circle (section 4.2.2.1) can be avoided if Grice’s explicit-implicit distinction 
is re-defined along RT’s lines. Crucially, the success of RT’s re-definition of the 
explicit-implicit distinction in solving Grice’s circle rests on the argument that linguistic 
semantics, unlike real semantics, does not have truth-theoretic properties. However, 
RT’s definition of the explicit – and hence of the explicit-implicit distinction – rests on 
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the argument that linguistic semantics does have truth-theoretic properties. Thus, RT’s 
re-definition of Grice’s explicit-implicit distinction achieves the opposite of what it 
sought to achieve in the first place. I shall refer to this problem of RT’s as ‘Relevance 
Theory’s circle’.  
 As discussed, Relevance Theory’s circle is evident when we consider RT’s 
theoretical claims regarding the acquisition of linguistic semantics, the nature of 
linguistic semantics and their re-definition of the explicit-implicit distinction. It is also 
evident when we consider more closely Noh’s (2000) claim that if linguistically 
semantically encodes MI.  
 Before I discuss Noh’s proposal in more detail, an important comment is in 
order. As argued earlier, Relevance Theory’s circle points to the conclusion that there is 
no principled distinction in RT between linguistic semantics and real semantics – 
especially in the light of my argument (2.1.3) against the necessity of positing the 
process of decoding. In this connection, consider the following quote from Carston 
(2002: 257): 
Quote 1: The truth relation holds between thoughts and states of affairs, so 
between propositions expressed by utterances (semantic/pragmatic hybrids) and 
states of affairs. Then, it is system of thought, rather than linguistic systems, for 
which a truth calculus, that is, a logic, should be devised. 
 
I agree entirely with what Carston is suggesting here – thought is the only locus of truth 
theoretic properties. However, the problem of Relevance Theory’s circle, which I 
identified for various aspects of Relevance Theory (acquisition of linguistic semantics, 
the nature of linguistic semantics and RT’s explicit-implicit distinction), shows that RT, 
including Carston, has not fully embraced the radical consequences of this claim: that 
there is no linguistic semantics or the process of deterministic decoding, for that matter; 
that a wholly pragmatic inference gets an interpreter to a (holistic) thought, which is the 
only locus of semantics.  
 Indeed, consider Carston’s (2002: 256) suggestion (mentioned in footnote 17) 
that the word and encodes no linguistic meaning (conceptual or procedural) and that the 
truth values of co-ordinated propositions follow from syntactic co-ordination. What 
Carston does here is distinguish between the ‘semantics of and’, which is empty, and 
‘the logic of and’, which is a syntactic matter. Clearly, if the logic of and is a syntactic 
matter, then the logic of and (i.e. conjunction) is still a linguistic, though not semantic, 
property. However, this claim of Carston’s is inconsistent with what she is suggesting in 
quote 1 – that is, that truth is not a property of linguistic representation but of thought. It 
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is not clear whether for Carston truth-theoretic properties apply in language or in 
thought. This inconsistency clearly reflects RT’s instability about the nature of 
semantics. Therefore, as much as I agree with what Carston is saying in quote 1, I argue 
that this claim can only be maintained once its radical consequences are acknowledged.  
4.2.2.4 Relevance Theory’s circle: pragmatic intrusion into encoded semantics of ‘if’ 
In this section, I show that the problem of pragmatic intrusion into encoded semantics 
arises for Relevance Theoretic accounts of conditionals (Smith & Smith 1988, Noh 
2000). My arguments will strengthen Carston’s claim made in quote 1 and call for the 
resolution of the Relevance Theory’s circle by means of acknowledging the radical 
pragmatic consequences of this claim.  
 Consider again the biconditional interpretation of if, which, it has been argued 
(e.g. Smith & Smith 1988), is easily amenable to a linguistic semantic analysis in terms 
of MI. Earlier, I discussed examples (14) and (15), repeated below. 
(14) If you pass the exam, I’ll take you to a restaurant.  
(15) If you do something illegal again, we’ll lock you up.  
According to MI, (14) and (15) should be false only if the antecedent is T and the 
consequent F, and true otherwise. As discussed in 4.1.2.4, it might be argued that in 
uttering (14) and (15) the speakers are not actually making any undertaking as to what 
they will do if the antecedent is false, only what they will do if the antecedent is T – i.e. 
that MI correctly predicts that the speakers of (14) and (15) have spoken falsely only in 
a situation where the antecedent is T and the consequent F. Thus, MI allows that the 
hearer of (14) may be taken to a restaurant even if he fails the exam, and that the hearer 
of (15) may be locked up even if he refrains from doing something illegal again. I will 
argue that there is in fact a problem with this analysis.  
 Examples (14) and (15) exemplify two types of conditional inducements, i.e. 
statements made to influence hearers’ behaviour by telling them about the consequences 
of their behaviour (Beller 2002). Accordingly, (14) is used to influence the hearer’s 
behaviour by promising that q will be T if p is T, and (14) is used to influence the 
hearer’s behaviour by threatening that q will be T if p is T. Promises and threats differ. 
With promises, p is a desired behaviour for which there is a reward (q). With threats, by 
contrast, p is an undesired behaviour for which there is a punishment (q). With promises 
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the hearer is motivated to make p true, whereas with threats the hearer is motivated to 
make p false.   
Beller (2002) argues that crucial to the interpretation of conditional inducements 
is the question of what the speaker is obliged to do and what the speaker is permitted to 
do when p is false. Importantly, Beller (2002: 114) argues that with promises if p is 
false, there is no obligation on the speaker to reward the hearer with q, but she is 
permitted to do so – i.e. the speaker is permitted to make q true even if p is false. 
However, presumably because of the difference in the social perception of reward and 
punishment, with threats, the speaker is not permitted to make q true if p is false. This 
suggests that the biconditional interpretation (i.e. pq) is more strongly associated 
with threats than it is with promises.
20
   
Now, if there really is such a difference in speaker commitment in the case of 
conditional inducements, not keeping a promise should correspond to ‘p and not-q’ 
(consistent with MI), whereas not keeping a threat should correspond to ‘not-p and q’ 
(not consistent with MI). Indeed, Beller’s proposal seems to be right.21 In (14), the 
promise made by the speaker clearly is broken if the hearer passes the exam (p is T) and 
the speaker does not take him to a restaurant (q is F). However, if the hearer is taken to 
the restaurant by the speaker (q is T) even if the hearer has failed the exam (p is F), one 
can argue that the speaker is over-indulgent, but not that she has not kept the promise to 
‘q if p’. In (15), however, there is a strong intuition that the speaker has violated the 
terms of the threat if the hearer does not do anything illegal again (p is F) and yet the 
speaker locks the hearer up (q is T).  
In sum, the difference between threats and promises is this: whereas with 
promises the speaker is not taken to have spoken falsely in a situation where p is F and q 
is T, with threats the speaker is taken to have spoken falsely in a situation where p is F 
and q is T. Crucially, this means that MI predicts when a conditional promise is violated 
(false) but not when a conditional threat is violated (false).   
 The difference between threats and promises raises serious problems for the 
assumption that if semantically encodes MI. If one wants to maintain MI as the encoded 
semantics of if, one has to acknowledge an inelegant asymmetry; the falsity of a 
conditional is sometimes (e.g. with promises) semantically encoded and thus 
deterministically decoded in utterance interpretation, and sometimes (e.g. with threats) 
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 I say more about the interpretation of threats and promises in chapter 5.  
21
 In fact, this prediction is supported with Beller’s (2002) experimental study. Beller (2002: 117) reports 
that 100% of the tested subjects equate not keeping a promise with ‘p and not-q’, and 95% of subjects 
equate not keeping a threat with ‘not-p and q’.   
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it is pragmatically inferred. But even this inelegant solution would be difficult to 
maintain, for the simple reason that what counts as a threat or a promise is a matter of 
individualistic, holistic pragmatic inference. This is well illustrated by (38). 
(38) If you do it again, I’ll take you to the funfair. 
Example (38) can be interpreted as a promise or a threat depending on whether the 
hearer finds funfairs a pleasure or not, respectively. Thus, it needs to be established 
whether the intended interpretation is a threat or a promise in order to establish whether 
the falsity of the conditional is modelled by MI – and thus encoded – or not. The 
problem for truth-functional approaches is that the distinction between threats and 
promises can only be made at the level of a holistic belief system – whether something 
is a threat or a promise is not a matter of logic.  
 The point I am making here is that if we agree that (a) MI predicts when a 
promise is F, but not when a threat is F and that (b) the distinction between promises 
and threats is a pragmatic distinction, then (c) MI models and thus applies at the level of 
pragmatically (i.e. holistically) inferable thought, and not at the level of linguistic 
semantics (LF).  
 In fact, this problem arises not only for conditional inducements, but also for 
conditional injunctions. Consider (20) and (21) again. 
(20) If there is no other choice, amputate his leg. 
(21) If you want to make your parents happy, quit smoking.  
The hearer of (20) will be taken not to have complied with the injunction – i.e. will be 
taken to have made (20) false – if he makes q T (the hearer amputates the patient’s leg) 
in a situation where p is F (where there is some other choice of treatment). This is 
incompatible with MI, which would be true in that situation. The hearer of (21), 
however, will not be taken to have failed to comply with the injunction – i.e. will not be 
taken to have made (21) false – if he quits smoking (q is T) even if he does not want to 
make his parents happy (p is F). This is predicted by MI.  
The difference between (20) and (21) may be due to the difference in the 
perception of leg-amputation and quitting smoking. Amputation is highly undesirable 
and requires a highly restricted set of circumstances/conditions in order to be 
performed. For this reason, the injunction in (20) would be normally taken to 
communicate a biconditional command (pq). However, quitting smoking is usually 
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perceived as a desirable behaviour and thus its performance does not require a highly 
restricted set of circumstances/conditions in order to be performed. In fact, it is 
plausible to imagine that the context of (21) is such that the speaker and hearer are 
talking about how to make the hearer’s parents happy. In this context, the antecedent (If 
you want to make your parents happy) is not a condition on the consequent (quit 
smoking) at all. Rather, the consequent suggests means to achieve the goal represented 
in the antecedent (and embedded in the propositional attitude represented by want). 
Unlike (20), (21) is not a command, but a suggestion. As with threats and promises, 
here the problem for truth-functional approaches is that the determination of whether MI 
applies or not depends on a distinction which can only be made at the level of a holistic 
belief system – whether something is a desirable action or not, a command or a 
suggestion, is not a matter of logic.
22
 
 Consider also the universal conditionals (17) and (18). 
(17) Water begins to boil if it reaches 100°C.  
(18) If one is a man, one cannot get pregnant.  
MI guarantees that the conditional in (17) is false when p is T and q is F. This is a 
correct prediction. But MI also guarantees that (17) should be true if p is F and q T. This 
is an incorrect prediction – it is impossible for water not to reach 100°C and boil. In 
contrast, the conditional in (18) is F when p is T and q F, and T otherwise. The truth 
value of (18), but not of (17), can be predicted by MI. Again, the difference between 
(17) and (18) and thus the determination of whether MI applies or not is established at 
the holistic level of belief – it depends on a cogniser’s (so-called ‘encyclopaedic’) 
knowledge that there is no other boiling point for water than 100°C and that there are 
other reasons for not being able to get pregnant than being a man. 
 It is clear that the cases which I discussed above and which are not modelled 
by MI are cases of biconditional interpretation. Thus, one may object that the 
requirement for the pragmatic inference of the truth value of such conditionals follows 
from the assumption that what we are dealing with is a pragmatic process of 
biconditional strengthening of the encoded MI to equivalence. But this argument is 
invalid. To repeat, just as it is pragmatically established that MI does not apply in (15), 
(20), (17) or on the threat interpretation of (38), so it is pragmatically established that 
MI applies in (14), (21), (18) and on the promise interpretation of (38). This is because 
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 In chapter 5, I will actually question the assumption that the interpretation of (21) can be modelled by 
MI.  
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recognising the lack of need for biconditional strengthening is itself a pragmatic 
inference.    
 I made a similar argument in chapter 2, where I argued that the process of 
deterministic decoding of linguistic semantics is redundant. One reason for arguing so 
was that in cases where the communicated concept is the same as the purportedly 
encoded concept – as in Carston’s (2010: 242-243) ‘Children in most cultures dance 
spontaneously’ – one and the same general concept DANCE has got to be accessed by 
two distinct cognitive processes (it has to be pragmatically inferred by the pragmatics 
module after it has been deterministically decoded by the language module). This is 
because perceiving that no further concept adjustment (i.e. the pragmatic adjustment of 
the purportedly encoded DANCE to a more specific ad hoc concept) is itself a 
pragmatic inference from context. I argued that because such a concept has got to be 
(and can be) pragmatically inferred anyway, and because there are so many problems 
with the notion of linguistic semantics, the notion of linguistic semantics and the 
process of deterministic decoding of such content should be rejected.   
 The point I am making with respect to MI goes even further. Not only is it the 
case that (a) the application of MI has to be pragmatically determined but, because of 
(a), it is also the case that (b) if MI applies, it does so at the level of (holistic) thought – 
not at the level of the LF encoded by a generated linguistic expression.   
 It also needs to be pointed out that the assumption that MI constitutes the 
encoded semantics of if gives rise to unsolvable paradoxes. Consider again (27). 
(27) If the patient is still alive in the morning, change the dressing. 
As discussed in 4.2.1, Edgington’s (2008) point with respect to this example was that 
since (pq) is logically equivalent to (p v q), the nurse may argue to have obeyed the 
command in (27) by making sure that the patient is not alive in the morning (p is T) 
and not changing the dressing (q is F).   
 The problem is that MI predicts that the nurse’s way of obeying the command 
is logically correct, but it is nevertheless an unreasonable way of obeying that 
command. But notice that the clash between what is logically correct and what is 
reasonable only arises on the assumption that (27) can be modelled by MI! Take away 
this assumption, and the clash/paradox – and the problem – disappears. 
 As noted, Edgington suggests that pragmatic explanations of examples like 
(27) are ‘stretching pragmatics rather far’. The argument I have put forward in this 
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section – that if MI applies, it never does so prior to pragmatic inference – substantiates 
Edgington’s claim. If, as shown in this section, pragmatic inference determines whether 
MI applies or not, MI cannot be the encoded semantic content of if. This is because 
encoded semantic content is supposed to be autonomous with respect to pragmatic 
inference.  
 In the next section, I give further arguments for why appeal to pragmatics in 
aid of maintaining MI as the encoded semantics of if actually shows that it is impossible 
to maintain MI as the encoded semantics of if.  
4.2.2.5 Problems with Noh’s (2000) metarepresentational account 
In this section, I concentrate on Noh’s (1996, 2000) claim that it is possible to retain MI 
as the encoded semantics of if even on metarepresentational uses. I argue that Noh’s 
appeal to pragmatics in order to maintain MI as the encoded semantics of if stretches 
pragmatics too far to be consistent with the claim that if semantically encodes MI. 
 As discussed in 4.1.2.5, Noh (2000) argues that a truth-functional analysis of 
examples like (23) (A: Two and eleven makes thirty; B: If two and eleven makes thirty, 
you need more work on maths) is available at the higher-explicature level. Noh argues 
that a truth-functional relation holds between the meta-level explicature ‘you say/believe 
that two and eleven makes thirty’ and ‘you need more work on maths’. Consider also 
(39). 
(39) If you’re thirsty, there’s beer in the fridge. 
Example (39) defies analysis in terms of MI at the descriptive level in the following 
way. The truth table for MI predicts that the conditional is T in a situation where p is F 
and q is F. But this is a wrong prediction for (39). This is because the truth of q (‘there’s 
beer in the fridge’) is independent of the truth value of p (‘you’re thirsty’). Relatedly, 
(39) defies an MI analysis in that that in uttering (39), the speaker is asserting that q is 
T. This means that q is not a consequent, hence p is not an antecedent and hence (39) is 
not modelled by MI. 
Noh (2000: 201) argues that when approached from a metarepresentational 
perspective, (39), and examples similar to it, do not defy an analysis in terms of MI. 
However, even though Noh criticises a descriptive level analysis of (39), she does not 
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actually offer a metarepresentational analysis of it. Instead, she gives an analysis of 
(40).
23
 
(40) [Son to mother who is going out] 
  Mum, don’t worry. If I’m hungry, there’s a sandwich in the fridge. 
Noh (2000: 201) argues that the consequent in (40) is an interpretive use – it 
metarepresents ‘a desired thought’, i.e. a thought which would become relevant to the 
speaker in a situation where the antecedent is T. Thus, for Noh, MI models the relation 
between ‘I am hungry’ communicated by the antecedent and ‘it will be relevant for me 
to remember that there’s a sandwich in the fridge’ communicated by the consequent. 
But Noh’s analysis is problematic for three reasons:  
- it suggests (contrary to Noh’s own arguments) that MI applies at the pragmatic 
rather than semantic level 
- it undermines the theoretical significance of the notion of metarepresentation  
- it does not offer an adequate explanation  
Fundamentally, the meta-level where the application of appropriate (i.e. consistent with 
MI) truth values is supposed to take place for metarepresentational uses is a pragmatic, 
not semantic, level. If MI applies here, then it does not apply at the level of decoded 
linguistic semantics, but at the level of pragmatically inferred thought. This gives rise to 
the question of whether a metarepresentational analysis actually shows, as Noh (2000: 
205) argues, that ‘natural-language if is semantically equivalent to material implication’ 
[my emphasis]. Consider also the following quote from Noh. 
Quote 2: […] metarepresentational antecedents can express propositions 
different from those expressed by descriptively used (i.e. ordinary) antecedents. 
This is possible as long as pragmatic enrichment processes can flesh out the 
linguistically encoded material in such a way as to distinguish between 
descriptive and metarepresentational use. As a result, the truth table for 
material implication applies to these ‘non-basic’ conditionals just as it does to 
more basic ones, and a standard argument against the truth table account 
dissolves. (Noh 2000: 190-191, my emphasis)  
 
In this quote, Noh makes it clear that descriptive and metarepresentational uses are 
pragmatically distinguished. But if that is the case, then the application of appropriate 
truth values – not only to meta-representational but also to descriptive uses – must occur 
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 I shortly return to a metarepresentational re-analysis of (39).  
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after it has been pragmatically determined whether the use in question is descriptive or 
meta-representational. Significantly, this suggests that, contrary to what Noh argues, 
Noh’s arguments are not about the encoded semantics of if, but about its pragmatics. 
Noh, however, does not acknowledge this point.
24
 
 As for the second problem, let me illustrate it with a metarepresentational re-
analysis of (39) (If you’re thirsty, there’s beer in the fridge). This example is significant 
because Noh (2000: 191) explicitly states that a metarepresentational re-analysis of 
examples like (39) is crucial to maintaining the argument that MI is the encoded 
semantics of if. However, even if we assume, along with Noh, that a 
metarepresentational analysis can be applied to (40), its application to (39) is 
problematic. 
 Let us imagine a context in which (39) is uttered by Paul to his brother John 
who has just entered the house after laying bricks in direct sun for the past eight hours, 
and that John has not verbally or in any other way communicated to Paul that he is 
thirsty. In such a context, there is a choice of two metarepresentational analyses: (i) the 
consequent is an interpretive use or (ii) the consequent is a metalinguistic use. Both 
options are problematic.  
 On the first option (i), the consequent in (39), like the consequent in (40), 
metarepresents a desired thought which will become relevant to John if the antecedent is 
T. The problem with an interpretive analysis of this consequent is that if ‘there’s beer in 
the fridge’ is a metarepresentation of a thought, it is a metarepresentation of the 
speaker’s own thought. If the consequent in (39) is interpretive, it is used to 
communicate that it will be relevant for the hearer to entertain the thought that the 
speaker himself entertains as T with respect to the world. In fact, the assumption of 
relevance of q to p depends on the speaker’s entertaining this particular thought as T 
with respect to the world. The problem is that if the consequent in (39) is 
metarepresentational of the speaker’s own thought – i.e. if one can metarepresent one’s 
own thoughts – then every single utterance, including the antecedent in (39), is 
metarepresentational and the notion of metarepersentation loses its import.
25
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 The descriptive-metalinguistic distinction was originally put forward by Horn (1989) as a pragmatic 
distinction. Horn argues that when if is used descriptively, it equals MI, but when it is used 
metalinguistically, it does not. Interestingly, Noh (1996: 26) argues that Horn (1989) posits a pragmatic 
ambiguity which ‘seem[s] to imply a semantic ambiguity’. If Noh is right, both Noh (for the reasons 
discussed above) and Horn fail to see that when MI applies, it does so in pragmatically inferred thought.  
25
 In fact, the same problem arises for the consequent in (40).  
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 On the second option (ii), the consequent in (39) would be a metalinguistic use; 
it would communicate something like ‘I am saying that …’.26 But the problem here is 
that if the consequent in (39) could be analysed as a metalinguistic use, then every 
utterance that every single speaker makes could be so analysed and, again, the notion of 
metalinguistic use would lose its theoretical significance.
 27
  
 The third problem with Noh’s analysis concerns the notion of 
metarepresentational faithfulness. As discussed earlier, Noh’s metarepresentational re-
analysis of examples which defy an MI analysis at the descriptive level relies on the 
relevance of the notion of metarepresentational faithfulness (of metarepresentation to 
the metarepresented object). As discussed in 4.1.2.5, Noh (2000: 187) argues that ‘what 
is important in metarepresentation is faithfulness to the original, rather than 
truthfulness’. Consider (26) again. 
(26) [A is talking to B about her meeting with her supervisor] 
  A: Then what did she say? 
  B: The argument is invalid. 
Noh argues that B’s utterance in (26) is T if and only if it is a faithful 
metarepresentation of B’s supervisor’s utterance. Noh (2000: 189) writes: ‘what is 
important is not whether the argument is valid or not, but whether the supervisor said 
something resembling that or not’. Notice that if it is irrelevant whether the argument is 
valid or not, it is irrelevant whether what B’s supervisor communicated was T or F. For 
Noh, (26B) is T as long as it is faithful to what the supervisor said, but regardless of 
whether what the supervisor communicated was T or F, i.e. regardless of whether the 
supervisor held a T or F belief about the argument.  
 For Noh (e.g. 2000: 202), the truth value of what is being metarepresented is 
irrelevant also in the case of conditionals. Consider (23), repeated below. 
(23)  A: Two and eleven makes thirty. 
   B: If two and eleven makes thirty, you need more work on maths. 
As noted earlier, Noh (2000: 187-189) maintains that even though a descriptive level 
MI analysis of (23B) yields wrong results, (23B) is modelled by MI at the meta-level. 
At the meta-level the antecedent (‘you say/believe that two and eleven makes thirty’) 
                                                          
26
 In fact, Noh (2000: 207) offers a metalinguistic analysis of the speaker’s own utterance for conditionals 
with patently false consequents. I criticise this proposal of Noh’s later in this section.  
27
 I will discuss a simpler and less problematic solution to the interpretation of examples like (39) in 
chapter 5.  
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comes out as T on the assumption that it faithfully metarepresents A’s utterance. Given 
that the antecedent is T, the consequent has got to be T for the whole conditional to be 
T. The metarepresentational analysis of the antecedent, thus, guarantees the assignment 
of T and only T to the consequent. Thus, on Noh’s analysis the consequent in (23B) is T 
because the antecedent is a faithful metarepresentation of A’s utterance and regardless 
of the fact that the antecedent is F at the descriptive level. It is precisely the importance 
of faithfulness rather than truthfulness which allows Noh to maintain MI as the encoded 
semantics of all conditionals.  
 However, Noh’s metarepresentational account misses a very important point 
about (23B) – that the faithfulness of the metarepresentational antecedent simply is not 
the reason why B in (23) communicates that A needs more work on maths (that the 
consequent is T). In fact, contrary to what follows from Noh’s proposal, crucial to the 
truth of the consequent is not the fact that B has truly metarepresented A’s belief, but 
the fact that A falsely believes that a patent falsity is true. It is thus the falsity of A’s 
belief which allows B to communicate that the consequent in (23) is T.  
 The following modification of (23) emphasises my point. If Noh were right in 
claiming that the ‘truthfulness’ of what is being metarepresented is irrelevant in 
metarepresentational uses, B would be able to communicate ‘you need more work on 
maths’ by faithfully metarepresenting a true mathematical belief of A – e.g. a belief that 
‘two plus two makes four’. However, because A’s belief that ‘two plus two makes four’ 
is T, B cannot communicate (or conclude) that A needs more work on maths even if B 
has faithfully metarepresented this belief of A’s.   
 Now, MI does not predict the fact that the truth of the consequent in (23B) 
follows from the falsity of A’s belief. Nevertheless, the use of if in (23B) does 
communicate that there is some (consequential) relation between p and q. This needs to 
be explained. Crucial to the explanation is, I argue, the falsity of A’s mathematical 
belief. A believes that what B knows is a patent mathematical falsity is true. Learning 
about this false belief of A, B realises that A does not have necessary mathematical 
knowledge to be aware that this belief is actually false. As a solution to this problem, B 
suggests that A needs more work on maths. There clearly is a relation of relevance 
between p and q in (23B), but that relation is not modelled by MI.
28
 
 Also important and relevant here is Noh’s analysis of (41). 
 
                                                          
28
 I return to this example in chapter 5.  
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(41) Pope to a telephone operator in a small Swiss village: I’m the Pope. 
 Operator: If you’re the Pope, I’m the Empress of China. 
Noh (2000: 207) argues that the antecedent in the operator’s utterance in (41) is used to 
metarepresent the hearer’s (the Pope’s) utterance and the consequent is used to 
metarepresent ‘an utterance that the speaker wants to make in the case where the 
proposition expressed by the antecedent is uttered/entertained’.29 According to Noh 
(ibid.), the speaker ‘is asserting that if the hearer is saying that he is the Pope, she will 
say that she is the Empress of China’. At the meta-level, T will be assigned to ‘you say 
you’re the Pope’ and to ‘I say I’m the Empress of China’.  
 Whereas Noh’s meta-level analysis is indeed consistent with MI, it misses the 
crucial point that the operator in (41) is communicating her disbelief that the hearer is 
the Pope by inviting an inference from the patent falsity of the consequent to the falsity 
of the antecedent (Modus Tollens). This inference is licensed by MI, but it is licensed at 
the descriptive, not meta-representational level. Noh (ibid.) does mention that both 
utterances involved in the meta-level analysis are ‘presented as blatantly false’ and that 
they ‘function as abstract echoes’ of ‘the property of being patently false’. However, the 
problem is that it is not clear how the meta-level can ‘echo’ the falsity involved at the 
descriptive level if, as argued by Noh (2000: 202), in metarepresentational uses ‘the 
proposition literally expressed by the consequent is given guarantee not of truthfulness, 
but of faithfulness’.  
 I have been arguing that Noh’s metarepresentational analysis of (41) is 
inadequate. This example can be more simply explained as inviting MT (an inference 
licensed by MI) in virtue of the patent falsity of the consequent. However, even though 
the interpretation of (41) is modelled by MI, MI applies at the level of holistic thought. 
The operator in (41) communicates her disbelief that the hearer is the Pope by inviting 
him to perform MT. The operator can assume that the hearer (i.e. the Pope) will be able 
to perform MT only because, given that the hearer (i.e. the Pope) assumes that at the 
other end of the line is an operator in Switzerland, the hearer (i.e. the Pope) will be able 
to pragmatically infer the blatant falsity of the consequent. Crucially, the hearer (i.e. the 
Pope) will be able to infer from the falsity of ‘I’m the Empress of China’ to the 
communicated falsity of ‘you’re the Pope’ even though the hearer (i.e. the Pope) knows 
that ‘you’re the Pope’ is in fact true. The Pope will be able to infer that MI models the 
                                                          
29
 See my earlier point that if consequents like the one in (41) can be analysed in metalinguistic terms, 
then all utterances can be so analysed.  
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relation between ‘I’m the Empress of China’ and ‘you’re the Pope’ in the operator’s 
mind even though it does not model the relation between these two 
propositions/thoughts in his mind. This shows that if MI models the relation between 
‘I’m the Empress of China’ and ‘you’re the Pope’, it does so not as a matter of logical 
necessity, but as a matter of an individual’s holistic belief system.  
 Now, Noh’s metarepresentational analysis seems to make correct predictions in 
some cases. For example, it seems plausible to agree with Noh that MI predicts the 
injunction interpretation of (22) (If that’s John, I’m not here), which involves a 
metarepresentational consequent. However, for the reasons discussed in 4.2.2.3, 4.2.2.4 
and in this section, one cannot extrapolate from the existence of such examples to the 
claim that MI is the encoded semantics of if. 
 The aim of this chapter was to answer the (title) question of whether if encodes 
MI. The answer is that it does not, because even where MI applies, it does so in 
pragmatically (i.e. holistically) inferred thought. It is thus not language, but thought 
which is the locus of MI.  
4.3 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have argued that there are two reasons why it is impossible to maintain 
the claim that if semantically encodes MI. Firstly, there are conditional belief deviations 
from MI. Because such deviations take place at the level of belief, they cannot be 
explained in terms of conversational principles. Secondly, the problem of pragmatic 
intrusion into encoded semantics arises for Relevance Theory just as it did for Grice.  
 The problem of pragmatic intrusion has important consequences. If pragmatic 
inference determines whether MI applies or not, MI cannot be the encoded semantic 
content of if. This is because encoded semantic content is supposed to be autonomous 
with respect to pragmatic inference (e.g. Carston 2002: 99-100). If, as I have argued, the 
purportedly encoded semantic content is not autonomous with respect to pragmatics, the 
rationale for positing encoded semantic content is lost.  
 The conclusion that the rationale for positing encoded semantic content is lost 
is further strengthened by RT’s account of the acquisition of linguistic semantics, the 
nature of linguistic semantics and their re-definition of the explicit-implicit distinction.   
 My argument that if MI applies, it does so at the level of holistic content 
suggests that conditional beliefs – and thus the interpretation of conditionals – can only 
be explained with reference to, because they arise at, the holistic/individualistic 
cognitive level. This argument also strengthens the claim of the Representational 
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Hypothesis (e.g. Burton-Roberts 2012) that thought is the only locus of semantic 
content, my claim (developed in chapters 1-3) that such content is holistic and thus 
accessible solely through pragmatic inference.  
One final comment that needs to be made at this point concerns the relation 
between MI and LOT. In chapter 3, I argued that an RH-based wholly inferential 
account which I propose allows for successful communication by combining the 
identity of LOT – i.e. primitive concepts and compositional capacity – among the 
human species with Bilgrami-type public availability of conceptual structures (which 
are allowed by the shared LOT). Now, one of the main arguments of this chapter was 
that holistic thought, and not linguistic expressions generated by the language module, 
is the locus of MI. By this I meant that the application of MI has to be pragmatically 
determined. However, the pragmatically determined (i.e. holistic and individualistic) 
application of MI does not at all indicate that MI itself is not subject to a realist-
naturalistic inquiry. Indeed, assuming that: 
(a) MI is part of the logical and thus realist-naturalistic system 
(b) The language module (on the assumption that it exists), or any expression 
generated by it, is not the locus of MI, as argued in this chapter 
(c) LOT is subject to a realist-naturalistic inquiry 
It follows that (d) MI is licensed/allowed by (most plausibly the compositional 
component of) LOT. Thus, even though the question of when MI applies is 
pragmatically determined, the fact that it does (and can) apply is naturalistically 
determined.  
 In the next chapter, I show how the interpretation of conditionals can be 
explained in terms of a wholly pragmatic inferential process cashed out in terms of 
Hintzman’s (1986) multiple-trace theory of memory (introduced in chapter 2) and its 
extension to the study of conversational common ground by Horton & Gerrig (2005). I 
also discuss the implications that a wholly pragmatic account of utterance interpretation 
has for the distinction between explicit and implicit communication.  
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Chapter 5. Holistic and individualistic conditions on interpretation 
 
5.0 Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to show how the interpretation of conditionals can be handled 
by a wholly pragmatic inferential process of utterance interpretation. I first introduce 
Horton & Gerrig’s (2005) extension of a multiple-trace theory of memory (e.g. 
Hintzman 1986) into the study of common ground. I argue that once Horton & Gerrig’s 
argument – that interlocutor-specific information places immediate constraints on 
utterance interpretation – is acknowledged, it is possible to explain the distinction 
between the weak and the strong interpretations of conditionals.  
I discuss basic uses of conditionals (where if signals a relation between two 
propositional objects p and q) and look at various relations which hold between p and q 
in such uses. Then, I move on to extended uses of conditionals (where if signals a 
relation between a proposition and an utterance (or speech act)) and discuss why the 
analysis I defend is more adequate than Sweetser’s speech-act analysis. Finally, I 
discuss implications of a wholly pragmatic approach to utterance interpretation for the 
explicit-implicit distinction.  
5.1 Interpretation of conditionals and common ground 
In 4.2.2.4, I discussed, among other things, the interpretation of conditional 
inducements. In line with Beller (2002), I argued that there is an important distinction 
between the interpretation of conditional promises and threats: whereas a conditional 
promise is generally taken to have been broken (i.e. the speaker is taken to have spoken 
falsely) when p is T and q is F, a conditional threat is generally taken to have been 
violated when p is F and q is T. This shows that MI predicts when a promise is false, but 
not when a threat is false. It also suggests that the biconditional interpretation is more 
strongly associated with threats than it is with promises.  
 I further argued that this difference in the interpretation of conditional threats 
and promises raises problems for the claim that if semantically encodes MI. Because the 
distinction between threats and promises is made at the level of a holistic belief system, 
when MI applies, it does so at the level of a pragmatically (i.e. holistically) inferred 
thought. I argued that the interpretation of conditionals – like all utterance interpretation 
– is a matter of a wholly pragmatic (holistic) inferential process.  
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 Now, if all utterance interpretation is a wholly pragmatic process, it necessarily 
depends on and is thus constrained by (cognitive) contextual factors. For example, in 
4.2.2.4, I discussed how the interpretation of (38), repeated here as (1), depends on the 
hearer’s desires and dreads. 
(1) If you do it again, I’ll take you to the funfair. 
Depending on whether the hearer likes or dislikes the funfair, (1) is intended as a 
promise or a threat. In turn, depending on whether (1) is intended as a promise or a 
threat, its interpretation is or is not modelled by MI.  
 One particular point I want to develop in the first section of this chapter is that 
part of contextual assumptions involved in the interpretation of conditionals is the 
interlocutors’ knowledge of one another’s holistic state of mind (i.e. cognitive context). 
My argument is compatible with, and strengthened by, recent (Horton & Gerrig 2005; 
Horton 2008) psycholinguistic work on the notion of common ground.  
5.1.1 Horton and Gerrig’s notion of common ground 
Horton & Gerrig (2005) are interested in the notion of COMMON GROUND, which 
concerns the set of assumptions (knowledge, beliefs, etc.) which interlocutors in a 
conversation consider as shared for the purposes of communication (Clark 1994). 
Consider the following exchange (taken from Horton & Gerrig (2005)). 
(2)   A: Oh first of all I have Shana’s shower coming up that I have to do. 
  B: Ah, that’s right. 
  A: That’s going to be like a huge like three day effort with all the cooking and 
cleaning and like actually party [sic] that I have to do. 
  B: Is there anyone you can get to help you? 
  A: Um Jessica’s going to help and Beth might because you see, Diane is here 
now. 
  B: Oh okay. 
Horton & Gerrig (2005) are concerned with what lies behind the successful use of 
referring expressions exemplified by Shana’s shower, Beth, Jessica and Diane in (2). 
They are interested in what it is that makes B successfully interpret the use of these 
expressions; how it is that A knows what expressions to use to ascertain a successful 
interpretation of them by B; and how it is that A and B know that what A intended to 
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communicate by the use of a given expression is what B understood as intended by A. 
In other words, Horton & Gerrig are interested in psycholinguistic underpinnings of the 
notion of common ground.     
 As observed by Clark (1994: 989), successful communication, like any joint 
activity, depends on participants’ co-ordination of their actions through making 
assumptions about each other. Clark (ibid.) distinguishes between COMMUNAL COMMON 
GROUND, which concerns the assumptions taken to be shared by members of the same 
general community, and PERSONAL COMMON GROUND, which refers to more specific 
mutual knowledge, etc. that interlocutors have inferred about each other from past 
experiences with each other. As Clark (1994: 990) puts it, common ground is ‘the 
background, the context, for everything the participants jointly do and say in 
[discourse]’. The goal of Horton & Gerrig (2005) is to propose a set of mechanisms that 
give rise to the effect described as common ground.  
Horton & Gerrig (2005: 2) argue that common ground is not a category of 
specialised mental representations, but ‘an emergent property of ordinary memory 
processes acting on ordinary memory representations’. Horton & Gerrig (2005) assume 
that speakers produce utterances which are suited to particular addressees. Similarly, 
listeners assume that speakers’ utterances were designed with the listeners’ needs in 
mind (Horton 2008: 193). Thus, when B in (2) indicates an understanding of who Shana 
is, it means, for Horton & Gerrig (2005: 3), that A has ‘correctly formulated her 
utterance against the belief that Shana is part of their common ground’. A general idea 
illustrated by this example is that speakers adjust their utterances to particular audiences 
by incorporating their assumptions about their interlocutors’ knowledge, etc. – a 
phenomenon referred to as AUDIENCE DESIGN.  
According to Horton & Gerrig (2005), two processes are relevant in audience 
design: COMMONALITY ASSESSMENT and MESSAGE FORMATION. Commonality 
assessment concerns cue-dependent retrieval of episodic memory traces
1
 which store 
information associated with a particular interlocutor. The retrieval of interlocutor-
specific information allows interlocutors to assume communal or personal common 
ground. Message formation concerns the use of such retrieved information in 
constructing an utterance. Thus, for Horton & Gerrig (2005: 4), utterances reflect the 
speaker’s beliefs about common ground.  
                                                          
1
 Horton & Gerrig (2005: 11) argue that commonality assessment arises via the mechanism of resonance 
(echo retrieval) proposed by e.g. Hintzman (1986). Resonance provides a parallel search of memory and 
thus allows a wide range of associated information to be accessible. 
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Let us look at (2) again. The fact that A chose the proper name Shana (rather 
than a more descriptive phrase like my sister Shana, etc.) reflects A’s belief that the 
concept of Shana is co-present for A and B (i.e. that it is in the common ground). This 
assumption of common ground (and the subsequent use of the proper name) relies on a 
strong pattern of associations in A’s memory between (the concepts of) A, B and Shana. 
But how does the assumption of common ground arise? In other words, how is a 
particular set of memory traces (associations between A, B and Shana) activated? 
Horton & Gerrig (2005: 9-10) argue that conversational interlocutors serve as highly 
salient cues for the retrieval of traces which are involved in the assumption of common 
ground. Such cue-based retrieval of interlocutor-associated information accounts for the 
readiness in memory of records of interlocutor-related experiences and their availability 
to processes of speech production and comprehension.  
Horton & Gerrig (2005: 10) argue that from a pool of stored information only 
those traces will be retrieved which are most consistently associated with the cue (here, 
with the interlocutor in a given context). Furthermore, only those traces will become 
relevant to the processes of language production and comprehension which are retrieved 
within an adequate time frame. Given such constraints, interlocutor-specific information 
which is too weak or too slow will not have an immediate impact on the language 
production and comprehension processes. 
 Horton & Gerrig (2005: 14-15) point out that the final products of commonality 
assessment do not always occur prior to message formation. The processes of 
commonality assessment and message formation interact so that partial commonality 
assessment may influence message formation and message formation may influence the 
(re)assessment of commonality. The interaction is dynamic because it is subject to the 
demands of fluent conversation. Relatedly, commonality assessment is not an infallible 
process. Hence, commonality mis-assessment and subsequent hearer-inappropriate 
message formation may take place, which results in a communicative failure.
2
    
Horton (2008: 196) suggests that a process analogous to message formation in 
language production is the process of MESSAGE INTERPRETATION in language 
comprehension. Horton does not explain how this process works, but it seems plausible 
to assume that the process of message interpretation is the reverse of the process of 
message formation: the form of the utterance will influence commonality assessment 
                                                          
2
 Horton & Gerrig (2005: 28) argue that the process of message formation is not exclusively constrained 
by the commonality assessment but also by factors like lexical frequency, recency, etc.  
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and thus constrain the search for the intended interpretation. For example, let us assume 
that B in (2) knows two people called Diane – Diane1 and Diane2. Furthermore, B 
knows of another person called Diane, Diane3, whom only A knows in person. Now, 
Diane1 is known only to B, Diane2 is known mutually to A and B, and Diane3 is known 
only to A (B just knows of Diane3). Accordingly, two factors related to (2) – (a) the 
utterance of the form Diane and (b) the utterance of it by A – are likely to constrain the 
interpretation to mutually known Diane2. This is because (a) and (b), acting as cues, are 
likely to activate memory records with associations between (the concepts of) A, B and 
Diane2. Such commonality assessment seems personal (because of the associations 
between A, B and Diane2). However, the commonality assessment relevant to the 
interpretation of Diane in (2) may also be more communal in that the discourse 
preceding the utterance of Diane already constrains the interpretation to individuals who 
are co-present for A and B, but also to those who are co-present for Shana, Jessica and 
Beth. 
In summary, Horton & Gerrig’s (2005) and Horton’s (2008) claim is that 
interlocutor-specific information, i.e. information about common ground, is one of 
many cues which are simultaneously integrated during language processing and that it 
serves as an immediate constraint on language processing. In the next section, I use 
Horton & Gerrig’s account of common ground to explain the weak and the strong 
interpretations of conditionals.   
5.1.2 Weak and strong interpretations of conditionals  
So far, I have assumed, in line with Beller’s (2002) findings, that the interpretation of 
conditional promises is modelled by MI, whereas the interpretation of conditional 
threats is not. Here, I argue that it is actually difficult to maintain such a neat distinction. 
Consider (14) from chapter 4, repeated here as (3). 
(3) If you pass the exam, I’ll take you to a restaurant.  
Let us imagine a scenario – scenario (i) – on which the speaker of (3) is an over-
indulgent grandmother of the hearer. In scenario (i), the hearer stores memory records 
of grandma promising q if p, where p corresponds to a successfully completed task (by 
the hearer or other member of his family) and q is a promised treat for p. Crucially, the 
hearer stores memory records of non-completion of a given task followed by the 
occurrence of treat. Put simply, due to grandma’s tendency for over-indulgence, the 
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hearer remembers occasions on which q was T even though p was F. Thus, in scenario 
(i), the product of personal commonality assessment is likely to dictate to the hearer that 
he can make no assumptions as to what will happen if he fails the exam. In other words, 
the hearer is likely to interpret the indulgent grandma as communicating that from the 
truth of p the truth of q will follow, and no more than that. On this interpretation of (3), 
the grandmother is not taken to have communicated anything about what she will do if 
the hearer fails the exam and thus it would not be surprising for the hearer to ask ‘What 
if I don’t pass the exam?’. This interpretation is modelled by MI; in particular, it 
involves the inference of Modus Ponens (MP) which is licensed by MI. I will refer to 
such an interpretation as the WEAK interpretation of conditionals.  
Indeed, if the indulgent grandma wanted to communicate and be taken to 
communicate that q iff p, the product of commonality assessment would most probably 
dictate to her that the form in (3) with an unmarked intonation pattern would not be 
sufficient to communicate that q iff p to this particular interlocutor. Thus, if the 
indulgent grandma wanted to communicate to her grandson that q iff p, she would be 
likely to put stress on if. Putting the stress on if would have the (intended) effect of 
making the shared background assumptions – that is, the assumptions about the 
grandma’s tendency for over-indulgence – irrelevant to this particular conversation. 
Alternatively, the indulgent grandma could use the more specific (4) to successfully 
communicate that q iff p.  
(4) If you pass the exam, I’ll take you to a restaurant but if you don’t, I won’t. 
Thus, it is the utterance of (3) (with an unmarked intonation pattern), combined with the 
fact that it is uttered by a particular interlocutor (the hearer’s grandma who is known to 
the hearer to be over-indulgent) which give rise to the weak interpretation. Similarly, 
the grandma’s assumption that the form in (3) uttered with unmarked intonation is not 
sufficient to communicate that q iff p arises due to her assumption of common ground 
with this particular hearer.   
However, it is also plausible to imagine a scenario – scenario (ii) – in which the 
speaker of (3) is the very strict father of the hearer. As in (i), so here, the utterance of (3) 
combined with the fact that it is uttered by the strict father of the hearer function as cues 
to activate records of relevant past experiences. In (ii), the hearer stores memory records 
of the father promising q (a treat) if p (an undertaking is successful) and also of 
consistent cause-effect associations between unsuccessful undertakings and ensuing 
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lack of treat. Given such commonality assessment, in scenario (ii), the hearer of (3) is 
likely to interpret his father as communicating that q iff p.  
It is plausible to argue that given the personal commonality assessment relevant 
to scenario (ii), choosing a more precise form such as (4) above to communicate that q 
iff p would simply be redundant. Indeed, given the shared assumptions about the 
father’s strictness, it would be unlikely for the hearer to ask ‘What if I don’t pass the 
exam?’.  
The strict father scenario interpretation is modelled by equivalence; in particular, 
it involves the inference of Denying the Antecedent (DA) which is licensed by 
equivalence, but blocked by MI. I will refer to such an interpretation as the STRONG 
interpretation of conditionals.     
So far, I have argued that conditional promises do not invariably involve the 
weak interpretation. But do conditional threats invariably involve the strong 
interpretation, as suggested by Beller’s (2002) study? Consider (15) from chapter 4, 
repeated here as (5). 
(5) If you do something illegal again, we’ll lock you up. 
Let us imagine a scenario in which the speaker of (5) is a police officer in a lawful state. 
Horton & Gerrig’s (2005) account allows us to explain why it is possible to successfully 
communicate that q iff p by uttering (5). In the scenario where the speaker is a police 
officer in a lawful state and the hearer is a member of that state, the communal 
commonality assessment is likely to yield the assumption in the speaker’s mind that the 
hearer shares with the speaker similar assumptions about legal aspects of social order. 
Presumably, the shared assumptions about the social order include the assumptions 
about what the speaker is permitted to do in a situation when p of a conditional threat is 
F, i.e. the assumption that with threats there is no social/legal consent for the speaker to 
make q T when p is F. Indeed, it would seem rather odd for the hearer of (5) to respond 
to the utterance of (5) with the question ‘What if I don’t steal again?’; the contextual 
assumptions about the legal aspects of social order in a lawful state are such that the 
succinct form of (5) to communicate that q iff p is informative enough. 
However, it is not implausible to assume that conditional threats may receive a 
weak interpretation. Consider a scenario in which Anna and Mary are at the party. Anna 
is very irritated because she has just been verbally offended by Mark. She says to Mary:  
(6) If he talks to me like that again, I’ll tell him what I really think about him. 
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Anna has just threatened that if p is T then q will be T, but has made no undertaking that 
if not p then not q. Indeed, even though it is plausible to interpret (6) as a threat, it is not 
clear that Anna could be judged to have spoken falsely if p is F and q T – if, for 
example, Mark offends someone else at the party or Anna gets sufficiently drunk. In 
fact, given that Anna has been verbally offended by Mark, she is permitted to make q T 
in the absence of p, i.e. in the absence of further offence by Mark.
3
 The difference 
between (5) and (6) is brought about by the difference in the nature and social context of 
the threat. Whereas the social context of the threat in (5) is legally limited, the one in (6) 
is not. Thus, whereas the product of communal commonality assessment will constrain 
the interpretation of (5) to iff, there is nothing in the (cognitive) context of (6) to place 
such a constraint.  
As discussed in 4.1.2.4 and in this section, the strong (i.e. biconditional) 
interpretation of conditionals is not limited to any homogenous group of examples: 
conditional promises, threats, injunctions and universal conditionals can all receive a 
weak or strong interpretation.
4
 We have seen that Smith & Smith (1988) argue for a 
relevance theoretic explanation of the strong interpretation; because the uttering of “p”, 
like any utterance, carries with it a presumption of its relevance, the speaker assumes 
that the hearer will be in position to assume that p is relevant in the context of q.  
However, I argue that this account of Smith & Smith’s (1988) is actually too 
general to explain the difference between the weak and the strong interpretations. The 
problem for Smith & Smith is that p is relevant to q even on the weak interpretation. It 
must be relevant if we assume that this interpretation involves the MP inference; if p 
were not relevant to q on the weak interpretation, how could we ever infer that the 
speaker has communicated that from the truth of p the truth of q will follow? Consider 
also (10) from chapter 4, repeated here as (7). 
(7) If Tom can drive a truck, then I am Mickey Mouse. 
                                                          
3
 Beller’s (2002) study is important as it shows a significant difference between the interpretation of 
conditional threats and promises. However, it has a shortcoming – due to the artificial setting of Beller’s 
experiment, his study could not possibly show the fine-graininess of conditional inducement 
interpretation. Because Beller’s subjects were interpreting written conditional statements, no relevant 
assumptions about the interlocutors could be made and thus no interlocutor specific assumptions could 
place immediate constraints on the interpretation of inducements.  
4
 Arguably, the product of personal commonality assessment influences the interpretation of conditional 
inducements more than it does the interpretation of universal conditionals. As discussed in 4.2.2.4, 
whether a universal conditional receives, and is indented to receive, a weak or strong interpretation 
depends on the cogniser’s (so-called ‘encyclopaedic’) knowledge. It seems that because conditional 
inducements are used to influence the hearer’s behaviour, the information about interlocutors is highly 
salient in this context and thus the personal commonality assessment is crucially involved in message 
formation and interpretation. However, what universal conditionals, conditional inducements and 
injunctions have in common is that their interpretation goes through a holistic belief system. 
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Example (7) involves the weak interpretation – the speaker is communicating that from 
the patent falsity of q, the falsity of p follows. Again, in contrast to what follows from 
Smith & Smith’s argument, it is not plausible to assume that because (7) does not 
involve the strong interpretation, q is irrelevant to p. Clearly, (7) involves an invitation 
to perform MT; the speaker is communicating that the falsity of q is relevant to what 
she thinks the truth value of p is. But how could the hearer perform MT without 
assuming that because the speaker has uttered “q” in the context of p, the falsity of q 
must be relevant to what the speaker is communicating about p? The difference between 
the strong and weak interpretations, I conclude, cannot consist in the difference in the 
relevance of p to q or lack of it (or in the relevance of q to p or lack of it). If, as Smith & 
Smith argue, the strong interpretation is due to the relevance of the fact that the speaker 
has uttered “p”, all conditionals would receive a strong interpretation. But they do not.  
At issue here is not the question of whether p is relevant to q (any utterance will 
convey the assumption of its own relevance, as argued in RT), but whether p is relevant 
to q in a way which allows us to perform inferences licensed by MI or those licensed by 
equivalence.  
As argued in this section, what sort of inferences we make, and are assumed to 
be able to make, will depend on the (cognitive) context, including the assumption of 
common ground (as in the over-indulgent grandma and strict father scenarios). Unlike 
earlier approaches to the interpretation of conditionals, a radically contextualist, wholly 
pragmatic approach defended in this thesis is able to explain the holistic (cognitive) 
contextual conditions under which the strong and the weak interpretations of conditional 
statements arise.  
5.2 Basic and extended uses 
In this section, I discus a distinction between basic and extended uses of conditionals. 
On basic uses of conditionals, if signals that there is some relation between two 
propositions in a given cognitive context, whereas on extended uses, if signals that there 
is a relation between a proposition and an utterance (or speech act). However, before I 
say more about this distinction, I explain why van der Auwera’s (1985) and Sweetser’s 
(1990) sufficient conditionality approach, as well as Relevance Theory’s notion of 
procedural semantics, are inadequate to handle the variation found in the interpretation 
of conditionals.   
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5.2.1 A digression on sufficient conditionality and procedural ‘meaning’ 
In 5.1.2, I argued, in contrast to Smith & Smith (1988), that the notion of relevance of p 
to q is not distinctive of the strong interpretation of conditionals. Indeed, any use of if p, 
q signifies that p and q are relevant to each other in some way or another. One way of 
thinking about the relevance of p to q is in terms of the notion of sufficient 
conditionality, which was first proposed by van der Auwera (1985) and later developed 
by Sweetser (1990).  
5.2.1.1 Sufficient conditionality 
Van der Auwera (1985) puts forward the Sufficient Conditionality Thesis, where it is 
argued that if is a modal operator, requiring some consequential relation – the 
sufficiency condition – to hold between p and q for if p, q to be T. For van der Auwera, 
the sufficiency condition constitutes the encoded non-truth-functional semantics of if.  
 Sweetser (1990) argues that van der Auwera’s sufficient conditionality 
approach can be maintained as long as it is recognised that conditionality operates in 
three distinct cognitive domains: the content domain, the epistemic domain and the 
speech act domain. In the content domain, one state of affairs (p) is a sufficient 
condition for the occurrence of another (q). In the epistemic domain, a given premise (p) 
is a sufficient condition to derive a conclusion (q). In the speech act domain, p is a 
sufficient condition for the speech act made in uttering “q”. However, there are 
problems with the sufficient conditionality account. Consider (23) from chapter 4, 
repeated below as (8). 
(8)   A: Two and eleven makes thirty. 
  B: If two and eleven makes thirty, you need more work on maths. 
Noh (2000) argues – rightly, I think – that the conditional in (8B) cannot be explained in 
terms of sufficient conditionality. In the content domain, it cannot be argued that the 
truth of the antecedent is sufficient for the truth of the consequent because the 
antecedent is obviously false. The problem also arises in the epistemic and speech act 
domains – the truth of the antecedent cannot be sufficient for concluding or asserting 
(respectively) that the referent of you needs more work on maths because the antecedent 
is false. This shows that sufficient conditionality is not the unitary non-truth-functional 
aspect of the encoded semantics of if (contrary to what van der Auwera and Sweetser 
argue).  
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 Indeed, in some instances of ‘conditional’ suggestions/advice, the antecedent 
clearly is not a condition on q. For example, in chapter 4, I gave example (21) (If you 
want to make your parents happy, quit smoking) and argued that the antecedent in (21) 
does not represent a condition on the consequent. Rather, the antecedent represents a 
(given) goal, which is embedded in the opaque context represented by want (suggesting 
that the truth of p is desired by the speaker). This goal, it is suggested by the speaker of 
(21), can be accomplished by means of q. In fact, if there is conditionality here, it runs 
in the opposite direction – in (21), it is q which represents a condition for the 
achievement of the goal in p! I return to this point shortly.  
 The second problem pertains to the fact that van der Auwera’s (1985) sufficient 
conditionality account is a non-truth-functional account of the encoded semantics of if. 
As noted in 4.2.1 (footnote 12), non-truth-functional approaches, like truth-functional 
approaches, make no prediction as to the truth value of the consequent when the 
antecedent is F ([p ├ (pq)]). Consequently, the problem of conditional belief 
deviations from MI arises for van der Auwera’s account just as it does for truth-
functional approaches. For this reason, it cannot be maintained. 
Furthermore, as shown in 4.2.2.5, Noh’s (2000) metarepresentational MI 
analysis of (8B) is also problematic: it gives rise to the problem of pragmatic intrusion 
into encoded semantics, it undermines the theoretical significance of the notion of 
metarepresentation and, because of Noh’s focus on metarepresentational faithfulness, it 
fails to acknowledge the relevance of the falsity of p to the truth of q. Clearly, another 
account in needed. 
5.2.1.2 Procedural ‘meaning’ 
In the preceding chapters, I provided many arguments against the notion of encoded 
semantics, in general, and encoded semantics of if, in particular. However, I need to 
return to this issue once more.  
 In Relevance Theory (e.g. Carston 2002, 2010), words encode concept 
schemas, full-fledged lexical concepts (as discussed in chapter 2) or procedural 
‘meanings’. These procedural ‘meanings’ are not concepts. Rather, they are constraints 
on pragmatic inference, i.e. they are processing instructions (Blakemore 1992). 
Consider (9), taken from Blakemore. 
(9) (a) John can open Bill’s safe. (b) He knows the combination. 
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Faced with (9), the hearer may not know how to process the relation between the 
propositions communicated by (9a) and (9b); there is no way of telling whether (a) is a 
premise and (b) a conclusion, or the other way round. If the speaker of (9) wanted to 
communicate that (a) is a premise and (b) a conclusion, she would use so in order to 
save the hearer the processing effort. Conversely, if the speaker of (9) wanted to 
communicate that (b) is a premise and (a) a conclusion, she would use after all.  
 Relevance Theory argues that, among other expressions, discourse markers (of 
which so and after all are examples) encode procedural information. Accordingly, so 
and after all encode instructions to the hearer on how to process the relation between 
the propositions communicated by (a) and (b). In other words, they specify the way in 
which (a) and (b) are relevant to each other. The question that needs to be explored is 
whether it can be argued that if encodes a procedure of that sort. 
 Hussein (2008: 77-78), working in Relevance Theory, makes a distinction 
between REAL conditionals and METAREPRESENTATIONAL conditionals. Hussein’s (2008) 
metarepresentational category parallels Sweetser’s speech act domain. His real 
conditional category subsumes uses in the content as well as the cognitive domain.
5
 On 
real conditional uses, the word if operates at a representational (i.e. propositional) level 
where it relates two propositions. According to Hussein (2008, 2009), real conditional if 
semantically encodes MI plus some non-truth-functional causal-consequential relation.  
 On metarepresentational uses, however, if does not relate two propositions but is 
used to introduce a reason for uttering “q”. The interpretation of metarepresentational 
use is, according to Hussein (2008), independent of MI; here, Hussein (2008: 78) 
argues, ‘if does not contribute to the semantic representation of the conditional but plays 
a role in the inferential part of the conditional interpretation by constraining the 
relevance of the second clause’.  
Now, Hussein’s claim that real conditional if semantically encodes MI cannot be 
maintained for the reasons discussed in chapter 4. But could Hussein’s claim that 
metarepresentational if encodes a procedural constraint on the ‘relevance of the second 
clause’ be maintained and perhaps extended to real conditionals? Consider (10). 
(10) John can open Bill’s safe, so he knows the combination. 
As discussed earlier, on RT’s account, so encodes an instruction to process what 
precedes it as a premise and what follows as a conclusion. Thus, in (10), knowing that 
                                                          
5
 Noh (2000) also argues that Sweetser’s content and epistemic domains fall under one category of 
descriptive uses (as opposed to metarepresentational uses).  
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John can open Bill’s safe allows the speaker to conclude that John knows the 
combination. Consider now (11). 
(11) If John can open Bill’s safe, he knows the combination. 
When interpreted as operating in the epistemic domain, it could be argued that, parallel 
to the use of so in (10), the use of if in (11) instructs the hearer to process p a premise on 
the basis of which the conclusion q can be drawn. However, the problem with this 
assumption is that it makes the encoded semantics of if and so identical. Notice that 
invoking some encoded non-truth-functional causal-consequential relation (e.g. 
sufficient conditionality) would not save such an argument either, as causal-
consequential (more specifically, inferential) relation is present in both (10) and (11).
6
  
 Furthermore, the nature of the purportedly encoded instruction would vary 
depending on the context. Thus, in (11) above, if would have to instruct the hearer to 
treat p as a premise and q as a conclusion. But in (7) (If Tom can drive a truck, then I 
am Mickey Mouse), if would have to instruct the hearer to treat q as a premise and p as a 
conclusion. In (5) (If you do something illegal again, we’ll lock you up), the instruction 
would be to treat p as a cause and q as effect (on the content domain interpretation). 
However, as argued earlier, the speaker of (21) (If you want to make your parents 
happy, quit smoking) suggests that the goal represented in p can be caused by q. 
Consider also (12), taken from Comrie (1986).  
(12) If it will amuse you, I’ll tell you a joke. 
Comrie (1986: 81) observes that in (12), the causal relation holds in both directions – 
my telling a joke (q) is the cause of you being amused (p), but also the hearer’s future 
amusement (p) is the cause for the speaker telling the joke (q).  
Now, if the inferential (i.e. premise-conclusion) relation can hold in any 
direction, as illustrated by (11) and (7), and if the causal relation can hold in both 
directions, as in (12), if would have to encode a very general procedure. To complicate 
things yet further, there are also speech-act domain uses. Consider (13), taken from 
Hussein (2008). 
                                                          
6
 As observed by Strawson (1986), p and q are not asserted in ‘if p … q’, but they are asserted in ‘p so q’. 
However, as we have seen (section 4.2.2.5), some uses of ‘if p …q’ involve assertion. For example, in 
(39) (If you’re thirsty, there’s beer in the fridge), q is asserted. Arguably (and depending on the definition 
of assertion, see e.g. MacFarlane 2010), the truth of p in (21) (If you want to make your parents happy, 
quit smoking) is as non-debatable (i.e. taken for granted, in common ground) as is the truth of ‘John can 
open Bill’s safe’ in (10). Of course, the truth of p in (21) is non-debatable on the interpretation where p is 
interpreted as a goal to which q is a means (i.e. when p is the topic). I return to this point in 5.2.2.2.  
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(13) If you are thirsty, there is a lemon juice in the fridge. 
If in (13) is treated by Hussein (2008: 78) as encoding a procedural instruction to 
constrain the relevance of the second clause. According to Hussein, in (13), the fact that 
there is lemon juice in the fridge is relevant to the person referred to in the if-clause, but 
no inferential or causal-consequential relation holds between the propositions expressed 
by p and q in any direction.
7
  
 Because of the variation in the ways in which p and q can be relevant to each 
other, if if encoded some procedural ‘meaning’, it could only be an instruction to the 
hearer that p and q are relevant to each other in some way or another. However, given 
that relevance is a pragmatic (cognitive) notion, no such instruction can be semantically 
encoded without undermining the claim that encoded semantics is autonomous with 
respect to pragmatics. Indeed, since in RT, every utterance carries with it a presumption 
of its own relevance and since relevance is established in context, encoding such an 
instruction would simply be redundant.  
 To conclude this section, I have argued that neither the sufficient conditionality 
approach nor the notion of procedural semantics is able to handle the variation 
concerning the relevance of p to q.
8
 
5.2.2 Basic uses 
Modulo differences (discussed above), it seems to me that Hussein’s (2008) two-fold 
distinction – between if which relates two propositions and if which relates a proposition 
with an utterance – is on the right track. Accordingly, I will employ the term BASIC USE 
for cases where if is used to communicate that there is some relation (on which below) 
between two propositions (p, q). I will employ the term EXTENDED USE for cases where 
if is used to communicate that there is some relation (on which below) between a 
proposition p, and the utterance of “q”. In the remainder of this section, I discuss basic 
uses. 
                                                          
7
 From the hearer’s thirst it cannot be concluded that there is lemon juice in the fridge (by MP), nor would 
it follow (by MT) that if there is no juice in the fridge, then the hearer is not thirsty. The hearer’s thirst is 
not a cause or reason for the presence of the juice in the fridge, nor is the absence of the juice in the fridge 
a cause or reason for the absence of hearer’s thirst. 
8
 A procedural account can be saved as long as it does not involve commitment to encoding. That is, it 
can be saved as long as procedures are understood as emerging from the interaction between primary and 
secondary memory systems (in the sense of Hintzman 1986) and defined in terms of acquiring a relation 
between a morpho-phonetic label and an aggregate of conceptual structures. On this view, a procedure 
equals a (representational) convention, as defined in 2.2.3.4. However, I prefer to use the term 
‘convention’ to stress my rejection of encoding.  
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5.2.2.1 Basic uses and holistic inference 
I argue that in its basic use, if serves to indicate that p and q are relevant to each other so 
that it will be possible to infer the truth value of one with respect to the other. In line 
with the arguments presented in chapter 4, I will show that the establishing of the truth 
value of q with respect to p or p with respect to q always goes through in a holistic 
system of thought. I will show that the establishing of the truth value of one proposition 
with respect to the other is sometimes modelled by MI, sometimes by equivalence, and 
sometimes determined by other factors. Consider (9) from chapter 4, repeated here as 
(14). 
(14) If it’s a square, it has four sides. 
The interpretation of (14) is modelled by MI – it allows the hearer to perform MP and 
MT, but not DA or AC. However, the fact that (14) is modelled by MI (and that we 
reject the validity of DA and AC) relies on a holistic inference – in order to know what 
inferences can and cannot be performed in the case of (14), one needs to know that 
rectangles too have four sides. It is in virtue of this premise, which is held in the holistic 
belief system, that the hearer of (14) can establish that the truth of p is relevant to the 
truth of q so that the truth of q follows from the truth of p, but not vice versa, and that 
the falsity of q is relevant to the falsity of p so that the falsity of p follows from the 
falsity of q, but not vice versa. Consider also example (15) (due to Noel Burton-
Roberts). 
(15) I can’t exactly remember the shape of the figure that John drew, but if it wasn’t 
a square, it was certainly a triangle. 
MI falsely predicts that if it actually was a square (antecedent is F), then we can make 
no inference – in the light of (15) – as to whether the figure was a triangle or not. But 
what the speaker of (15) is committing herself to is that from the falsity of p in (15), the 
falsity of q follows. That is, what the speaker is communicating in (15) is modelled by 
equivalence (DA). As above, in order to know what inferences can and cannot be 
performed in the case of (15), one needs to know that nothing can be both a square and 
triangle. It is in virtue of this premise, which is held at the holistic level – and in the 
light of (15), which restricts the options to either a triangle or a square – that the hearer 
can establish that in the case of (15): the truth of p is relevant to the truth of q so that the 
truth of q follows from the truth of p, and vice versa, and that the falsity of q is relevant 
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to the falsity of p so that the falsity of p follows from the falsity of q, and vice versa. 
Thus, as was the case in (14), the inferential process triggered by the utterance of (15), 
takes place in a holistic domain of thought. Indeed, the correctness of the inferential 
process depends on its taking place in a holistic domain. Let us now re-consider (8). 
(8)   A: Two and eleven makes thirty. 
  B: If two and eleven makes thirty, you need more work on maths. 
Arguably, (8B) can be analysed in three ways – (a) as representing the speaker’s train of 
reasoning (reaching a conclusion q), (b) as communicating that p is F, or (c) as 
suggesting that the hearer makes q T. On interpretation (a), from A’s utterance and two 
premises: (i) that A believes x (a mathematical belief that two eleven makes thirty) is T 
and (ii) that x is F, B draws a conclusion (iii) that A needs more work on maths.
9
 But the 
second premise (ii) holds in holistic thought (in fact, both premises do). Thus, the 
inference from A’s utterance to the conclusion (iii) must go through the holistic system; 
indeed, the plausibility of conclusion (iii) crucially depends on this holistic premise 
(ii).
10
  
  On interpretation (b), (8B) is used to communicate that two and eleven does 
not make thirty, i.e. that p is F. Presumably, A needs to somehow infer that p is F from 
the utterance of (8B) and the assumption that B’s conclusion (q) is T. This inference 
clearly is not licensed by MI or equivalence. However, it can be explained once it is 
acknowledged that it goes through in the holistic system of thought; from three 
assumptions – (iv) that q is T, (v) that one needs more work on maths if one does not 
have mathematical knowledge which is relevant in the current context, and (vi) that the 
relevant mathematical knowledge concerns A’s belief that two and eleven makes thirty, 
A can infer that B communicates that A’s belief that two and eleven makes thirty is 
actually F.  
 Interpretation (c) seems to depend on (b). Notice that if (8B) is to be 
interpreted as a suggestion that A needs more work on maths, the falsity of A’s belief 
that two and eleven makes thirty needs to be assumed (acknowledged). If (8B) suggests 
anything, it suggests a means to resolve what B perceives as a contradiction – i.e. A’s F 
                                                          
9
 More specifically, from the premises (i) and (ii), B concludes that (i+ii) A holds a false belief. It is the 
conclusion (i+ii), which serves as a premise in the inference to (iii).    
10
 As discussed in chapter 4, Noh’s metarepresentational MI analysis of (8) fails to acknowledge that the 
faithfulness of the metarepresentational antecedent to what it metarepresents is NOT a reason for 
concluding that A needs more work on maths. Indeed, it is the falsity of what A represented in (8A), 
which is the reason. Thus, neither a metarepresentational MI analysis nor a descriptive level MI analysis 
can be maintained. The relation between p and q in (8B) is much more fine-grained. 
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belief that what is F is T. Indeed, I suggest that it is the logically driven need for the 
resolution of (perceived) contradiction – which is perceived in virtue of (iv), (v) and (vi) 
– which explains why the falsity of p in (8B) can be inferred and thus communicated. 
 Relatedly, the use of if in the context of A’s utterance in (8) indicates that the 
truth value of p is at stake here – it communicates that, contrary to what A 
suggests/argues, the truth of the proposition communicated in (8A) should not be taken 
for granted. Notice that, if in (8B) cannot be exchanged with given that, which would 
indicate that that the truth of the proposition communicated in (8A) was taken for 
granted. Incidentally, given that could only be used if followed by you believe. This is 
because the addition of you believe would indicate that B is not committed to the truth 
of the proposition communicated in (8A) – the use of if seems a more succinct way to 
achieve the same communicative goal in this example. Consider (7) again, repeated 
below. 
(7) If Tom can drive a truck, then I am Mickey Mouse. 
Earlier, I suggested that (7) involves an invitation to perform MT (licensed by MI), i.e. 
to infer from the patent falsity of q that the speaker believes p is F. Now, the most 
probable occurrence of (7) is in the context of a response to a previous utterance, as in 
(16). 
(16) A: Tom says he can drive a truck. 
  B: If Tom can drive a truck, then I am Mickey Mouse. 
As was the case with (8B), so in (16B), the use of if signifies that B does not take for 
granted the truth value of the proposition communicated in (16A). By representing a 
patently F proposition in q – i.e. a proposition whose truth value is manifest – B is 
unambiguously inviting A to infer that B thinks p is F. Indeed, if (16B) is preceded by 
B’s laughter in response to A’s utterance, or if B utters the if-clause with the falling 
intonation (which indicates A’s disbelief in Tom’s ability), there is nothing in the 
context that prevents A from assuming that B thinks p is F. This assumption of A is then 
confirmed by the utterance of the second clause. Now, MP can also be performed in the 
case of (16B) – if you believe that Tom can drive a truck (p is T), you must believe that 
I am Mickey Mouse (q is T). However, because the falsity of q is patent, the assumption 
that B is inviting the hearer to establish the truth value of q with respect to p gives rise 
to a contradiction. This contradiction is resolved when the hearer realises that the 
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speaker’s communicative intention is for A to infer the truth value of p with respect to 
the falsity of q.  
 Crucially, in order to know that the hearer is being invited to perform MT, the 
hearer must consult his (‘encyclopaedic’) knowledge to establish that q is F. Thus, the 
inference to the falsity of p must go through in the holistic system of thought. Indeed, 
the inferring of the falsity of p via MT (rather than by way of contradiction resolution as 
in (8B) If two and eleven makes thirty, you need more work on maths) is a result of a 
holistic interpretive process. Consider also (32) and (21) from chapter 4, repeated here 
as (17) and (18), respectively. 
(17) If you press the red button, the conveyor belt will stop. 
(18) If you want to make your parents happy, quit smoking. 
As argued in chapter 4, (17) is a conditional instruction on what the hearer should do 
(i.e. he should make p T) to make q T. I suggested that this interpretation is not 
modelled by MI because according to MI, it does not matter whether p is T or F as long 
as q is T (because q ├ (pq)). The problem is that if (17) is to be understood as an 
instruction on what the hearer should do to make q T, the context of (17) must exclude a 
situation where there is a power cut (etc.) and the belt has stopped, as in such a situation 
there would be no point instructing the hearer on what to do to stop it. The (cognitive) 
context of (17) must be limited to the action that is supposed to be performed by the 
hearer. Thus, the assumption that the relation between the truth values of p and q in (17) 
is modelled by equivalence follows from the contextual limitation to the action 
performed by the hearer, which, in turn, depends on (17) being an instruction.   
 In chapter 4, I also argued that the antecedent of (18) does not represent a 
condition on the consequent but a goal which is embedded in the propositional attitude 
represented by want (suggesting that the truth of the embedded proposition is desired by 
the speaker). Accordingly, (18) is used to suggest that the truth of the proposition 
embedded in p (the truth which is desired by the hearer), can be accomplished by means 
of making q T. Notice that the truth of p cannot be debatable on the assumption that the 
speaker utters (18) because she knows that p is T (p is the topic). But how is this 
intended interpretation – that the truth of the proposition embedded in p will follow 
from the truth of q – arrived at? The fact that it can be communicated (and inferred) that 
the truth of the proposition embedded in p will follow from the truth of q suggests that 
this inference is modelled by equivalence (the inference is AC). Indeed, to perform AC, 
in the speaker’s (hearer’s) mind, the proposition (about the state of affairs) that the 
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hearer’s parents are unhappy (H) and the proposition (about the state of affairs) that 
the hearer smokes (S) must be logically equivalent. Because these propositions are 
equivalent in the speaker’s (hearer’s) mind, the only way to make (H) false (i.e. to 
make (H) true) – which the hearer wants – is to make (S) false. Thus, (i) the equivalence 
relation between (H) and (S) – which can only be held in holistic thought – and (ii) the 
assumption that the hearer wants to make (H) false (also held in holistic thought), 
allow to communicate (and infer) that the truth of (S) will result in the truth of (H).  
 So far, I have argued that in its basic use – i.e. where it signifies a relation 
between two propositions – if serves to indicate that p and q are relevant to each other 
so that it will be possible to infer the truth value of one with respect to the other. I have 
sought to show that the establishing of the truth value of one proposition with respect to 
the other always goes through in the holistic system of thought. Depending on a holistic 
interpretive process, the establishing of the truth value of one proposition with respect 
to the other is sometimes modelled by MI – as in (14) and (16B); sometimes by 
equivalence – as in (15), (17) and (18); and sometimes by the logically motivated need 
for the resolution of a perceived contradiction – as in (8B).    
5.2.2.2 A note on directionality of inference 
There is one more comment that needs to be made with regards to the variation found in 
the basic uses of if. Now, I have been arguing that if serves to indicate that p and q are 
relevant to each other so that it will be possible to infer the truth value of one, i.e. ANY 
one, with respect to the other. If I am right in arguing that, we should be able to find 
cases where the truth values of both propositions are open and thus mutually relative. 
However, we should also be able to find examples where the truth value of q is taken 
for granted (and serves as a premise), and the truth value of p is inferred on that basis. 
Conversely, we should also be able to find examples where the truth value of p is taken 
for granted (and serves as a premise), and the truth value of q is inferred on that basis. If 
true, this prediction would be in contrast to Strawson (1986), who argues that, in ‘if p … 
q’, p and q are not asserted (see fn 6), and to Grice (1989), for whom it would not be 
rational to use a conditional where, for example, there is no doubt about the truth of p 
(see Chapman 2005: 108).   
 My prediction, I argue, is borne out. Accordingly, in (16B) (If Tom can drive a 
truck, then I am Mickey Mouse), the truth value of p is established with respect to the 
patent falsity of q; and in (8) (If two and eleven makes thirty, you need more work on 
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maths), the truth value of p is established with respect to the assumed truth of q (on 
interpretation b). Conversely, in a context where (14) (If it’s a square, it has four sides) 
is uttered as a judgemental response to the question ‘How many sides does this square 
have?’, the truth value of q is established with respect to the assumed truth of p. The 
same obtains for (19), which does not involve a judgemental reaction.  
(19) A: A ten pence coin fits through that slot. 
  B: If a ten pence coin fits through that slot, a five pence coin will fit through   
that slot.  
Let us assume that B knows that A has empirically confirmed that a ten pence coin fits 
through the relevant slot. In this context, we can assume that A has truly communicated 
that a ten pence coin fits through that slot and that p in (19B) is non-debatably taken as 
T. Thus, the truth value of q can be established with respect to the empirically 
confirmed (and contextually given) truth value of p via MP. Similarly, in the case of 
example (11) from chapter 4 (If two plus two equals four, then my client is innocent), 
the truth value of q is established with respect to the patent truth of p. 
 However, in the context of (15) (I can’t exactly remember the shape of the 
figure that John drew, but if it wasn’t a square, it was certainly a triangle), it is 
manifest that the truth value of neither proposition is to be taken for granted, but 
because p and q represent the only two options, their truth values, which are relative 
with respect to one another, can be calculated as predicted by equivalence. The truth 
values are also open in (17) (If you press the red button, the conveyor belt will stop) and 
the calculation of relative truth values proceeds as predicted by equivalence. 
Incidentally, both truth values are open in (14) (If it’s a square, it has four sides) if it is 
said of an unseen geometric figure (i.e. a figure hidden in a box). However, because of 
the hearer’s knowledge that other figures can have four sides, the calculation of relative 
truth values proceeds as predicted by MI.  
5.2.3 Extended uses 
In extended use, if is used to communicate that there is some relation between a 
proposition p, and the utterance of “q”. Consider (39) from chapter 4, repeated here as 
(20).  
(20) If you’re thirsty, there’s beer in the fridge. 
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An extended use analysis of (20) is simpler and less problematic than Noh’s 
metarepresentational analysis (discussed in chapter 4). On an extended use analysis, the 
relation of relevance holds between the proposition/thought communicated by p and the 
uttering of “q” (or the speech act of informing the hearer that there is beer in the fridge). 
This correctly predicts that p is used to communicate a reason for the uttering of “q” – p 
explains why the speaker is bothering to utter “q”, without undermining the theoretical 
significance of the notion of metarepresentation (as was the case with Noh’s account). 
Notice that the extended use analysis explains why there is no truth-functional relation 
involved here, i.e. why the truth of p is independent of the truth of q and vice versa. 
Even though a conditional form is used, there can be no truth-functional relation here 
because utterances (and speech acts) are not propositional objects. It is thus the lack of 
truth-functional relation between p and q – which is due to the relation holding between 
a proposition and an utterance (speech act) – which makes extended uses different from 
basic uses.
11
 Consider also (21).   
(21) If you’re thinking of ordering drinks, I’ve already ordered them. 
Similarly to (20), in (21), p is used to communicate the reason for uttering “q” (or the 
speech act of informing the hearer that the speaker has already ordered drinks). The 
reason why the speaker is informing the hearer that the speaker has already ordered 
drinks is that the speaker thinks the hearer may be thinking of ordering drinks, and thus 
the uttering of “q” will be relevant, as it will save the hearer an unnecessary trip to the 
bar. As in (20), so here, the truth value of p is independent of the truth value of q, and 
vice versa, because the relation of relevance holds between a proposition and an 
utterance (speech act). In the remainder of this section, I defend the extended use 
analysis presented here against Sweetser’s sufficient conditionality speech-act analysis.  
5.2.3.1 Sweetser’s speech-act analysis versus extended use analysis 
Consider (22), taken from Sweetser (1990). 
(22) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them. 
                                                          
11
 If there is conditionality here, it is the relevance of the speaker’s utterance of “q” which seems to be 
conditional on p. But this conditionality is not modelled by MI as it concerns the relation between a 
propositional object and a non-propositional object (i.e. an utterance). This view is better than Noh’s 
(2000) metarepresentation proposal, which undermines the theoretical significance of the notion of 
metarepresentation (as argued in 4.2.2.5).    
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According to Sweetser (1990: 119-122), (22) lends itself to the sufficient conditionality 
analysis at the level of a speech act. Sweetser (ibid.) argues that in the speech act 
domain, the speech act is conditional upon what is represented in the antecedent. Thus, 
in (22) the offer of biscuits is conditional upon its potential acceptability to the hearer; 
in Sweetser’s terms, a conditional speech-act structure for utterances like (22) is ‘I 
hereby offer X, if X is a felicitous offer’. The problem with this analysis is discernible 
in the following quote from Sweetser: 
Quote 1: The major felicity condition for an offer is (as mentioned above) that 
the speaker assumes the hearer to want the thing offered. An offer is therefore 
infelicitous (or even irrelevant, in Gricean terms) if it fails in fact to respond to a 
desire or need on the part of the addressee. (Sweetser 1990: 122) 
 
Whereas I agree with the first part of the above quote – that the speaker’s assumption of 
the hearer’s needs is a felicity condition (the weaker characterisation), I disagree with 
the second one – that the assumption’s compatibility with the actual need of the hearer 
is a felicity condition (the stronger characterisation).  
Given the stronger characterisation of the felicity condition in the second part of 
the quote, the offer in (22) must be infelicitous if the hearer does not actually want the 
biscuits, i.e. if the speaker of (22) has misinterpreted the hearer’s needs. However, the 
problem with the predictions that Sweetser’s analysis of (22) makes is that the offer in 
(22) simply has been made – and the relevance of “q” to p has been communicated – 
regardless of whether the hearer does or does not actually want the biscuits.
12
 In other 
words, the performance of the speech act simply is not conditional upon the truth of p 
(its faithfulness to the actual needs of the hearer), but on the speaker’s assumption that 
the hearer may want the biscuits (the weaker characterisation).  
The extended use analysis offers a simpler solution to (22). Like in (20), so in 
(22), p communicates the speaker’s reason for uttering “q” (or for the speech act of 
informing the hearer that there are biscuits on the sideboard). There is no truth-
functional relation between there being biscuits on the sideboard and the hearer wanting 
them (the biscuits are there regardless of whether the hearer wants them or not), but the 
speaker finds the presence of the biscuits potentially relevant to the hearer. Indeed, the 
                                                          
12
 Austin (1975) makes a distinction between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary forces of a 
speech act. A locutionary act is the act of uttering something. An illocutionary act is the act of signalling 
the particular speech act (e.g. a question, order, offer, etc.) intended by the speaker. A perlocutionary act 
has to do with an effect the performance of the speech act has on the hearer. In talking about felicity 
conditions, Sweetser (e.g. 1990: 118) is interested in the illocutionary force of the speech act.  
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lack of correlation between the speaker’s assumptions about the hearer’s needs and the 
hearer’s actual needs does not invalidate the relevance of “q” to p. Consider now (23).  
(23)  If (as we both know) you were at the party, how’s Harry these days? 
Sweetser (1990: 131) argues that because the speech-act world is built up by references 
to it, it is in constant flux. Since it is constantly changing, it is, in Sweetser’s words, 
‘intangible’. So just like the epistemic world, the speech-act world is not subject to 
direct examination. Given that, Sweetser (ibid.) suggests that a conditional presentation 
of a speech act allows the speaker to indicate how the speech act ‘fits into the structure 
of the jointly constructed conversational world’. Thus, so the argument goes, in (23) the 
speaker’s enquiry about Harry is relevant because it fits to the constructed discourse 
world. Sweetser argues that such display of conditional relevance gives the question a 
context. I entirely agree with that. However, in contrast to the weaker characterisation of 
the felicity condition, and consistently with the stronger characterisation, Sweetser 
(ibid.) argues that the enquiry is relevant on condition that the hearer has been to the 
party.  
 The problem with Sweetser’s analysis is clearly discernible if we omit the clause 
in brackets (as we both know). Sweetser’s analysis misses the crucial point that in (23) 
the relevance of the speaker asking the question (“q”) is not conditional on the truth of p 
but on the speaker’s assumption that the hearer may have been to the party. The use of 
conditional indicates that the question about Harry’s well-being is not ad hoc but 
motivated by the speaker’s assumption that the hearer may know how Harry is because 
the speaker may have been to the party. The extended use analysis correctly predicts 
that even if it turns out that the speaker has not actually been to the party and is not in 
position to answer the question, the question has been asked (the speech act has been 
performed) and the motivation for (relevance of) asking the question (performing the 
speech act) has been represented. Consider also the following examples (taken from 
Sweetser 1990: 118). 
(24) If I may say so, that’s a crazy idea. 
(25) If it’s not rude to ask, what made you decide to leave IBM? 
As discussed earlier, for Sweetser (1990: 118) the performance of the speech acts (“q”) 
in (24) and (25) is conditional upon the fulfilment of p. Sweetser rightly argues that 
even though (24) and (25) ‘purport’ to state an opinion or ask a question (respectively) 
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conditionally on the hearer’s permission, such politeness conditions do not actually 
prevent the performance of the speech act. Nevertheless, in consistence with the 
stronger characterisation of the felicity condition, Sweetser (ibid.) argues that in these 
examples ‘the statement is made and the question is asked – but not quite fully’ (my 
emphasis) presumably because such politeness conditionals ‘somehow do allow the 
hearer a little more room to maneuver’. But if, as Sweetser argues, the speech acts in 
(24) and (25) are ‘not quite fully’ performed, then it is not clear whether they are 
actually performed or not.  
 I suggest that the performance of speech acts in (24) and (25) is not conditional 
upon the hearer’s permission – in fact, the speech acts have been performed regardless 
of whether the hearer likes it or not. These uses, however, are indicative of the relation 
between the performed speech acts and the speaker’s contextual assumptions about 
social inappropriateness of stating the opinion in (24) and asking the question in (25). In 
(24) and (25), like in (22) and (23), the speaker’s contextual assumptions are 
represented in the if-clause and therefore the speaker is communicating that there is a 
relevance relation between the represented contextual assumptions and the speech act in 
“q”. In (24) and (25), the relevance is such that the speaker is performing the speech act 
not because of the contextual assumptions (as in (22) and (23)) but despite the 
contextual assumptions that it may be inappropriate. By social convention, the ‘display’ 
of the speaker’s awareness of such potential inappropriateness makes the speech act less 
inappropriate.  
5.2.4 Interim conclusion: objectively messy, subjectively predictable  
In chapter 4 and earlier in this chapter, we saw that thus far the difference between the 
strong (biconditional) and the weak (MI) interpretations of conditionals has not been 
adequately explained.  The iff interpretation cannot be explained by reference to scales 
because equivalence is not lexicalised. A further problem for Levinson’s [(pq)├ 
(pq)] scale is that the informativeness principle it invokes is trivial. A problem with 
Smith & Smith’s (1988) relevance theoretic account is that p is relevant not only on the 
strong interpretation, but also on the weak interpretation.   
Another problem with the strong interpretation is that it is not limited to any 
homogenous group of uses – conditional threats, promises, injunctions and universal 
conditionals can all be weakly or strongly interpreted. It has proven impossible to 
explain and predict the conditions under which these two interpretations arise in terms 
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of some necessary (objective) principles. I have argued that the distinction between the 
weak and strong interpretations of conditionals can be explained and predicted from a 
holistic/individualistic perspective. As shown in 5.1.2, it is only when we take into 
account the cognitive contexts of particular interlocutors in particular conversational 
situations, that we are able to pin down the cognitive contextual (individualistic) 
conditions under which the weak or the strong interpretation arises. 
My point is not that meaning cannot be explained in objective terms. It can – for 
example, the difference between basic and extended uses of conditionals can be reliably 
distinguished by whether the relation signified by if holds between two propositional 
objects or not. Of course, establishing whether the relation holds between two 
propositional objects or not requires pragmatic (holistic) inference, but an inference 
about particular interlocutors (personal common ground) does not play a crucial role in 
establishing that. Rather, my point is that sometimes – as with weak and strong 
interpretations of conditionals – even though objectively messy, i.e. not governed by 
any necessary principle, the use IS subjectively predictable.  
5.3 Implications for the explicit-implicit distinction 
In 4.2.2, I argued that contrary to claims made in Carston (2000: 99-100), Relevance 
Theory’s re-analysis of Grice’s explicit-implicit distinction does not resolve the 
problem of pragmatic intrusion into encoded semantics. RT’s problem is that their 
‘solution’ to Grice’s circle is to argue that linguistic semantics does not have truth-
theoretic properties, but RT’s definition of the explicit – and hence of the explicit-
implicit distinction – depends on the argument that linguistic semantics has truth-
theoretic properties. This problem, which I referred to as Relevance Theory’s circle, 
also emerges in RT’s claims about the acquisition of linguistic semantics, the nature of 
linguistic semantics, and, more specifically, in RT’s (Noh 2000, Smith & Smith 1988) 
account of the encoded semantics of if. 
 RT’s (and Grice’s) problems with formalising the explicit-implicit distinction 
raise the question of whether this distinction can actually be defined in formal terms. In 
the next section, I discuss Gibbs’ (2002) proposal that there do not seem to be ‘hard and 
fast’ rules which distinguish explicit communication from implicit communication.  
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5.3.1 Gibbs on the explicit-implicit distinction 
Gibbs (2002) argues that there is no psycholinguistic evidence for the existence of 
‘some canonical, non-pragmatic meaning that is automatically analysed at both the word 
and sentence level’. In other words, Gibbs maintains that there is no evidence for the 
existence of linguistic semantics or lexical concepts, respectively. Nevertheless, Gibbs 
(ibid.) argues that empirical evidence strongly suggests that speakers do differentiate 
between what is explicitly and implicitly communicated. 
 Like RT, Gibbs (ibid.) rejects Grice’s explicit-implicit distinction in terms of a 
distinction between semantics and pragmatics. However, because Gibbs rejects the 
notion of linguistic semantics (i.e. ‘non-pragmatic content which is automatically 
analysed at both sentence and word level’), Gibbs cannot appeal to RT’s explicit-
implicit distinction. Put simply, explicature cannot be defined in terms of a logical 
development of what is linguistically encoded because, according to Gibbs, there is no 
linguistic encoding. So how does the explicit-implicit distinction arise?  
Gibbs (2002: 476-477) discusses two kinds of pragmatic information/knowledge 
which are activated during language comprehension. PRIMARY PRAGMATIC KNOWLEDGE 
refers to deeply held background knowledge/beliefs, whereas SECONDARY PRAGMATIC 
KNOWLEDGE refers to local information which is available in the communicative 
context. Gibbs (ibid.) tentatively suggests that primary pragmatic knowledge is more 
involved in the derivation of what is explicitly communicated, whereas secondary, i.e. 
local, pragmatic knowledge is more involved in the derivation of what is implicated. 
Consider the following example. 
(26) The cat is on the mat. 
Gibbs (2002: 477, drawing on Searle 1978) suggests that the primary pragmatic 
knowledge involved in the derivation of what is explicitly communicated by (26) 
consists in assumptions such as that ‘the cat chose for some reason to sit on the mat, and 
that the cat and mat are on the ground operating under the constraints of physical laws 
like gravity and are not floating in space in such a way that the cat is on the mat by 
virtue of touching the underneath part of the mat as in The fly is on the ceiling’. 
Secondary pragmatic knowledge involved in the derivation of what is implicated (i.e. 
that the addressee should let the cat outside) consists in recognising features of the local 
context such as the manifestly shared (between the speaker and the hearer) assumption 
that when the cat sits on the mat, it typically wants to go outside.  
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 The first problem with this distinction is, as observed by Gibbs (ibid.) himself, 
that it is ‘difficult, if not impossible’ to decide which pragmatic knowledge is primary 
and which secondary. Gibbs’ suggestion (drawn from Recanati 1993) is that perhaps 
primary pragmatic knowledge is more salient and therefore accessed more quickly than 
the local secondary pragmatic knowledge. However, this description seems circular.  
First of all, if we consider Gibbs’ proposal in terms of the interaction between 
Hintzman’s (1986) primary memory (which records current experiences) and secondary 
memory (which stores largely dormant memory traces), it would seem that Gibbs’ 
distinction does not take into account the dynamic and interactional nature of the 
relation between the two memory systems. Gibbs’ proposal presupposes that parts of the 
primary pragmatic knowledge (i.e. the memory traces stored in long term memory) 
are/become salient irrespective of the cogniser’s current (i.e. local) experience. That, 
however, cannot be true for the following reason.  
Let us assume that the salient part of primary pragmatic knowledge relevant to 
the interpretation of (26) is, as proposed by Gibbs, that ‘the cat chose for some reason to 
sit on the mat’, etc. The question that needs to be asked is what is it that makes this and 
no other part of primary pragmatic knowledge (e.g. that fish are animals) salient. The 
answer is that particular parts of primary pragmatic knowledge are salient in the context 
of particular utterances. Thus, the salient parts of primary pragmatic knowledge 
predicted by Gibbs for (26) are salient in response to hearing the utterance of (26). Even 
if one wished to argue that it is only morpho-phonetic properties of the utterance of (26) 
that are relevant to the salience of parts of primary pragmatic knowledge, morpho-
phonetic properties are nevertheless part of the current/local experience. This means that 
the salience of relevant parts of primary pragmatic knowledge does depend on features 
of the current/local experience. I suggest that Hintzman’s dynamic model of the 
interaction between records of current experience and old memory traces is more 
appropriate.  
Another, related problem is that if one assumes that local pragmatic knowledge 
is involved in the derivation of what is implicated, then one has to say that, for example, 
the information that the speaker of (26) is communicating a thought about the cat and 
the mat which are in the perceptual (visual) presence of the interlocutors is an 
implicature. This is because such information is derivable from the current/local 
context. The problem is that the analysis of so-called reference assignment in terms of 
implicature is intuitively incorrect (as captured by RT).  
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As mentioned, Gibbs’ suggestion regarding the relevance of the primary versus 
secondary knowledge in the derivation of explicatures and implicatures is only 
tentative, but I suggest it needs to be rejected. Nevertheless, Gibbs’ experimental work 
clearly indicates that there is some intuitively felt distinction between explicatures and 
implicatures and that hearers use explicatures in the derivation of implicatures.  
The first reported experiment (Gibbs 2002; Hamblin & Gibbs 2003) measured 
the comprehension time of the same utterance which was used in two different contexts 
to communicate different kinds of information. The utterances in contexts are given in 
(27) and (28) below.  
(27) Ted and Michele ran into each other at the mall. 
  Ted asked Michele what she had been doing lately. 
  Michele said that she had been busy car shopping. 
  Looking for ideas, Michele decided to consult Ted. 
  Michele asked Ted about his own car. 
  Ted mentioned: ‘‘I drive a sports utility vehicle’’.  
(28) Ted and Michele are planning a trip to Lake Tahoe. 
  Michele had heard that there was a terrible storm there. 
  She wondered if it was going to be safe for them to go. 
  Michele was concerned about the vehicle they would drive. 
  She asked Ted if he thought they would be okay. 
  Ted replied: ‘‘I drive a sports utility vehicle’’.  
In (27) there is no further information that Ted wants Michelle to access beyond that (a) 
he drives a particular kind of car. In (28), however, Ted informs Michelle that (a) he 
drives a particular kind of car, but he also communicates that (b) his car is safer to drive 
in a storm. Let us assume, after Gibbs (2002) and Hamblin & Gibbs (2003), that (a) in 
(27) and (28) is explicitly communicated by Ted’s utterances and that (b) in (28) is 
implicitly communicated. The results of Hamblin & Gibbs’ (2003) reaction time 
experiment show that deriving implicatures (measured by the comprehension time of 
the last line in (28)) increases the processing effort beyond that which is necessary to 
comprehend what speakers explicitly communicate (measured by the comprehension 
time of the last line in (27)). Whereas subjects on average took 1604 ms to derive the 
explicature, they took 1751 ms to derive the implicature. Hamblin & Gibbs (2003) 
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argue that these results are consistent with the assumption that people analyse what is 
explicated as part of determining what is implicated.
13
  
The second experiment (Gibbs 2002; Hamblin & Gibbs 2003) measured the 
comprehension time of two different utterances which communicate the same 
information – one does so explicitly and the other implicitly. Consider (29) below. 
(29) Bill is a new tenant in an apartment building. 
  His neighbor Jack has lived there for four years. 
  Bill was concerned that the building might be too loud. 
  Bill decided to ask a neighbor about it. 
  Bill asked Jack since he was the only neighbor Bill had met. 
  Jack replied, 
  a) ‘‘This is a very noisy building.’’  
  b) ‘‘I usually sleep with earplugs.’’  
The assumption is that whereas (a) communicates the information that the building is 
very noisy explicitly, (b) does so implicitly. If that is the case, people should take more 
time to comprehend (b) than they do to comprehend (a). The findings were compatible 
with the findings of the pervious experiment: on average, subjects took 1511 ms to 
comprehend explicatures and 1661 ms to comprehend implicatures.  
 According to Gibbs (2002), the challenge for research into the explicit-implicit 
distinction is to specify the conditions under which hearers’ analyses of what speakers 
communicate demand more cognitive effort. Gibbs’ (ibid.) suggestion is that what 
facilitates comprehension is ‘conventionality’14. On the assumption that a given usage is 
conventional if it is frequent and thus widely accepted in a given speech community, it 
follows from Gibbs’ suggestion that if a non-literal use (e.g. metaphorical use, irony or 
indirect speech act use) is the conventional use of an expression which can also be used 
                                                          
13
 It must be pointed out that Gibbs (2002) and Hamblin & Gibbs (2003) suggest that these findings are 
also compatible with the assumption that people access primary pragmatic knowledge sooner than they do 
secondary pragmatic knowledge. Notice, however, that this suggestion is made without having defined 
the primary-secondary knowledge distinction properly (as discussed earlier). Because of that, the 
suggestion is merely about accessing primary pragmatic knowledge – whatever that is – sooner than 
accessing secondary pragmatic knowledge – whatever that is. Given this and other problems with the 
primary-secondary knowledge distinction discussed above, I reject this particular suggestion. I agree, 
however, that the results clearly indicate that reaction times are shorter for comprehending information (a) 
in (27) and longer for comprehending information (b) in (28); that for this reason we can take information 
(a) in (27) as explicitly communicated and information (b) in (28) an implicitly communicated; and that 
the findings are compatible with the suggestion that deriving an implicature is preceded by deriving an 
explicature.  
14
 ‘Conventional’ here means ‘licensed by general use’.  
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in a literal way, the non-literal interpretation will be accessed faster than the literal 
one.
15
   
 This assumption receives support from experimental work. Thus, Gibbs (2002: 
459-460) reports that people can comprehend an ironic use of ‘You’re a fine friend’ to 
mean that someone is a bad friend ‘as quickly as, sometimes even more quickly, than 
literal uses of the same expression in different contexts, or equivalent non-figurative 
expressions’. Similarly, Gibbs (2002: 472) reports that people take less time to 
comprehend an indirect request communicated by Can’t you be friendly? (i.e. the 
request to be friendly) than they do to comprehend its literal counterpart (i.e. the 
question of whether the hearer is unable to be friendly).  
 The question that I am interested in is whether the faster derivation of non-
literal interpretations is wholly down to conventionality or whether conventionality is 
only partially responsible for this phenomenon. An answer to this question is suggested 
by Gibbs’ (2002: 463, 480) observation that it is not only conventionalised non-literal 
interpretations which are accessed more quickly than their literal counterparts, but also 
novel forms (e.g. novel metaphors, ironies or sarcastic indirect requests). If that is the 
case, there must be something in addition to pure conventionality which facilitates their 
faster comprehension. Indeed, Gibbs (2002: 462) argues that people take less time to 
analyse ironies (e.g. You’re a fine friend) if the context is right, i.e. if ‘the context itself 
sets up an ironic situation’. Gibbs (2002: 480) goes on to suggest that ‘there may not be 
a hard-and-fast rule that determines which kind of irony is understood as an explicature, 
and which as an implicature’. I suggest that this hypothesis should be extended beyond 
the interpretation of ironies – perhaps there are no hard-and-fast (i.e. formal) rules about 
what is understood as an explicature and what as an implicature; perhaps it is all 
context-dependent.  
 In the next section, I explore this hypothesis and suggest that what counts as 
explicitly communicated and what counts as implicitly communicated is not formally, 
but contextually determined. I suggest that it is plausible to approach the explicit-
implicit distinction from a ‘local’ perspective, i.e. from the perspective of what happens 
between particular interlocutors in particular conversational contexts. On the ‘local’ 
account, the explicit-implicit distinction is an intuitive epiphenomenon of the amount of 
processing effort. I argue that this account is compatible with the Representational 
                                                          
15
 Gibbs (2002) argues that the distinction between literal (non-figurative) and non-literal (figurative) uses 
is questionable, if only in the light of evidence that much of what may be termed ‘literal’ has roots in 
figurative thought and language. I am concerned with the literal versus non-literal distinction insofar as it 
illustrates the distinction between conventional and non-conventional uses.   
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Hypothesis (especially, Burton-Roberts 2012) and supported by Horton & Gerrig’s 
(2005) account of conversational common ground.  
5.3.2 Towards a local account of the explicit-implicit distinction 
As discussed in 5.1.1, Horton & Gerrig (2005) argue that particular conversational 
contexts, which include particular interlocutors, place immediate constraints on 
language production and comprehension. I argue that once it is acknowledged that 
interlocutor-specific information constitutes part of immediate (i.e. not merely ‘post-
decoding) contextual constraints on language processing, it seems plausible to approach 
the intuited explicit-implicit distinction from the LOCAL perspective, i.e. from the 
perspective of particular conversations in particular contexts between particular 
interlocutors. 
On the local approach to the explicit-implicit distinction, the role of Horton & 
Gerrig’s (2005) commonality assessment is essential. Consider (3) again. 
(3) If you pass the exam, I’ll take you to a restaurant.  
In 5.1.2, I argued that, depending on the result of personal commonality assessment, (3) 
may give rise to (and be intended to give rise to) the weak interpretation (the over-
indulgent grandma scenario) or the strong interpretation (the strict father scenario). 
Thus, the use of (3) to communicate that q iff p depends on the strict father’s 
assumption that the form of (3) is sufficient to communicate that q iff p to this particular 
hearer – the strict father must have assumed, as a result of the personal commonality 
assessment, that the hearer is likely to effortlessly infer what the speaker intends to 
communicate. Similarly, the common ground assumptions in the over-indulgent 
grandma scenario suggest to the grandma that the form in (3) is not likely to give rise to 
the iff interpretation in the mind of this particular interlocutor (her grandson). Likewise 
in the grandson’s mind, the common ground assumptions will suggest that the grandma 
is merely communicating that from the truth of p the truth of q will follow.
16
 In other 
words, the weak and strong interpretations of (3) rely on the assumption of tacit 
agreement – which arises due to the assumption of common ground – between the 
speaker and the hearer as to what interpretation the use of if may give rise to.    
Presumably, if the assumption of tacit agreement is the product of the personal 
commonality assessment, we are dealing with communicative (representational) 
                                                          
16
 As discussed in 5.1.2, the same common ground assumptions will dictate to the grandma that in order 
to communicate that q iff p to this particular interlocutor, she needs to put the stress on if.  
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conventions used by a small community of speakers (e.g. members of a family). If the 
assumption of tacit agreement is (at least partially) the product of the communal 
commonality assessment we are dealing with conventions used by a larger community 
of speakers. Let me explain this with (26), repeated below. 
(26) The cat is on the mat. 
I suggest that (26) can, in the right circumstances, be used and be understood as used to 
explicitly communicate that the speaker wants the hearer to let the cat out. The speaker 
A of (26) may choose this utterance to explicitly communicate that she wants the hearer 
B to let the cat out because the product of the personal commonality assessment dictates 
to her that this form is sufficient for this particular interlocutor, i.e. for B, to effortlessly 
infer that A wants B to let the cat out. Such personal commonality assessment must be 
derived on the basis of memory records of the uses of the form in (26) to communicate 
this particular request. It seems plausible to assume that in order for the form in (26) to 
explicitly communicate the relevant request, it must be initially used to implicitly 
communicate it. With time and frequent usage the route from the utterance of (26) to the 
request is short-cut – it becomes a representational convention for these particular 
interlocutors, A and B. The successful use of (26) to explicitly communicate the request 
relies on the tacit assumption that A and B share a particular convention.  
Let us assume now that there is another interlocutor C for whom the 
commonality assessment does not yield the assumption of tacit agreement to use this 
particular convention – A has no memories of using (26) to communicate the relevant 
request to C and no memories which would make A infer that C knows that A and B 
share such a convention. Presumably, if A wanted to communicate to C that A wants C 
to let the cat out, the use of (26) would not communicate it explicitly. This is not to say 
that C would be unable to infer the intention to (implicitly) communicate the request. If 
A wanted to explicitly communicate the request to C, the communal commonality 
assessment would probably dictate to A to use something like ‘Could you please let the 
cat out?’.  
The local approach to the explicit-implicit distinction seems consistent with 
work in the Representational Hypothesis. As discussed in chapter 2, one of the central 
arguments of the Representational Hypothesis (e.g. Burton-Roberts 2007, 2012) is that 
meaning is not a property of anything, but a cognitive relation, for someone, between X 
(anything) and what has semantic content Y (a thought and only a thought). Burton-
Roberts (ibid.) argues that the RH’s distinction between meaning and semantics is 
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strengthened by the observation that thoughts themselves can be meaningful but not 
simply in virtue of having semantic content. Thoughts – simply in virtue of being 
thoughts – are not signs (have no significance), but a thought (T1) can be significant 
(“have“ meaning)17 to a cogniser if it leads the cogniser to have another thought (T2). 
Burton-Roberts (ibid.) argues that, in a person’s mental world, there are semiotic, 
inferential relations between thoughts and that this semiotic fact, about relations 
between thoughts in an individual’s mental world, is separate from facts about semantic 
content of thoughts. Burton-Roberts illustrates this point with the following example. 
Let us imagine that Anna sees a big pile of clean washing in the kitchen. That 
phenomenon (P) leads Anna to have thought T1:  
 T1: [the washing has been done] 
The pile of clean washing (P) is a sign (to Anna). It has no semantics but its 
significance lies in its relation (for Anna) to T1 (it communicates T1 to Anna). Now, T1 
has semantic content (conventionally represented in the square brackets). But, separate 
from its semantic content, Anna’s having T1 might lead her to have another thought, 
T2.  
T2: [I don’t need to do any washing right now] (and T2 ~~> T3, and so on) 
The relation between T1 and T2 is the meaning “of“ thought T1 (what T1 
communicates to Anna). For Anna, then, [T1] means that [T2]. But the relation 
[T1→T2], and T2 itself, are clearly distinct from T1’s semantic content.  
 This argument of Burton-Roberts also applies to ostensive communication. 
Consider (30). 
(30) There’s a snail in the conservatory.  
In line with what I have argued for (26) (The cat is on the mat), I argue that the 
utterance of (30) may be taken as explicitly or implicitly communicating the thought 
that the speaker wants the hearer to get the snail out. Whether this thought is taken as 
being explicitly or implicitly communicated crucially depends on the result of 
                                                          
17
 As in chapter 2, I am using inverted commas here to emphasise that in the RH meaning is not 
equivalent to the encoding of semantic properties. In the RH, a sign can “have” meaning, or meaning can 
be said to be “of” a sign, insofar as it leads a cogniser to have a thought.  
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commonality assessment. I will first look at the situation in which this thought may be 
taken as implicitly communicated.   
Let us assume that (30) is uttered by Alice to Chris and that Chris is not aware 
that Alice considers snails disgusting to the extent that she cannot get them out herself. 
As a result of the process of echo retrieval (including commonality assessment) the 
utterance of (30) by Alice gives rise to T1 (conventionally represented in the square 
brackets) in Chris’s mind:  
      T1: [there’s a snail in the conservatory] 
As the pile of clean washing was a sign to Anna in the earlier example, so the utterance 
of (30) is a sign to Chris. This sign has no semantic content (it is an acoustic 
phenomenon), but its significance lies in its relation (for Chris) to T1 – the utterance of 
(30) communicates T1 to Chris. Separate from its semantic content, Chris’ having T1 
might lead him (via the echo retireval process) to have another thought, T2.  
     T2: [Alice wants me to get the snail out] (and T2 ~~> T3, and so on) 
As before, the relation between T1 and T2 is the significance of thought T1 (what T1 
communicates to Chris). For Chris, [T1] means that [T2], but the relation [T1→T2], and 
T2 itself, are distinct from T1’s semantic content.   
 I argue that, in ostensive communication, Burton-Roberts’ T1 constitutes the 
explicitly communicated content, and that Burton-Roberts’ T2 constitutes the implicitly 
communicated content. I shall refer to the pragmatic inferential process which gives rise 
to T1 as the PRIMARY inferential process (or inference), and to the pragmatic inferential 
process which gives rise to T2 as the SECONDARY inferential process (or inference). The 
following figure is a rough sketch of the primary and secondary inferential processes. 
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Figure 5.1: Primary and secondary inferential processes in ostensive communication 
 
On the account I am proposing, T1 is the conclusion of the primary inferential process. 
The mechanics of this inferential process is to be cashed out in terms of Hintzman’s 
(1986) information retrieval process (chapter 2). Accordingly, Hintzman’s probe – i.e. a 
mental representation of a stimulus, e.g. an utterance, in a particular context – serves as 
a premise in an online derivation of the conclusion T1 (Hintzman’s echo). T1, which is 
retrieved in the primary inferential process, is taken by the hearer to be explicitly 
communicated. Thus, I argue that the locus of explicit meaning is the (primary) semiotic 
relation between an utterance (in context) and a thought this utterance gives rise to (T1). 
Because (cognitive) context places immediate constraints on utterance interpretation, 
what is explicitly communicated by an uttered word is LOCAL, i.e. it varies across pairs 
of interlocutors and communicative situations. In the secondary inferential process, T1 
serves as a premise on the basis of which the conclusion – i.e. T2 – is derived. T2, like 
T1, is derived via Hintzman’s information retrieval process.18 T2, which is retrieved in 
the secondary inferential process, is taken by the hearer to be implicitly communicated 
(if assumed to have been intended). Thus, I argue that the locus of implicit meaning is 
the (secondary) semiotic relation between (T1) and another thought (T2).  
Coming back to the utterance of (26) by Alice to Chris, the thought that Alice 
wants Chris to get the snail out arises via the secondary inferential process as T2. 
However, we can imagine a second scenario in which (30) is uttered by Alice to Ben. 
Unlike Chris, Ben is well aware of the fact that Alice considers snails disgusting to the 
                                                          
18
 My proposal is that both primary and secondary inferential processes can be cashed out in terms of 
Hintzman’s (1986) multiple-trace theory of memory – the two processes differ in terms of what 
constitutes the premise in an inference. This seems compatible with Gibbs (2002: 477). 
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extent that she cannot get them out herself. As a result of the process of echo retrieval, 
including commonality assessment, the utterance of (30) by Alice gives rise to T1 in 
Ben’s mind: 
      T1: [Alice wants me to get a snail out of the conservatory] 
In Ben’s mind, T1 arises via the primary inferential process. The difference between 
Chris’ and Ben’s interpretations of (30) amounts to a difference in the processing effort 
required to infer a thought upon which Chris and Ben are likely to act in a way wished-
for by Alice (i.e. get the snail out); Chris is likely to act upon his T2 in the same way as 
Ben is likely to act upon his T1.   
Similarly, I argue that the utterance of (3) (If you pass the exam, I’ll take you to 
a restaurant) can give rise to the iff interpretation via the primary inferential process – 
and thus be taken as explicitly communicated – in the strict father scenario, but not in 
the lenient grandma scenario. Now, my analysis of the iff interpretation as explicitly 
communicated (when it is explicitly communicated) differs from RT’s analysis of this 
interpretation as an explicature in the following way. In RT, the iff interpretation arises 
as an explicature because it entails the purportedly encoded MI – for RT, the iff 
interpretation is secondary with respect to the deterministic decoding of MI (which is 
the necessary step in the interpretation of (3)). On my account, when the iff 
interpretation is explicit, it is explicit because the context allows an effortless derivation 
of it. For example, in the strict father scenario, the iff interpretation does not arise as a 
result of the strengthening of MI to equivalence, but is derived directly (i.e. without the 
mediation of MI) from the utterance in an adequate (cognitive) context.  
Thus, the biggest contrast between RT’s proposal and mine concerns the role of 
context in the determination of the explicit-implicit distinction. In RT, even though 
explicit does not equal encoded, explicit is dependent on what is encoded. As discussed 
in 4.2.2.2, in RT, explicature entails the purportedly encoded linguistic semantics, and 
any communicated assumption which is not an explicature, i.e. which does not entail the 
encoded semantics, is an implicature. In RT, thus, one does not need to look to context 
to determine what is explicitly and what is implicitly communicated; whether a 
proposition is explicitly – or therefore implicitly – communicated depends on whether 
that proposition entails what is encoded. On my account, however, whether something 
is explicitly or implicitly communicated is contextually determined and depends, in 
each particular case, on particular holistic states of mind. 
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I argue that the explicit-implicit distinction cannot be formalised because it is a 
psycho-processing distinction which is an intuitive epiphenomenon of the amount of 
cognitive effort undertaken (and intended to be undertaken) by the hearer in order to 
arrive at a given interpretation. Thus, less cognitive effort correlates with the intuition of 
explicitness and more cognitive effort correlates with the intuition of implicitness (as 
suggested by Gibbs 2002).  
 Now, it has already been suggested by Elsheikh (2010, 2011), who works within 
the Representational Hypothesis, that semiotic relations among thoughts (as proposed 
by Burton-Roberts) may be responsible for generating the inferences which are 
traditionally referred to as implicatures. Elsheikh illustrates this point with the following 
exchange.  
(31) A: Are you bringing any drinks to the party. 
  B: Well, I have invited my father. 
Let us assume that the cognitive context of the interlocutors taking part in (31) is such 
that they know that B’s father is a conservative type. Elsheikh (2011) argues that, given 
such context, B’s utterance communicates the thought that B has invited her father to 
the party (T1), but also that B is not bringing any drinks to the party (T2). For Elsheikh, 
T1 and T2 stand in a semiotic relation such that T2 is inferred from the semantic content 
of T1 and the context. Because T2 is derived from another thought (i.e. it is the meaning 
of T1 for A) and because B intended to communicate T2, Elsheikh (2011) is prepared to 
agree that T2 roughly corresponds to what is traditionally referred to as an implicature. 
She writes:  
Quote 2: It is this semiotic relation among thoughts which is responsible for the 
kind of inferences we label ’implicatures‘. So, on the RH, what is standardly 
called ‘implicature‘ might be construed as the meaning of a thought in a hearer‘s 
mind such [that] this meaning is intended and is intended to be recognised as 
intended. (Elsheikh 2011: 132-133) 
 
The title of Elsheikh (2011) (i.e. The Myth of Explicit Communication) clearly indicates 
that, even though she is prepared to say that T2 in (31) is implicitly communicated, she 
is not prepared to say that T1 is explicitly communicated. Elsheikh’s rejection of the 
notion of explicit communication is closely tied up with her rejection of this notion as 
defined in both Gricean and relevance theoretic traditions. I agree with Elsheikh’s 
rejection of the traditional explicit-implicit distinction (as discussed in chapter 4); 
however, I also share Gibbs’ view that despite the lack of prospects for its 
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formalisation, the intuitive distinction is still there. Hence, I do not object to the use of 
the terms explicit and implicit as long as it is made clear that both terms refer to 
interpretations that are wholly pragmatically – and locally – derived (and 
communicated). To repeat, Elsheikh’s rejection of explicit communication is a rejection 
of the idea that there are any non-pragmatic aspects of communication. We agree on 
that. What we disagree on is that, unlike Elsheikh, I argue, in line with Gibbs (2002), 
that some intuitive notion of explicit communication must be acknowledged. 
 As discussed in 5.3.1, Gibbs (2002) suggests that conventionality facilitates 
comprehension. Now, were conventionality the only facilitative condition, then T2 in 
(31) could be taken as the result of the secondary inference from T1. This is because B’s 
answer is not the most conventional answer to A’s question.19 However, as observed by 
Gibbs, novel, i.e. non-conventional, forms (e.g. novel metaphors, ironies or sarcastic 
indirect requests) can be accessed more quickly than their literal counterparts as long as 
the context is right. This suggests that sufficient contextual clues (both incoming and 
stored in long term memory) may counter-balance lack of conventionality.
20
 The result 
is that, given the right context, an utterance which is not the most conventional may be 
used to explicitly communicate a thought, which would not be explicitly communicated 
by that utterance outside this particular context.   
 Accordingly, I argue that in (31) what Elsheikh refers to as T2 may be explicitly 
communicated – i.e. triggered in the primary inference process, by the utterance of (31) 
– if A and B have in their common ground (as defined by Horton & Gerrig 2005) the 
information that B’s father is conservative and does not approve of drinking. The use of 
the discourse marker well in this particular example also supports my analysis. The use 
of well here signifies that the communicated information will be in conflict with the 
hearer’s expectations. Clearly, in the context of A’s question, the expectations concern 
the presence of drinks, and not the presence of B’s father (put simply, A is asking about 
the drinks, not about B’s father). If well signifies that what is communicated by the 
following I have invited my father is in conflict with the hearer’s expectations and the 
hearer’s expectations concern the drinks and not the father, then what is communicated 
by I have invited my father has got to be something about the drinks. Thus, the use of 
                                                          
19
 My assumption is that no would be the most conventional answer here because the use of no would 
guarantee successful communication irrespective of the interlocutors’ personal common ground. It seems 
plausible to assume that whether an utterance is judged as conventional or not depends on the social, 
rather than personal, commonality assessment.  
20
 As long as the relevant clues stored in long term memory are accessed within the time frame to play 
immediate role in utterance interpretation (as discussed earlier).  
196 
 
well in the co-text serves as a salient cue as to what is being communicated; together 
with the assumptions in the common ground, the use of well enables Elsheikh’s T2 to 
arise via a primary inference process. In terms of communication efficiency, it is 
plausible to assume that the product of personal commonality assessment dictated to B 
that this particular form (i.e. B’s answer in (31)) will be sufficient to communicate both 
that she is not bringing any drinks and a reason for it. If the product of personal 
commonality assessment were to yield the assumption that A does not know B’s father, 
B would most likely choose a less succinct form in (32). 
(32) No, I’m not because I have invited my father. 
Given Horton & Gerrig’s (2005) approach to common ground, it seems plausible to 
assume that there will often be misalignments between speakers and hearers as to what 
is explicitly communicated and what is taken to be explicitly communicated. For 
example, we can imagine that in scenario (31) the speaker’s communicative intentions 
and the common ground are exactly as discussed earlier, but that due to some normal 
memory limitation resulting from inattention or tiredness, the relevant memory traces in 
the hearer’s mind were not activated within the time frame to immediately constrain the 
interpretation of this utterance. In this situation, the thought that B’s not bringing any 
drinks will be derived via the secondary inferential process from the thought that B has 
invited her father. Such misalignments are a necessary consequence of the local 
approach to the explicit-implicit distinction.  
 To summarise, I have argued that once it is acknowledged that interlocutor-
specific information constitutes part of the immediate contextual constraints on 
language processing (production and comprehension), it seems plausible to approach 
the explicit-implicit distinction from the local perspective of particular conversations in 
particular contexts between particular interlocutors. I have further argued that the 
explicit-implicit distinction is an epiphenomenon of the amount of processing effort 
(expected to be) undertaken by the hearer in the processing of an utterance. I also 
contended that the distinction between what is explicitly and what is implicitly 
communicated parallels the distinction between the primary and secondary inferential 
processes.   
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5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed a wholly pragmatic, inferential approach to the interpretation 
of conditionals. In line with Horton & Gerrig (2005), I argued that (cognitive) 
contextual information – including the assumption of common ground – places 
immediate constraints on utterance interpretation. Using this approach, I was able to 
explain weak and strong interpretations of conditionals in terms of cognitive contextual 
– i.e. holistic/individualistic – conditions. I further argued that the existence of such 
holistic/individualistic constraints on utterance interpretation indicates that what seems 
objectively messy (i.e. not explainable in terms of some necessary principles) may 
actually be subjectively predictable.  
Finally, I discussed the implications of a wholly pragmatic approach to utterance 
interpretation for the explicit-implicit distinction. In line with the arguments put forward 
by Gibbs (2002), I argued that the intuition of the explicit-implicit distinction arises as 
an epiphenomenon of the amount of cognitive effort undertaken to process a given 
utterance.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis set out to investigate whether it is plausible and necessary to posit the 
existence of specifically linguistic semantics. I argued that the notion of linguistic 
semantics, as well as the cognitive process of deterministic decoding of such content, is 
implausible and unnecessary to account for meaning in language. I then explored the 
consequences of this claim for a theory of meaning and utterance interpretation.  
 In chapter 1, I raised questions about the nature of semantic content and its 
relation to words. I critically engaged with Fodor’s (1998, 2008) notion of 
externalist/referential semantics and argued that Fodor’s account is untenable for several 
reasons. First, it presupposes internalist content in the guise of mind-dependent 
properties that our minds attribute to mind-external entities. Furthermore, it is these 
properties that compose and not, as Fodor argues, reference. Relatedly, I argued that 
Fodor’s lexical-conceptual isomorphism incorrectly predicts one-to-one mapping 
between words and concepts. Indeed, I showed that referential equivalents like English 
shallow and French peu profond indicate that at least some ‘atomic’ concepts have 
compositional content. I argued that, in the context of the externalist-internalist debate 
about the nature of semantic content, the problems with Fodor’s referentialism strongly 
tip the balance in favour of internalism.  
 I then endorsed Chomsky’s (2000a) position on semantics, from which it follows 
that: (a) conceptual primitives are innately pre-determined, (b) a word’s semantics is 
internally compositional, (c) it is context-variable and (d) it is radically individualistic. 
However, I argued that there is a tension between the consequences of Chomsky’s 
internalist-individualistic assumptions and his double-interface view of language: from 
the former it follows that there is no linguistic semantics and from the latter it follows 
that there is linguistic semantics.  
In chapter 2, I sought to show that the tension between the consequences of 
internalism-individualism, on the one hand, and the double-interface view of language, 
on the other, should be resolved in favour of internalism-individualism. To this aim, I 
first discussed some problems with the nature and acquisition of linguistic semantics in 
Relevance Theory. I argued that the introduction of full-fledged concepts (i.e. concepts 
with truth-theoretic properties) into the lexical concept repertoire leaves RT with no 
principled distinction between lexical and ad hoc concepts. Secondly, I argued that even 
if acquired, lexical concepts (a) are either unnecessary in utterance interpretation 
because they are post hoc or (b) cannot constitute adequate evidence for the intended 
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interpretation because they are derived through personal inference. Thirdly, I argued 
that the posited cognitive process of deterministic decoding of linguistic semantic 
content is redundant in cases of loose use, cases of so-called concept narrowing and 
where the communicated concept is the same as the assumed lexical concept. I then 
argued that there is no linguistic semantics and that utterance interpretation is a wholly 
pragmatic inferential process, which is immediately constrained by a personal, holistic 
inference about the communicative intention of the speaker in a given conversational 
context.  
I defended my position by endorsing the Representational Hypothesis’ (e.g. 
Burton-Roberts 2012) definition of meaning-as-relation and Hintzman’s (1986) 
multiple-trace theory of memory. I argued that the RH offers a way of reconciling the 
non-existence of linguistic semantics with the fact that uttered words are meaningful. I 
further suggested that Hintzman’s radically contextualist account of information 
retrieval invalidates the criticism that utterance interpretation without linguistic 
semantics is not sufficiently constrained to allow for successful communication. The 
general conclusion of chapter 2 was that utterance interpretation does not proceed from 
what is (controversially) shared – i.e. linguistic semantics – to what sufficiently 
converges, but from what diverges – i.e. multiple-memory traces associated with 
particular semiotic labels – to what sufficiently converges.     
In chapter 3, I looked at philosophical legacy in thinking about linguistic 
semantics. I argued that all philosophical notions of shared content which have been 
posited as linguistic semantics (i.e. causal-externalist wide content, social-externalist 
wide content and non-truth-theoretic narrow content) are problematic and that holism is 
the only plausible thesis about mental content. I argued that, contrary to claims made by 
Fodor & Lepore (1992), holism: (a) does allow for mental generalisations (and thus for 
a theory of the human mind) – in terms of quantified laws, (b) does offer an accurate 
account of compositionality – as long as the existence of (immediate) pragmatic 
constraints is acknowledged; and (c) does not give rise to the sense-reference problem – 
because content externalism (á la Fodor), unlike ascriptive externalism (á la Bilgrami), 
is impossible to maintain. I further argued that an RH-based wholly inferential account 
of utterance interpretation, which combines the identity of LOT (i.e. primitive concepts 
and compositional capacity) among the human species with Bilgrami-type notion of 
public availability of communicated concepts, allows for successful communication 
without linguistic semantics.   
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 In the second part of the thesis, I investigated whether my theoretical 
arguments apply to the analysis of the relation between the linguistic sign if and MI. In 
chapter 4, I argued that the claim that if semantically encodes MI cannot be maintained 
even when this claim is supported by pragmatic explanation. The first reason is that 
there are conditional belief deviations from MI. Because they arise at the level of belief, 
they cannot be explained in terms of conversational principles. The second reason is that 
the problem of pragmatic intrusion into encoded semantics, which was initially 
identified for Grice (1989), also arises for Relevance Theory (Carston 2002, Noh 2000); 
this problem is evident in RT’s account of the acquisition of linguistic semantics, their 
claims about the nature of linguistic semantics, their re-definition of the explicit-implicit 
distinction and their account of the meaning of if.  
 Contrary to claims made in Carston (2002: 99-100), I argued that the 
purportedly encoded semantic content is not autonomous with respect to pragmatic 
inference – I showed that if MI applies, it can only ever do so at the level of 
pragmatically inferred holistic thought. Not only does it demonstrate that MI cannot be 
the encoded semantic content of if, but it also strengthens the RH’s claim that thought is 
the only locus of semantic content and my earlier claim that such content is holistic and 
accessible solely through pragmatic inference.   
In chapter 5, I showed how the interpretation of conditionals can be explained in 
terms of Horton & Gerrig’s (2005) extension of a multiple-trace theory of memory into 
the study of conversational common ground. In particular, I argued that the distinction 
between the weak (i.e. modelled by MI) and the strong (i.e. modelled by equivalence) 
interpretations of conditionals can be explained as long as it is acknowledged that 
interlocutor-specific information places immediate constraints on utterance 
interpretation.  
I distinguished between basic and extended uses of conditionals. I argued that in 
basic uses if signals a relation between two propositional objects p and q, whereas in 
extended uses if signals a relation between a proposition and an utterance (or speech 
act). I argued that, unlike previous approaches (e.g. Noh (2000), Sweetser (1990), Smith 
& Smith (1988)), the wholly pragmatic (holistic) analysis proposed in this thesis 
handles the variation found in the interpretation of basic and extended uses. Finally, I 
discussed the implications of a wholly pragmatic approach to utterance interpretation 
for the distinction between explicit and implicit communication. In line with Gibbs 
(2002), I argued that the explicit-implicit distinction is an intuitive epiphenomenon of 
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the amount of cognitive effort undertaken (and expected to be undertaken) to process a 
given utterance.  
This thesis has indicated a number of areas for further research. Firstly, my 
investigation of conditionals was limited to indicative conditionals, as this group alone 
exhibits a degree of variation sufficient to illustrate and support the theoretical 
arguments put forward in chapters 1-3. However, no study of conditionals is complete 
without investigating counterfactual (or subjunctive) conditionals and their relation to 
indicative conditionals.  
Drawing the indicative-counterfactual distinction is controversial (e.g. Dudman 
1988) and even when drawn, there is no consensus as to why, on some occasions, it is 
possible to accept an indicative conditional but deny its counterfactual counterpart and, 
on other occasions, to accept both indicative conditional and its counterfactual 
counterpart (e.g. Edgington 2008, Jackson 1990). The former situation is illustrated by 
(1) and (2) below (taken from Jackson 1990). The latter is illustrated by (3) and (4) 
(taken from Edgington 2008). 
(1) If Booth did not kill Lincoln, someone else did. 
(2) If Booth had not killed Lincoln, someone else would have. 
(3) If you go in, you will get hurt. 
(4) If you had gone in, you would have got hurt.  
The indicative conditional (1) and the counterfactual (2) are illustrative of the crucial 
interpretive difference between the two kinds: it is possible to accept (1) but deny (2). 
However, not all indicative-counterfactual pairs behave in this way. A hearer who 
accepts (3) and stays outside the building which is just about to collapse will also accept 
(4) after the building has collapsed. It is important, I believe, to investigate whether this 
asymmetry can be explained in terms of a wholly pragmatic account proposed in this 
thesis. 
Secondly, it is important to investigate the relation between and, or and not, on 
the one hand, and logical functors of conjunction, disjunction and negation, on the 
other. For example, it transpires that even a brief reflection on or reveals interesting 
facts. Consider (5). 
(5) Tomorrow I will take the 9am flight to Paris or the 9am flight to New York. 
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Let us assume with Grice (1989) that semantically or is inclusive, i.e. it is equivalent to 
the logical functor of disjunction, which is true if at least one of the disjuncts is true. On 
this assumption, the exclusive (i.e. p or q and not both) interpretation can be seen as a 
GCI and explained by reference to semantic scales (e.g. Levinson 2000); by uttering a 
lower member on the scale (and ├ or), the speaker is conversationally implicating that 
the stronger one does not obtain. As for Relevance Theory, it is assumed (e.g. 
Chevallier et al. 2008) that the exclusive interpretation arises as an explicature, derived 
on the basis of encoded inclusive disjunction and (cognitive) context of the utterance. In 
the case of (5), it is plausible to assume that the relevant cognitive context would 
concern the assumption that a single person cannot board two planes at the same time. 
Both Grice/Levinson and RT have a way of explaining why, even though or encodes 
inclusive disjunction, the utterance of it in (5) communicates the more specific p or q 
and not both.   
However, it seems that, as was the case with if, so with or, there is a problem 
with belief deviations from the logic of inclusive disjunction. A person C can rationally 
but inconsistently with the logic of inclusive disjunction believe that the next day C will 
take the 9am flight to Paris or the 9am flight to New York. This exclusive disjunction 
belief deviation from the logic of inclusive disjunction cannot be explained in 
conversational terms.  
Thirdly, the local account of the explicit-implicit distinction which I pointed 
towards in this thesis needs a more in-depth investigation. As a particular area of 
interest I identify research into the extent of correlation between (a) the intuition of 
explicit communication (E) and a high degree of reliance on communal commonality 
assessment (CCA); and (b) the intuition of implicit communication (I) and a high degree 
of reliance on personal commonality assessment (PCA). If the arguments put forward in 
Gibbs (2005), Hamblin & Gibbs (2003) and in section 5.3 are on the right track, in real 
life discourses we should often be able to find lack of correlation between E and high 
degree of CCA and between I and high degree of PCA.   
Relevance Theory has shown that the role of pragmatic inference in utterance 
interpretation is much greater than Grice had envisaged. I hope to have shown in this 
thesis that the role of pragmatic inference in utterance interpretation is even greater than 
envisaged by Relevance Theory and that this fact is not as problematic as argued by 
sceptics.    
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